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This thesis explores ideas of sympathy in the works of modernist authors D. H. 
Lawrence, Virginia Woolf and Elizabeth Bowen, and contemporary novelist Ian 
McEwan. Read in parallel with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, this 
study argues that in the selected modernist and contemporary texts sympathy 
takes place between feeling bodies that exist in constant interaction with each 
other and the world. My chosen authors challenge the view that fellow feeling is 
synonymous with gaining rational knowledge of other minds; on the contrary, their 
works suggest that feeling for and with others often transcends the limits of 
cognition. As such, obtaining a clear view of other minds cannot only fail to lead 
to intimacy but it can even be considered violent and dangerous. The authors at 
the centre of this thesis are suspicious of hyper-visibility because they associate 
it with desires for subordination and possession, ideas that acquire an 
unprecedented urgency in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars. 
Instead of clear sight and rational knowledge, my chosen writers place sympathy 
in a semi-luminous zone of ambiguity, where the other’s contours remain blurred 
and not easily discernible yet this haziness allows for the emergence of an 
alternative ‘manner of seeing’ rooted in affective attention to the fragile human 
body. As such, this thesis shows the existence of a different kind of modernism 
that is interested in haziness instead of clarity, soft flesh instead of hard biological 
matter, and imperfection instead of totality. The last chapter of this study, 
dedicated to McEwan’s engagement with modernist legacies, argues that 
modernist ideas about fellow feeling are still relevant in twenty-first-century 
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All is solemn, all is pale where she [Miss Lambert] stands, like a statue in 
a grove. She lets her tasselled silken cloak slip down, and only her purple 
ring still glows, her vinous, her amethystine ring. There is this mystery 
about people when they leave us. When they leave us I can companion 
them to the pond and make them stately. When Miss Lambert passes, she 
makes the daisy change; and everything runs like streaks of fire when she 
carves the beef. Month by month things are losing their hardness; even 
my body now lets the light through; my spine is soft like wax near the flame 
of the candle. (Woolf, The Waves 32–33) 
 
One of the six protagonists of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves (1931), Rhoda, 
contemplates the mystery that surrounds Miss Lambert, her tutor in the boarding 
school. There is a strange interplay of presence and absence, materiality and 
abstraction in this passage. Miss Lambert is at once statuesque, firmly rooted, 
and evanescent, embraced by an unexplainable pallor. She seems untouchable, 
as though her ‘silken cloak slip[s]’ through Rhoda’s and the reader’s fingers, yet 
she is also ‘stately’ and statuesque, unmistakable with her glowing purple ring. 
Miss Lambert becomes semi-transparent, enveloped in pallor while also having 
an embodied presence, as her gestures (‘she makes the daisy change; and 
everything runs like streaks of fire when she carves the beef’) remain etched in 
Rhoda’s memory. By observing Miss Lambert’s movements, Rhoda realises how 
things, including her own body ‘lose their hardness’ and opacity, ‘let[ting] the light 
through’ and softly yielding to ‘the flame of the candle’. Rhoda’s response to Miss 
Lambert suggests the essential ingredients of interpersonal intimacy (as 
interpreted in the works of my chosen authors): semi-luminosity, plasticity and a 
sense of mystery indecipherable by rationality. Woolf proposes that possessing 
clear and unambiguous knowledge about others is impossible but this does not 
necessarily have to lead to failed sympathy. On the contrary, as this thesis will 
argue, vagueness, the inability to see and know with certainty, can often facilitate 
and foster intimacy.  
 Literary modernism has more often been associated with clarity and 
preciseness than blurredness. In his Imagist manifesto Ezra Pound defined 
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modern poetry as ‘hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite’ (Kolokotroni et al. 
269), the latter qualities being linked to the literature of the nineteenth century 
(especially Symbolist poetry, presumably), which Pound considered ‘a rather 
blurry, messy sort of period’ (Literary Essays 11). T. E. Hulme claimed that 
modern poems should not be ‘dragging in infinite’ and they have ‘nothing to do 
[…] with mystery, or with emotions’ (133). Pound and Hulme rejected ideas of 
mystery and infinitude because they connected them to emotions, sloppiness and 
softness, which should be avoided by modernists due to their fluid and 
ungraspable nature. In Pound’s and Hulme’s view, modernist poems should be 
‘hard’ – have a well defined form, whose boundaries remain solid in the reader’s 
hands – and ‘clear’ – guide the reader towards light instead of keeping him/her in 
a misty half-obscurity.  
Haziness, nevertheless, as several critics have recently argued, might be 
central to our understanding of literature in general, and modernism in particular. 
By reading modernist works in parallel with early twentieth-century cinema and 
photography, Beci Carver suggests that ‘Granular Modernists’ – such as Joseph 
Conrad, T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden, and Samuel Beckett – at times preferred 
vagueness to clarity in their attempt ‘to see [their] experiments through to the end, 
and to get on with life’ (180). David Russell also proposes an alternative way of 
exploring intimacy in literature, and though his main focus point falls outside of 
modernism, his arguments are highly relevant to modernist criticism. In his 
exploration of the concept of tact, Russell seeks to provide answers to the vital 
question of ‘whether there are other things we can do with people, with any 
objects of our attention, than know them. And whether coming to an answer 
about, or exposing the truth of, something or someone is the most useful, or the 
most imaginative, or the most kind thing we can do with them.’ (2)  
The authors at the centre of this thesis have been, to a different extent and 
in different ways, suspicious of ‘knowing’ others. Elizabeth Bowen wrote that ‘the 
most interesting people are those whom we continue to know the least […]. To 
them, with their shadowy background and untold secrets, the imagination, 
fascinated, returns.’ (Hepburn, People, Places, Things 399) Bowen talks about 
the act of fiction writing and her comments refer to literary characters but could 
equally be applied to real-life people and works of art. This thesis proposes that 
there are affinities between how we feel for our fellow beings and art objects, 
such as paintings and sculptures, and indeed literary texts. D. H. Lawrence’s 
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fascination with the paintings of the French Post-Impressionist artist Paul 
Cézanne (1839–1906), or Virginia Woolf’s admiration for the ancient Greek 
statues of the Acropolis suggest that fellow feeling might lie in a gesture of 
unknowing by opening towards the mystery and partial visibility of the other. As 
such, imperfect vision – the inability to see and know with clarity – becomes an 
important theme in this study, opening up the possibility for an exploration of the 
relationship between verbal and visual modernisms.  
Indeed, art was important for my modernist authors. Lawrence did not only 
write on art (especially Cézanne’s paintings) but he was also a painter, while 
Woolf was surrounded by Post-Impressionist artists and art critics, such as her 
sister, Vanessa Bell, Roger Fry and Duncan Grant, not to mention that her great-
aunt, Julia Margaret Cameron (1815–1879), was one of the most famous female 
photographers of the nineteenth century. Before becoming a professional writer, 
Bowen wished to become an artist and went to the London County Council 
School of Art but after a few months she abandoned her artistic ambitions 
(Hoogland 8).  
A parallel reading of modernist literature and modern as well as earlier art 
movements shows that feeling sympathy is not synonymous with a tight grip or 
clear sight. As my chosen modernist writers suggest, there are subtler ways of 
“handling” others, even if these will never lead to complete epistemological truth. 
The works of Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen and contemporary novelist Ian McEwan 
show that sympathy resides in a semi-soft and blurred realm, where bodies touch 
other bodies without taking possession of each other. The body, read through the 
lens of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1908–1961) phenomenology, represents a 
living entity that, surpassing the limits of its biological confinements, reaches out 
to and interweaves with the world. Following Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of 
embodiment, this study suggests that sympathy happens in the phenomenal 
body that is neither a purely biological machine nor a rational mind, but living and 
vulnerable flesh inevitably embedded in the texture of the world. In other words, 
sympathy takes place between relational bodies. This relation, however, is not 
always unproblematic. The novels of Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen and McEwan also 
reveal the rough edges and blind spots of this particular strain of fellow feeling, 
which is not entirely devoid of desires for subordination and violence, and 
sometimes might even prove to be insufficient for creating lasting bonds. In what 
follows the introduction will offer a brief historical overview of fellow feeling, after 
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which it will explain the rationale for reading literary modernism in parallel with 
phenomenology, followed by a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of 
embodiment. The following sections will focus on the renewed interest in the 
feeling body and emotion in modernist studies, and finally the last section will 
explore the importance of blurred vision in the literature and philosophy of the 
first half of the twentieth century.  
 
Sympathy and empathy 
 
Before starting to discuss modernist ideas of fellow feeling, it is important to offer 
a brief historical overview of sympathy and empathy, two closely related terms. 
In the eighteenth century, the two major philosophers of sympathy, David Hume 
(1711–1776) and Adam Smith (1723–1790) offered different definitions of fellow 
feeling. In Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), Hume argued that 
the capacity of feeling for others is ‘a principle in human nature’: every person 
feels an inward urge to contribute to other humans’ wellbeing, which represents 
the basis for moral decisions (219). At the same time, Hume believed that 
sympathy is a ‘contagious’ act that enables rationally unexplainable forms of 
social communication: sympathy ‘makes us enter deeply into each other’s 
sentiments, and causes […] passions and sentiments to run, as it were, by 
contagion thro’ the whole club or knot of companions (Essays 273). Hume, of 
course, was not alone in advocating the contagious nature of feelings. In the 
eighteenth century it was a widely held belief that emotions live an existence of 
their own and are transmitted between humans, a theory that often caused great 
anxieties (Pinch 1).  
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith went further than Hume, 
suggesting that sympathy is actually an imaginary identification between two 
subjects. As Ildikó Csengei succinctly summarises: in Smith’s theory, ‘[t]he result 
is an intersubjective identity created through a partial bodily and affective 
identification, which implies borrowing the feelings that belong to the other person 
– that is, placing parts of the other into the self’ (52). According to Brigid Lowe, 
while Hume defined sympathy as a form of ‘intersubjective communication’, 
Smith identified its roots in distant spectatorship, a view that influenced 
nineteenth-century literary discussions of fellow feeling (10). While several critics 
of Victorian literature have proposed a view of sympathy as distant spectatorship, 
 9 
Lowe argues that in the fiction of certain Victorian novelists, such as Charles 
Dickens and George Eliot, fellow feeling preserves its positive value, partly due 
to the emphasis these novelists place on the ‘bodily manifestations of sympathy’: 
‘Dickens’s characters grow hot, laugh, and eat out of sympathy’ (10).1  
Hume’s and Smith’s theories illustrate two extreme interpretations of 
sympathy that, to a certain extent, have survived in contemporary discussions of 
empathy, to which I will shortly turn. Hume’s account encourages a view of 
sympathy as a passive, biologically hardwired state, which triggers altruistic 
behaviour and moral action, while Smith’s version suggests that sympathy is a 
cognitive act of imagination that facilitates our understanding of others’ inner 
states. Though in different ways, both theories seem to ignore the role of the living 
body: while Hume transforms the body into a mechanism programmed to 
sympathise, Smith emphasises the importance of the mind’s abstract capacity to 
project the other’s inner world into the perceiver.  
 The kind of sympathy in which many modernists were interested, differs 
significantly from earlier definitions of fellow feeling, an umbrella term that, for the 
scope of this thesis, encompasses sympathy, empathy and other forms of inter-
human communication. Lawrence’s, Woolf’s and Bowen’s writings show that 
sympathy is neither an automatic bodily reflex nor a purely cognitive act. Kirsty 
Martin suggests that sympathy in modernist fiction is at once rooted in the body 
and transcends corporeal boundaries, creating a vitalist rhythm that unites self 
and other in a cognitively ungraspable bond: ‘[F]eeling [seems] both based in the 
senses and yet difficult to map exactly onto bodily senses, both experienced by 
the individual as intense inner sensation and also something that seems to leave 
one bereft of autonomy’ (Modernism 7). While Martin locates fellow feeling in the 
vitalist energy transcending strictly corporeal confines, this thesis proposes that 
sympathy happens in the feeling body. The phenomenal body is always already 
stretching beyond the borders of its physical boundaries by being embedded into 
and interacting with its environment. The living body on which this thesis focuses, 
can be described as malleable and yielding to its surroundings, while at the same 
time fragile, ruthlessly exposed to violence and destruction, a characteristic that 
became painfully evident in the aftermath of the First and Second World War.  
                                                        
1 For an example of a critic interpreting sympathy as distant spectatorship, see Audrey Jaffe. 
Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction. Cornell University Press, 
2000. 
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 In discussions of fellow feeling in the modernist period the question of 
terminology arises inevitably. Though the term ‘sympathy’ was still widely used 
in the first half of the twentieth century, after 1909 it coexisted, or in certain 
contexts was even superseded by the new and more fashionable word ‘empathy’. 
The term ‘empathy’ was coined by psychologist Edward Bradford Titchener 
(1867–1927), who translated it from the German Einfühlung, meaning ‘feeling 
into’.2 In literary circles the concept of empathy was first theorised by English 
novelist, essayist and art critic Vernon Lee (pseudonym for Violet Paget, 1856–
1935), who in the essay collection, Beauty and Ugliness and Other Studies in 
Psychological Aesthetics (1912), investigated the viewer’s feelings for art objects, 
such as paintings, sculptures and architecture. Lee believed that an object of art 
causes physical alterations in the beholder’s body (tense muscles, quick 
breathing), which give birth to pleasant or uncomfortable emotions. These 
emotions, in turn, are projected back onto the art object and experienced by the 
viewer as though they were inherent properties of the object (Burdett 3–4). For 
Lee aesthetic feelings represented dynamic entities that could be exchanged 
between the viewing subject and the seen art object. As such, though 
experienced as corporeal symptoms, emotions actually resided outside the body, 
in the environment from which they could be borrowed and into which they were 
returned. Though, as Burdett argues, ‘the body never quite goes away’ for Lee, 
her later writings show a distancing from the body as her attention turns towards 
the cognitive aspects of aesthetic empathy: beauty is not so much an inherent 
property of the art object but a mental quality invented by the viewer (23, 25). 
 Lee’s turn to what later came to be known in psychology as cognitive 
empathy marks a watershed moment in the history of fellow feeling. Indeed, in 
recent discussions of empathy, the emphasis seems to predominantly fall on the 
cognitive-cerebral aspects of fellow feeling. Since the discovery of the so-called 
‘mirror neurons’ in 1992, many neuroscientists have attempted to locate empathy 
in a specific region of the brain.3 Cognitive empathy means understanding what 
                                                        
2 See Edward Bradford Titchener. Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-
Processes. New York: Macmillan, 1909. 
3 In 1992 neuroscientists at the University of Parma discovered by accident that a certain groups 
of neurons in the brains of macaque monkeys fired not only when the animals performed an 
action, but also when they observed someone else carry out the same action, for example a 
human being taking out nuts from a box. These groups of neurons became to be known as ‘mirror 
neurons’. Vittorio Gallese. ‘”Being Like Me: Self-Other Identity. Mirror Neurons, and Empathy.” 
Perspectives on Imitation: From Cognitive Neuroscience to Social Science, edited by Susan 
Hurkey and Nick Chater, MIT Press, 2005, pp. 101–118. It is important to mention that although 
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the other goes through (mostly through the act of imagination), while affective 
empathy is synonymous with experiencing the other’s feelings (Keen 27–28). 
Although there is no consensus regarding the definition of empathy, the term has 
recently become a buzzword advocated by scientists, philosophers, politicians 
and journalists as the key to building a more caring and better-functioning 
society.4 The phrase most commonly associated with empathy is ‘stepping into 
the other’s shoes’, or ‘look[ing] at the world through other people’s eyes’, as the 
project leaders of the Empathy Museum put it.5 If one does a Google search for 
the word ‘empathy’, the most frequent images show two interlinking heads/brains, 
corroborating the meaning of empathy as cognitive perspective taking. Those 
following the ‘mirror neuron’-strand and claiming that empathy is hardwired in the 
brain, suggest that we are able to empathise with other humans because we have 
more characteristics and abilities in common than we have previously thought. 
Among the advocates of this theory one can find scientists, humanities scholars, 
and interestingly, fiction writers too. One of the most prominent British novelists 
interested in the topic of empathy is McEwan, who has written extensively on the 
evolutionary roots of fellow feeling in his essays and articles.  
 McEwan thinks that one of the best ways of honing empathetic skills is 
through the reading of literature.6 In a 1994 interview he said that ‘[…] fiction is a 
                                                        
the idea of mirror neurons has had a lot of influence in the cultural sphere, the status of that 
research in neuroscience itself is not very firm. Many neuroscientists have started to question the 
role of mirror neurons in empathy. See, for example, Gregory Hickok, The Myth of Mirror Neurons: 
The Real Neuroscience of Communication and Cognition. New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 
2014.  
4 See, for example, Mark Honigsbaum. ‘Barack Obama and the “empathy deficit”.’ The 
Observer. 4 January 2013; Sasha Gonzales, ‘Empathy: Why we need more of it in a polarised 
world, and how to cultivate the human touch.’ South China Morning Post, 22 February 2018.  
5 The Empathy Museum is a ‘travelling museum [that] explores how empathy can not only 
transform our personal relationships, but also help tackle global challenges such as 
prejudice, conflict and inequality.’ Previous projects/exhibitions include, f or example, ‘A 
Mile in My Shoes’, housed in a shoebox-shaped building, where visitors could try on and  
walk in other people’s shoes and listen to their  life stories (in the form of podcasts): ‘The 
stories cover different aspects of life, from loss and grief to hope and love and take the 
visitor on an empathetic as well as a physical journey.’ For more information see 
www.empathymuseum.com/index2.html. It might be worth considering the language of the 
last sentence: visitors embark on an ‘empathetic as well as a physical journey’. This  
formulation suggests that empathy is equated with imagination and cognitive role taking, 
mental faculties clearly separated from the body. The project leaders admit that empathy is 
vaguely related to corporeal sensations too, but these seem to occupy secondary roles 
compared to the imaginative function of empathy.   
6 For McEwan, the kind of literature (especially fiction) capable of improving empathy is rooted in 
the ‘real’ world. In an interview with Zadie Smith, McEwan claimed: ‘[…] I do have a sneaking 
sympathy with the view that the real, the actual, is so demanding and rich, that magical realism 
is really a tedious evasion of some artistic responsibility’ (n.p.). Zadie Smith. ‘Zadie Smith Talks 
with Ian McEwan.’ Believer: Book of Writers Talking to Writers. McSweeneys, 2005. 
www.believermag.com/an-interview-with-ian-mcewan/. Accessed 30 November 2018. As Laura 
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deeply moral form in that it is the perfect medium for entering the mind of another. 
I think it is at the level of empathy that moral questions begin in fiction’ (Louvel et 
al. 4). Empathy, in McEwan’s view, is an essential prerequisite of human nature, 
at the heart of which lies the individual’s ability to imaginatively enter other 
consciousnesses and gain intimate, inside knowledge of them. Literature, and 
the novel in particular, represents a fruitful terrain for imagining oneself in the 
other’s situation, which can transform us into moral and responsible subjects. 
According to McEwan ‘we are innately moral beings, at the most basic, wired-in 
neurological level’ (Louvel et al. 4), and as a result of ‘our common nature’ and 
‘our general understanding of what it means to be someone else’, we are able to 
read and enjoy literature of remote times and cultures (McEwan, ‘Literature, 
Science, and Human Nature’ 19, 5).  
 McEwan views empathy as a biological phenomenon, hard-wired in the 
brain, which ensures our moral nature: our ability to enter other minds and gain 
knowledge of other people’s thoughts and feelings. Literature represents the 
perfect territory where we can hone our empathetic skills, since reading fiction 
requires that we scrutinise characters’ consciousness, which in turn leads to our 
becoming moral agents, attentive to real people in our real surroundings. These 
ideas chime with the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum and the works of literary 
critic Wayne Booth, both of whom have suggested that literary texts (especially 
those portraying real-life scenarios) have the role of ‘enlightening our passions’ 
and offering moral guidance in our everyday lives and relationships (Nussbaum, 
Upheavals 381).7  
 McEwan’s insistence on ‘our common nature’ raises some unsettling 
questions. Is empathy based exclusively on analogy, on aspects we have in 
common with our fellow beings? Is there a minimum threshold of commonality 
under which we cannot talk about empathy? As Sophie Ratcliffe reminds us, the 
relationship between fellow feeling and analogy is complex and difficult to pin 
down. She argues that ‘[w]e turn to analogical modes of thought […] because 
                                                        
Salisbury concisely formulates: ‘For McEwan, […] the novel, as a liberal form, is at its most 
penetrating when it is bound to the realm of sensibility, to attempts to explore and get to the heart 
of the world as it is, rather than to […] utopian forms that […] [want] to change it.’ Laura Salisbury. 
‘Narration and Neurology: Ian McEwan’s Mother Tongue.’ Textual Practice, vol. 24, no. 5, 2010, 
pp. 883–912, p. 884.   
7 See Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction. University of California Press, 
1988; Martha C. Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Oxford 
University Press, 1990; Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of the 
Emotions. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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there are limits to our sympathetic comprehension’ (4). In other words, analogy, 
or identification are not inherent components of fellow feeling but something to 
which we recur precisely due to the fractured and incomplete nature of our 
attempt to understand others. These fractures and gaps represent the differences 
between self and other, which make a total union with other entities impossible. 
Yet these gaps play an important role in interpersonal relationships, allowing for 
a form of proximity that does not aim at dissolving distinctions between subjects.  
The question whether literature promotes empathy by enhancing ‘our 
common nature’ remains a highly debated topic in contemporary culture. While 
philosophers, such as Nussbaum, favour this view, many literary critics are wary 
of drawing a direct correlation between fiction reading and empathy, as a force 
triggering real-life altruistic action. As Martin clarifies, her study of modernist 
sympathy ‘does not claim that by feeling for others, or by feeling for art we 
become more altruistic’ (1, my emphasis). Though I recognise the relevance of 
the topic of literature reading and empathy, my study will not address this 
problem. I am primarily interested in the possibilities and limitations of fellow 
feeling within literary works. I mainly focus on the interaction between fictional 
characters but I also discuss writers’, and to a lesser extent, readers’ feelings for 
literary characters. My question, however, is not whether or how fiction reading 
facilitates real-life pro-social action, but how the kind of sympathy in which my 
chosen authors were interested, examined through the lens of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, can provide an alternative, possibly more sympathetic 
way of reading (modernist) literature. 
 Various reasons have led to my decision to use the term ‘sympathy’ 
instead of ‘empathy’, the most important being that the modernist authors this 
thesis focuses on did not employ the word ‘empathy’ despite being probably 
familiar with it. More importantly, empathy is most frequently associated with 
cognitive faculties, such as imagination and role taking, which are crucial but not 
exclusive skills in interpersonal encounters as presented in the works of 
Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen, and McEwan. Nevertheless, some literary critics 
disagree with the usage of the word ‘sympathy’ in modernist studies. Meghan 
Marie Hammond, for example, suggests that modernist literature illustrates the 
turn from sympathy to empathy, which happened at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. By the end of the nineteenth century, Hammond argues, the meaning of 
sympathy became blurred, and inadequate to express the change that took place 
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in early twentieth-century discussions of fellow feeling (7). She identifies this 
change in the unprecedented preoccupation with the mind due to the rise of 
modern psychology (1). According to her, the exploration of empathy sheds new 
light on ‘a strain of modernism […] that is inward-looking, concerned with “getting 
inside” minds’ (2). Hammond defines modernism as ‘a literature that is both 
focused on bridging psychological distance and intent on finding new ways of 
representing consciousness’ (27). But modernist fellow feeling was equally 
interested in bridging bodily distance, while also showing the difficulties and 
dangers of this endeavour. Sympathy, as I interpret it, is not merely a problem of 
entering other minds, but also of extending one’s corporeal boundaries in order 
to touch and be touched by the world, including other human beings. As such, 
this thesis nuances the meaning of the mind as something inherently coupled 
with the body, and not an abstraction existing outside or above the body.8 The 
kind of modernism emerging from this study is not anti-mental, not even anti-
rational but rather pre-rational, able to open to the world and view it with wonder. 
The meaning of sympathy might have become blurred by the beginning of the 
twentieth century, as Hammond suggests, but this did not curtail modernists’ 
interest in this particular form of fellow feeling. On the contrary, qualities of 
haziness and mystery remained crucial to modernist understandings of intimacy.   
 Hammond’s reluctance to write on sympathy is understandable from a 
twenty-first century perspective. In the last decades sympathy has fallen out of 
grace, being most commonly associated with pity, a kind of passive and helpless 
state in which the sympathiser feels sorry for but does not necessarily act to 
alleviate the other’s suffering. For many modernists, however, sympathy had a 
far more complex meaning, imbued with connotations of what is nowadays called 
empathy. As Ratcliffe suggests, (modernist) sympathy ‘still includes the notion of 
feeling with another person’ (19, my emphasis).9 What is more, the concept of 
sympathy is closely related to wonder and mystery, two terms of crucial 
                                                        
8 Drawing on philosopher Andy Clark’s theory of the ‘extended mind’, Patricia Waugh reads 
modernist fiction, especially Woolf’s novels as illustrating the mutual interdependence of mind 
and body: ‘Thinking is not simply the individual’s private and internal mental “manipulation of 
symbol but is “meshed” with a substrate of embodied sensorimotor capacity, a body entangled 
with an environment, a history and other mind-body-environment complexes’. Patricia Waugh. 
‘“Did I not banish the soul”: Thinking other-wise Woolf-wise.’ Contradictory Woolf: Selected 
Papers from the Twenty-First Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf, edited by Derek 
Ryan and Stella Bolaki. International Virgina Woolf Society, Clemson University Press, 2012, pp. 
23–42, p. 33. 
9 Sympathy is usually defined as ‘feeling for’, while empathy as ‘feeling with’ others. See Keen, 
pp. 4–5.  
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importance to modernist feeling, and which have less to do with cognitive 
understanding, than with a whole-body orientation to the world (Ratcliffe 17).  
 
Phenomenological literature and literary phenomenology 
 
Besides the mentioned novelists, a central figure of this thesis is the French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I will read his philosophy of 
embodiment in parallel with the fiction of Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen, and to a lesser 
extent, McEwan, showing how literature and philosophy can sympathetically 
illuminate each other. Instead of looking for direct connections between 
phenomenology and modernist literature, or treating either field as a source of 
influence for the other, this thesis sets out to investigate the affinities between 
philosophy and modernist fiction by showing how they might mutually illuminate 
each other and help us better understand a particular form of sympathy that 
emerged in the first half of the twentieth century – a historical period burdened 
with military conflict and death. As such, the methodology employed in this thesis 
is close to what Ariane Mildenberg calls ‘a kinship of method between modernism 
and phenomenology’ (2–3, emphasis in original), or Cleo Hanaway-Oakley 
describes as ‘parallel philosophies’ that are ‘likely to originate in a collective 
cultural history’ (3, 4). The investigation of this ‘collective cultural history’ reveals 
how sympathy is rooted in a careful attention to the fragility of other bodies, which 
will never become fully transparent to the beholder’s gaze, yet their half-visible 
nature is precisely what allows for the emergence of a form of fellow feeling the 
aim of which is not epistemological appropriation but sensuous proximity.  
At the same time, due to its nature of employing characters in concrete 
everyday situations, modernist fiction also reveals the shortcomings of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy. While the philosopher tends to view the subject’s sympathetic 
coexistence with the world as an example of perfect harmony, in which self and 
other exist in proximity while retaining their separateness, modernist writers show 
the difficulties of drawing any clear lines of demarcation between acts of intimacy 
and violence. The semi-transparent zone of sympathy is often darkened by the 
primordial forces of aggression, as in Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920), or 
painfully illuminated by the intruding lights of personal and historical treachery, 
as in Bowen’s The Heat of the Day (1949). In other words, the modernist works 
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examined in this thesis suggest not only the vulnerability of individual bodies but 
also the immense fragility of the body’s coexistence with other bodies.  
 One of the basic principles that link my modernist authors’ works to 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology is their shared interest in the mystery of the 
world, a quality that, in contrast with popular belief, does not impede but rather 
facilitates interpersonal bonding. According to the writers on which this study 
focuses, mystery is not synonymous with complete opacity: the impossibility of 
getting intimate knowledge of others. Rather, human beings are semi-
transparent, partially opened to others, while never fully understandable. What is 
more, knowing others is not limited to rational comprehension but happens rather 
in and through the living body, or more precisely in the interaction of bodies.  
 In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty argues that 
ambiguity shows how humans’ existence cannot be explained through 
dichotomies such as nature and culture: ‘[f]or man, everything is constructed and 
everything is natural’ a complexity that results in a form of behaviour that 
‘deflect[s] vital behaviors from their direction [sens] through a sort of escape and 
a genius of ambiguity’ (195, emphasis in original). 10  Ambiguity, for Merleau-
Ponty, can only be experienced as an embodied state, since it is the body through 
which we communicate with the world, the former being at once a subjective, first-
person experience and a mode of becoming part of a universal generality that 
transcends our consciousness (204). Mystery, in other words, both permits and 
restricts our communion with the world, a quality of crucial importance for 
Merleau-Ponty and modernists. Ambiguity allows for the acceptance of one’s 
limits, or as Carole Bourne-Taylor and Ariane Mildenberg put it, in a form of 
‘humility [that] lies in the recognition of one’s limited powers’, just as in modernist 
literature, where ‘the world is there to be invested and its mystery will remain’ 
(13). The perceiver’s inability to fully grasp the other (by which Merleau-Ponty 
means both human and nonhuman beings), at least in a cognitive sense, gives 
birth to a sense of continually renewing wonder, the possibility of re-experiencing 
the world with fresh eyes. Wonder, at the same time, as Ratcliffe suggests, is a 
crucial component of sympathy, which ‘might comprise not only a realization that 
we ourselves may be the object of other people’s feelings and emotions but […] 
[that] our world-view is not necessarily definitive, that it may be one bewildered 
                                                        
10 Hereafter PP. 
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with prejudgments, and that there may be other worlds’ (19). Phenomenological 
ambiguity and wonder, as Lawrence’s, Woolf’s, Bowen’s, and McEwan’s works 
suggest, allow for the subject’s sympathetic coexistence with a world that can 
never be fully possessed or understood, yet which repeatedly opens to and 
envelops the wonderer.  
Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen, McEwan, and Merleau-Ponty are not obvious 
thinkers to group together. On the literary side, Lawrence and Woolf were often 
hostile to each other’s works, as Martin puts it (10), and Woolf’s relationship with 
Bowen was also uneasy: Woolf did not quite make up her mind whether she 
actually liked Bowen’s fiction, and called the latter ‘conventional’ (Diary 4: 86). 
The greatest “misfit” of this thesis, however, is McEwan, who can hardly be called 
a modernist, at least not if we interpret modernism as a temporally bound literary 
period. McEwan started to write after Lawrence, Woolf and Bowen died. Despite 
not living in the same historical period as my modernist authors, McEwan 
engaged with modernist legacies in various ways. What explains his presence in 
this study, however, is not only his preoccupation with modernist traditions in 
general but his active involvement in contemporary discussions of fellow 
feeling.11 McEwan has promoted himself as a defender of the humanities in 
general, and literary fiction in particular. One of the basic values of literature, 
according to him, lies in its ability to enhance readers’ empathy, which in turn 
triggers compassion and pro-social action in real-life situations. This thesis 
remains reluctant to draw any direct links between fiction reading and real-life 
altruism. Instead, this study argues that McEwan’s novels, read in conjunction 
with modernist accounts of fellow feeling, show that sympathy is located in the 
phenomenal body, always embedded in a historical, social and cultural world. As 
such, the scope of this thesis is at once chronological – offering a historical 
overview of fellow feeling in British fiction in the first half of the twentieth century 
– and generic, looking at those components of interpersonal intimacy that remain 
stable over time, simultaneously nourishing and troubling our understanding of 
what it means to feel for and with others in the twenty-first century.  
The decision of grouping Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen, and McEwan with 
Merleau-Ponty also requires some explanation. Lawrence and Woolf died before 
                                                        
11 Several critics, such as David James, Laura Marcus, and Brian Finney, have drawn attention 
to McEwan’s engagement with the modernist canon. These ideas will be discussed in detail in 
my McEwan chapter.  
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Merleau-Ponty published his first major work, The Phenomenology of Perception. 
Bowen outlived Merleau-Ponty, but there is no evidence that she might have 
been familiar with his philosophy. However, Bowen did know about, possibly even 
read the works of other phenomenological and existentialist French philosophers 
and friends of Merleau-Ponty, such as Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) and 
Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986). Bowen came to know Sartre through her 
friend Raymond Mortimer (1895–1980), critic and literary editor of the New 
Statesman. In a 1945 letter to her lover, Charles Ritchie, Bowen expressed her 
interest in Sartre’s work: ‘If you do see the NS [New Statesman], I hope you 
haven’t missed the sharp little rap Raymond delivered to Existentialism in 
general, Sartre in particular. […] I do want to read Huis Clos…’ [Sartre’s 1944 
play, translated as No Exit] (Glendinning 80). Merleau-Ponty did probably not 
read any of my chosen modernists’ works, though he was familiar with European 
literary modernism: he often made references to authors, such as Marcel Proust 
and Franz Kafka. Merleau-Ponty might also seem an odd choice when it comes 
to discussions of sympathy, as he has not been considered a theorist of 
sympathy/empathy as some other phenomenologists, such as Edith Stein (1891–
1942), have been. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, precisely due to its open-
ended nature seems to be the closest to the kind of sympathy at the heart of this 
thesis. His oeuvre is imbued with ideas of fellow feeling, even if he rarely uses 
terms such as sympathy or empathy.  
 When discussing Woolf’s fiction in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, 
critics have usually looked at the two writers’ works from an 
ecophenomenological perspective. In her article ‘Virginia Woolf and the Flesh of 
the World’ (1999), Louise Westling elaborates on the ways in which Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology illuminates Woolf’s preoccupation with the forces of the 
universe. In Ecocriticism in the Modernist Imagination (2016), Kelly E. Sultzbach 
investigates how, in Woolf’s works, ideas of ‘wholeness’ are shaped by the 
complicated relationship between humans and the natural environment (82–144). 
Mildenberg’s approach differs from the aforementioned critics’ in that abandoning 
a strictly ecological framework, she reads Woolf’s The Waves and Cézanne’s 
The Large Bathers (1906) through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
interrelatedness, rejecting previous readings of Woolf’s novel as preoccupied 
exclusively with inwardness, arguing instead that ‘Woolf’s voices turn inward only 
 19 
to discover that they cannot escape being pulled out by a world within which they 
are already immersed as carnal beings’ (106).  
 Fewer critics have observed the affinities between Lawrence and 
phenomenology in general, or Merleau-Ponty’s works in particular. Youngjoo Son 
briefly mentions the possibility of discussing Lawrence’s essay ‘Why the Novel 
Matters’ (written c. 1925) in parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm 
(114). Ulrika Maude argues that Lawrence and Merleau-Ponty shared an interest 
in the primacy of perception, a pre-rational experience of the body that Lawrence 
called ‘blood-consciousness’. Through an analysis of the representation of illness 
in Lawrence’s early novel, Sons and Lovers (1913) and his short story ‘Sun’ 
(1925), Maude suggests that Lawrence’s illness narratives reveal an 
irreconcilable chasm between the phenomenal and material body (‘D. H. 
Lawrence, Merleau-Ponty, and the Phenomenology of Illness’ 186). 
Similarly, Bowen’s fiction has been rarely linked to phenomenology. Maud 
Ellmann observes that in Bowen’s fiction, furniture’s ability to reciprocate the 
human gaze can be read as a ‘paranoid exaggeration of Merleau-Ponty’s theory’ 
(‘Elizabeth Bowen: The Missing Corner’ 77). In her unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Katy Alexandra Menczer also emphasises the ‘hallucinatory or uncanny’ (2) 
nature of visibility in Bowen and Merleau-Ponty, arguing that Bowen’s novels test 
the boundaries of the domestic space, which the Anglo-Irish author presents as 
a haunting ghost, though ‘a ghost with a body’ (9). ‘This bodily presence’, 
Menczer writes, ‘makes the strange presence known to us; known but not 
necessarily understood; known somatically, through a sympathetic contraction of 
sinews, a responsive tingling of nerves’ (9). While her argument is close to the 
central premise of this thesis, that is the significance of a pre-reflective form of 
embodiment, similarly to Ellmann, Menczer, at least partially, approaches 
Bowen’s fiction from a psychoanalytic perspective by examining Merleau-Ponty’s 
affinities with Freud. Rochelle Rives analyses Bowen’s description of domestic 
interior in The Death of the Heart (1938) in parallel with phenomenological 
discussions of space, quoting Merleau-Ponty’s definition of hallucination, which 
‘causes the real to disintegrate before our eyes, and puts a quasi-reality in its 
place’, returning ‘us back to the pre-logical basis of our knowledge’ (150). Bowen, 
however, Rives suggests, complicates Merleau-Ponty’s claim in that her texts 
present ‘a dialectical relationship between the empirical certainty of the object 
and the essential prelogical “knowledge” of hallucination’, allowing for the 
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experience of the world through objects that create the possibilities of (fellow) 
feeling (150).  
In McEwan’s case, the aim of this thesis is not to directly read his works in 
tandem with phenomenology. Although some critics have drawn links between 
his fiction and phenomenological ideas, as I will discuss in my last chapter, 
McEwan has never considered himself a phenomenologist. Furthermore, 
McEwan’s fascination with (neuro)scientific theories of empathy, which claim that 
humans’ ability to empathise is evolutionarily coded in the brain, might also seem 
at odds with phenomenological ideas about interpersonal attachments. Yet 
McEwan’s fiction, often contradicting his journalistic claims, shows subtle 
affinities not only with phenomenological interpretations of embodied intimacy but 
also with modernist ideas of fellow feeling, as presented, more prominently, in 
Woolf’s works. As such, the final chapter of this thesis has a double scope: it 
examines how modernist ideas about sympathy have influenced McEwan’s 
understanding of fellow feeling, while also revealing the intertextual sympathies 
between McEwan’s novels, Atonement (2001) and Saturday (2005), and 
modernist fiction, with emphasis on Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927).  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment  
 
Since this thesis will repeatedly return to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of embodied 
intimacy, it is important to offer an overview of his philosophy. In Phenomenology 
of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the subject’s communion with the world 
as an act of mutual interaction: ‘I am, as a sensing subject, full of natural powers 
of which I am the first to be filled with wonder. Thus I am not, to recall Hegel’s 
phrase, a “hole in being,” but rather a hollow, or a fold that was made and that 
can be unmade.’12 (223) In contrast with the hole, which suggests emptiness and 
lack, the hollow indicates a mutually created space of togetherness, filled with 
presence. In his interpretation of the Merleau-Pontian hollow, Galen Johnson 
writes that subjectivity is ‘“hollowed out” from the outside rather than an interior 
master seeking domination of the outside and the other. It is the individual, yet 
                                                        
12 As the translator of Phenomenology of Perception, Donald Landes, remarks in the Endnotes, 
the phrase ‘hole in being’, is probably taken from Alexandre Kojève’s lectures on Hegel, which 
Merleau-Ponty attended in the 1930s. For more on the English translation of Kojève’s selected 
letters, see: Alexandre Kojève. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the 
Phenomenology of Sprit. Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Cornell University Press, 1980. 
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the individual who belongs to others and the outside much more than the 
individual who makes demands and claims on others and the world’ (168). In 
other words, the phenomenological hollow is not a form of retrieval from the 
external environment but a fold created by and in the texture of the world.  
Merleau-Ponty illustrates our sympathetic communion with the world 
(including human and nonhuman agents) through the image of self-touch, two 
hands clasping each other. Genuine togetherness, however, does not occur in 
the exact overlapping of palms and fingers but in that space of imperfection or 
hollow where the two hands unite without merging into undistinguishable 
wholeness. In his last, unfinished work, The Visible and the Invisible (1964), 
Merleau-Ponty elaborates on this phenomenon, which he calls reversibility:13 
 
But this hiatus between my right hand touched and my right hand touching, 
between my voice heard and my voice uttered, between one moment of 
my tactile life and the following one, is not an ontological void, a non-being: 
it is spanned by the total being of my body, and by that of the world; it is 
the zero of pressure between two solids that makes them adhere to one 
another. My flesh and that of the world therefore involve clear zones, 
clearings, about which pivot their opaque zones […].  (148) 
 
The zone of ‘zero pressure’ does not create a hole but a space devoid of violent 
coercion and desire for subordination, where knowledge gained about the other 
will always remain incomplete; yet this imperfectness remains an inherent 
component of sympathy. This idea chimes with Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
phenomenology as ‘unfinished’ and ‘inchoate’, attributes that do not signify 
‘failure’ but rather reveal ‘the mystery of the world’ (PP lxxxv). Moreover, following 
on from Merleau-Ponty’s contention that the tactile and the visible are often 
inseparable, our contact with the world does not take place in pure transparency 
but ‘clear zones’ are always enveloped in mistiness. Since the human subject 
itself is not a transparent object, its relation with other objects of the world is 
inherently ambiguous and characterised by an amalgamation of clarity and 
obscurity. Woolf often called this interplay of opacity and luminosity ‘semi-
transparency’, a concept that encapsulates the essence of sympathy, which is 
                                                        
13 Hereafter VI. 
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poised between light and darkness, hard matter and fleeting impressions. The 
subject, Merleau-Ponty argues in ‘Eye and Mind’ (1960),14  
 
sees itself seeing; it touches itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for 
itself. It is a self, not by transparency, like thought […] but a self by 
confusion, narcissism, inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in 
the touched, the feeler in the felt – a self, then, that is caught up in things, 
having a front and a back, a past and a future… (The Merleau-Ponty 
Aesthetics Reader 124) 
 
The individual is not a clear glass panel but ‘a self by confusion’, on the surface 
of which misty patches and dark shades merge with rays of light. Yet Merleau-
Ponty does not fail to emphasise the importance of the subject’s three-
dimensionality: being ‘caught up in things’ is not synonymous with being lost 
among them. On the contrary, while being made of the same ‘flesh’ as the world, 
the self’s corporeal boundaries are not completely erased: ‘having a front and a 
back, a past and a future’ is ultimately one of the basic preconditions of 
harmonious coexistence with the universe, which contains the capacity to be 
touched while remaining separate. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty 
defines flesh (chair) as neither matter, nor mind or substance but an ‘”element” 
of Being’:  
 
To designate it [flesh], we should need the old term “element,” in the sense 
it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a 
general thing, […] a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being 
wherever there is a fragment of being. […] [The flesh is] [n]ot a fact or a 
sum of facts, and yet adherent to location and to the now. (139–140, 
emphasis in original)  
 
In his collection of lectures entitled Nature, written around the same period when 
he was working on The Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty defines his theory of 
flesh as an empathetic act: ‘[M]y body [is] interposed between what is in front of 
me and what is behind me, my body [is] standing in front of the upright things, in 
                                                        
14 Hereafter ‘EM’. 
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a circuit with the world, an Einfühlung with the world, with the things, with the 
animals, with other bodies’ (209). Einfühlung, nevertheless, is not synonymous 
with oneness. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the simultaneous proximity and 
separateness in our encounters with the flesh of the world is important, because 
his putative definition of the flesh as collapsing difference between self and other 
represents one of the most common reasons for poststructuralists’ critique of 
phenomenology.  
Jacques Lacan accuses Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of being too fixated 
on the eye/I and creating the illusion of the familiarity and knowability of the 
scrutinised object. According to Lacan, the phenomenological view distorts the 
essential quality of the gaze, which lies in its capacity to approach the other as 
the unfamiliar, the locus of ‘strange contingenc[ies]’ rather than known certainties 
(72). Lacan’s observation is well founded as Merleau-Ponty did indeed lionise the 
‘unfamiliar gaze’. In The World of Perception (published in French in 1948), he 
wrote that ‘there is something healthy about [the] unfamiliar gaze’, which allows 
the subject to view the world from a different, ‘below’ perspective (89). 
Interestingly, he uses a modernist example to corroborate his point: the 
transformation of Gregor Samsa, the protagonist of Kafka’s The Metamorphosis 
(1915), into an insect, allows him to look at his family from a previously unknown 
perspective (89). Merleau-Ponty, however, does not view the ‘unfamiliar gaze’ as 
the manifestation of the absurd. On the contrary, he thinks that the perspective 
of the below represents the possibility of sympathy, ‘the ground for those rare and 
precious moments at which human beings come to recognise, to find, one 
another’ (90).  
Jacques Derrida also critiques Merleau-Ponty for reducing the other’s 
fundamental unknowability and untouchability to something familiar, erasing thus 
the essential gap in interpersonal communication (191).15 For Merleau-Ponty, 
                                                        
15  However, as Laura Doyle argues, Lacan and Derrida did not unequivocally dismiss 
phenomenology but also used it ‘as a source of inspiration’ (xv). Indeed, as Doyle puts is, 
poststructuralism’s and postmodernism’s rejection of phenomenology is often based on a 
misconception, namely the misinterpretation of Husserl’s emphasis on ‘return[ing] to the things 
themselves’, a statement that many poststructuralist critics read as a suggestion that things can 
be fully known (Doyle xvi–xvii). But as Doyle clarifies, ‘[f]or Husserl, the “things themselves” refer 
to the things  as “phenomena”, which is to say as they are perceived by consciousness; and it is 
important to know that his insistence on a “return” is a call “back” from science’s positivistic and 
mathematical truth claims about the phenomenal world’ (xvii, emphasis in original). As such, 
Husserl, similarly to Merleau-Ponty, actually states that the world cannot be experienced in an 
objective way, outside of the subject’s consciousness, and in this respect phenomenology comes 
close to the philosophy of Derrida and other poststructuralist thinkers (xvii). Laura Doyle, editor. 
Bodies of Resistance: New Phenomenologies of Politics, Agency, and Culture. Northwestern 
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however, the flesh is not a homogeneous mass, violently incorporating the other. 
He highlights that no matter how close my own vision is that to ‘what the other 
sees’, I can ‘never [fully] rejoin the other’s lived experience’ (VI 10). Or as 
Johnson puts it, for Merleau-Ponty, flesh ‘is verbal and adverbial, process and 
not substance or matter’ (168). Flesh is not synonymous with dead matter but 
designates the dynamic and live relationship between self and world.  
Though I do not think that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology collapses 
differences between self and other, his ideas can at times create the illusion of 
the subject’s perfectly harmonious coexistence with the universe. He presents 
intimacy in an idealistic way, as a space of complete safety and love, devoid of 
egocentrism and desire for domination. Nevertheless, as the investigation of 
sympathy in modernist literature shows, interpersonal proximity is, at times, 
burdened with feelings of suppression and control. In modernist fiction, Merleau-
Ponty’s ideal hollow can at times transform into a painful and unbridgeable gap, 
which besides love and care, also accommodates violence and lack of respect 
for the other. While the main aim of this thesis is to explore the affinities, or 
sympathies, between literary modernism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, 
the following chapters will also reveal some underlying tensions between 




The phenomenological and modernist body 
 
In the last three decades there has been a (re)turn to the body in the humanities. 
As Patricia Waugh suggests, critics have started to pay attention to embodiment 
partly as a form of reaction against previous understandings of corporeality ‘as 
“written,” as text, mutually reinforcing a fantasy of disembodiment and human 
invulnerability’ (‘Writing the Body’ 133). In postmodern theory, the body, as living 
material thing, often became lost in the intricate nets of language. Applying 
different methodological frameworks, several poststructuralist thinkers 
                                                        
University Press, 2001. Husserl’s call to ‘return to the things themselves’ appears in his Logical 
Investigations. Translated by J. N. Findlay, vol. 1, Humanities Press, 1970, p. 252. 
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interpreted corporeality as determined by social, historical and cultural discourses 
rather than biological attributes.16  
 Although theories that view the body as a biological automaton, a socially 
written entity or a computer program are still prevalent in the contemporary 
cultural landscape, philosophical and literary studies interested in living bodily 
matter have recently proliferated, often in parallel with a renewed interest in mid-
century phenomenology. Philosophers such as Francisco Varela, Evan 
Thompson, and Shaun Gallagher have returned to phenomenology, especially 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of embodiment to suggest that, as Thompson puts it, ‘our 
primary way of relating to things is neither purely sensory and reflexive, nor 
cognitive or intellectual, but rather bodily and skillful’ (247). The interpretation of 
the body as a living entity in constant interaction with the world has acquired 
unprecedented importance among literary scholars and art historians too. As 
Corinne Saunders, Ulrika Maude and Jane Macnaughton argue in the 
introduction to The Body and the Arts (2009), the major part of the chapters 
constituting the collection, focus on ‘the fleshly, experiencing, living body, best 
theorized by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ (4).  
Modernist critics, in particular, have shown a keen interest in the 
relationship between phenomenology and literature and art, not least because of 
a turn to the feeling body in modernist criticism. Though the critical framework of 
these studies varies, and not all of them employ a strictly phenomenological 
perspective, they share a renewed interest in the feeling corpus of modernism. In 
Haptic Modernism (2013), Abbie Garrington investigates touch as one of the 
basic methods of forging interpersonal ties. She suggests that the works of 
Lawrence, Woolf, James Joyce, and Dorothy Richardson, read in conjunction 
                                                        
16 For example, for Michel Foucault, the body represents an object written by institutionalised 
knowledge and authority. Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 1975. 
Vintage Books, 1995. Another major theorist of embodiment, Judith Butler views gender and 
sexuality as social performances rather than biological givens. Judith Butler. Gender Trouble. 
1990. Routledge, 2006. It is worth noting that Butler reflects on the charge brought up against her 
in the Preface of Bodies That Matter: ‘Theorizing from the ruins of the Logos invites the following 
question: “What about the materiality of the body?” Actually, in the recent past, the question was 
repeatedly formulated to me this way: “What about the materiality of the body, Judy?”’ Judith 
Butler. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. 1993. Routledge, 2011, p. viii. At 
the same time, many feminist critics, in their attempt to challenge the supremacy of the male 
body, established a strain of feminism called by Elizabeth Grosz, ‘corporeal feminism’, which 
analysed bodily experiences unique to women: menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation. 
Elizabeth Grosz. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism, Indiana University Press, 1994. 
Other ‘corporeal’ feminists include Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous. For a more recent discussion 
of ‘corporeal feminism’ see Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, editors. Material Feminisms. 
Indiana University Press, 2008.   
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with new scientific and technological inventions such as the cinema, show the 
emergence of a new corporeal sense rooted in the sensuous movements and 
gestures of the body. In Touch and Intimacy in First World War Literature (2005), 
Santanu Das explores the role of tactility in interpersonal relationships between 
soldiers but also between combatants and nurses. He argues that touch, ‘the 
most intimate of the senses’ allows us to better understand ‘the ambiguous zone’ 
of male intimacy in the trenches, while also throwing light on the possibilities and 
limitations of nurses’ empathy for wounded soldiers (32, 26). Although Das and 
Garrington do not rely extensively on phenomenology, both acknowledge 
Merleau-Ponty’s significance in discussions of the body in modernist literature. 
Similarly, the First World War represents the historical setting of Ana Carden-
Coyne’s study, Reconstructing the Body (2009), in which she argues that post-
war descriptions of the body merge ‘the classical tradition with modern attitudes 
[that] infused corporeality with the vibrant gesture of reconstruction’ (2). The 
possibilities of healing and putting together the war-torn body acquired 
unprecedented importance for Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen, and McEwan. The war 
experience questioned assumptions that bodies are hard and impenetrable 
mechanisms, and demonstrated the vulnerable, ‘easily torn, not easily mended’-
nature of flesh (McEwan, Atonement 304). Consequently, since individual bodies 
are made of vulnerable, living matter, sympathy can only happen between fragile 
flesh-and-blood entities, not automata or immaterial minds. As David Hillman and 
Ulrika Maude put it, ‘bodies (in literature, and not only there) always need other 
bodies’ (6).  
All three of my chosen modernist novelists lived through the First World 
War, and Bowen experienced the Second World War too. Though neither of them 
did actually witness the war in the trenches – Lawrence due to medical reasons, 
while Woolf and Bowen due to their gender – they were deeply touched, or indeed 
wounded by its brutalities. As Marina MacKay puts it, ‘even the most civilian of 
modernists were working in a social and cultural environment saturated and 
transformed by total war’ (Modernism, War, and Violence 12). They firmly 
rejected military violence, among many other reasons, because it obliterated the 
feeling bodies of individual subjects, transforming them into indistinguishable 
masses of lifeless automata, or as Woolf poignantly writes in Jacob’s Room 
(1922), ‘fragments of broken match-stick’ (136). Merleau-Ponty was also 
personally affected by the Second World War. He enrolled in the infantry in 1939 
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and was discharged in the summer of 1940 due to an injury (Andrews 20). As a 
civilian living in Paris during the German occupation, he was forced to face the 
devastating effects of the war on people’s quotidian lives. McEwan was born after 
1945, and did not have any first-hand experience of the Second World War, which 
nevertheless represents the historical setting of his novel Atonement (and 
Saturday is also written in the shadow of the war in Iraq). The war plays an 
important role in discussions of sympathy in Atonement because it represents the 
cultural-historical setting in which the protagonist, Briony Tallis, is brutally 
confronted with the fragility of the human body. As such, while the war is not the 
major or exclusive focus of this thesis, it nevertheless represents a factor that has 
significantly shaped ideas of sympathy and belonging in modernist and 
contemporary fiction.  
Another reason why modernist scholars have become interested in the 
phenomenal body can be explained by the emergence of a new branch of 
modernist studies that has sought to challenge modernism’s exclusive 
association with inwardness. 17  Indeed, modernism – especially the high 
modernist aesthetics of Woolf, Joyce and T. S. Eliot – has often been interpreted 
as a literary period mainly preoccupied with abstract consciousness, the workings 
of the immaterial mind. Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane describe the 
modernist period as ‘a new era of high aesthetic self-consciousness and non-
representationalism, in which art turns from realism and humanistic 
representation towards style, technique and spatial form in pursuit of a deeper 
penetration of life’ (25). Bradbury and McFarlane’s definition can be narrowed 
down to three interlinked concepts: aesthetics, inner consciousness (as opposed 
to external reality), and the absence of human presence in favour of formal 
qualities. Modernists’ reliance on ‘technique’ and form allegedly allows for ‘a 
deeper penetration of life’, a glimpse of the intricate workings of the psyche, 
insufficiently explored in the materialistic world of the nineteenth-century realist 
novel. Bradbury and McFarlane’s claim is of course well founded. After all, 
modernist writers themselves promoted inwardness and aesthetic composition 
                                                        
17 AnnKatrin Jonsson argues that the works of Joyce, Woolf and Djuna Barnes challenge the 
Descartian notion of the subject, one ‘that restrains and dominates instead of remaining open, 
approachable and exposed’. AnnKatrin Jonsson. Relations: Ethics and the Modernist Subject in 
James Joyce’s Ulysses, Virginia Woolf’s The Waves and Djuna Barnes’s Nightwood. Oxford and 
Bern, Peter Lang, 2006, p. 21.  
 28 
as major hallmarks of early twentieth-century art and literature.18 However, they 
did not turn away from external materiality or ‘humanistic representation’, 
especially if we understand by the latter the sentient human flesh. What they 
dismissed was a view of the body as inert matter, a ‘mechanism moved by 
springs’ (Merleau-Ponty, PP 365). In Jacob’s Room Woolf offers a poignant 
critique of humans’ description as disembodied abstractions: the image of the 
uncontrollably shivering ‘tin soldiers’ creates a jarring atmosphere, an almost 
viscerally painful (reading) experience (136).  
 Bradbury and McFarlane are not alone in accusing modernism of 
inwardness. Peter Nicholls also argues that modernism sacrificed the sentient 
body to aesthetic form. He identifies the roots of modernism in mid-nineteenth-
century French poetry, and suggests that Charles Baudelaire’s poem ‘To a Red-
haired Beggar Girl’ (1845–6), illustrates the ‘triumph of form over “bodily” content 
on which one major strand of modernism will depend’ (4). According to Nicholls, 
Baudelaire’s male spectator, who watches a girl on the street, objectifies the 
female body, not because he views her as a sexual item, but because ‘he takes 
her as an occasion for a poem’ (2). In other words, he transforms the woman into 
an abstract aesthetic form serving his artistic purposes. Furthermore, Nicholls 
associates this kind of aesthetic with an ironic, detached and possessive gaze 
that cruelly robs the woman of her lived fleshly existence (3). Nicholls views the 
ironic gaze, which he interprets as an important component of modernist 
aesthetic, as opposed to emotional proximity. The literary texts at the centre of 
this thesis, however, show that there are other forms of viewing too. Sight, as 
advocated by my chosen authors, can also be imbued with affective attention to 
and care for the other’s embodied reality. In other words, emotions are not 
necessarily absent in sight but they rather have the power to soften our gaze, 
bringing the object of perception closer. 
  
                                                        
18 In her essays Woolf accused the Edwardians’ materialistic approach that failed to capture the 
‘myriad impressions’ of the mind, those ‘innumerable atoms’ that ‘shape themselves in the life of 
Monday or Tuesday’ (Essays 4: 160). In his Imagist manifesto, Ezra Pound identified poetic value 
in the formal qualities of the poem, which should be written in clear and concise language, without 




Emotion, affect and feeling 
 
Lawrence’s, Woolf’s, Bowen’s, and McEwan’s works show that emotions, 
experienced in and by feeling bodies, matter to modernism and contemporary 
fiction. It is important to clarify at this point that this thesis does not make any 
formal distinction between emotion, affect and feeling, terms that are mostly used 
interchangeably in the following chapters. However, I prefer the concept of 
emotion and feeling to affect because the latter, as defined by affect scholars, 
does not necessarily, or not always, seem to be congruent with how fellow feeling 
works in my chosen texts. As Gregory Seigworth, Melissa Gregg and Sara 
Ahmed argue, there is no universally accepted definition of affect in the 
contemporary cultural landscape (3).19 The two main sources of present affect 
theories can be traced back to two sources. The first is Silvan Tomkins’s 
psychobiology of affects that represents the basis of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and 
Adam Frank’s essay ‘Shame in the Cybernetic Fold’ (1995). The second is Gilles 
Deleuze’s ‘Spinozist ethology of bodily capacities’, a source of influence for Brian 
Massumi’s ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ (1995) (Seigworth and Gregg 5).20 While 
Tomkins defines affect as biologically innate, and differentiates between nine 
basic affects, Deleuze interprets affect as an in-between state, an immanent 
meeting space between things, humans and non-living entities (5–6).  
The critical framework of this thesis is not fully compatible with either of 
the above-mentioned directions. In the works of Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen and 
McEwan, feelings are neither strictly located in the biological body nor in an 
immanent space between interacting entities. Rather, emotions are experienced 
in the phenomenal body: the sentient flesh intricately intermingled with the texture 
of the world, without becoming indistinguishably enmeshed in it. As Merleau-
Ponty puts it in ‘The Film and the New Psychology’ (1945): ‘Emotion is not a 
                                                        
19  Antonio Damasio distinguishes between emotion and feeling, arguing that feeling is a 
perception of physical changes in the body, together with the mental images that trigger these 
alterations, while emotion is a ‘mental-evaluative process’, the actual interpretation of bodily 
states. Antonio Damasio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. Picador, 
1994, p. 145, p. 139. 
20 Modernist scholars have found both branches of affective studies helpful in casting new light 
on literary modernism. Julie Taylor reads Djuna Barnes’s fiction in parallel with Tomkins’s theory 
of affect, while Charlotta P. Einarsson thinks that Samuel Beckett’s dramas are closer to 
Deleuze’s version of affect theory. See Julie Taylor. Djuna Barnes and Affective Modernism. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012; Charlotta P. Einarsson. A Theatre of Affect: The Corporeal 
Turn in Samuel Beckett’s Drama. Stuttgart, ibidem, 2017.   
 30 
psychic, internal fact but rather a variation in our relations with others and the 
world which is expressed in our bodily attitude’ (Sense and Non-Sense 53). For 
Merleau-Ponty and the writers discussed in this thesis, emotion is neither an 
abstract mental faculty nor a biological mechanism but a state felt in the relational 
body that never ceases to open onto the world.  
 In a phenomenological context, any arbitrary distinction between emotion 
and affect becomes meaningless. As Sianne Ngai succinctly summarises, the 
divide between the two terms originates in psychoanalytic discourses, in which 
the third-person perspective of the analyst (affect) had to be separated from the 
first-person experience of the analysand subject (emotion) (25). Certain affect 
theorists, such as Massumi, have gone further in distinguishing emotion from 
affect, suggesting that while emotion is a conscious and narratively structured 
act, affect remains in a pre-conscious, cognitively incomprehensible and 
semantically unordered state (Ngai 25). While feeling is often portrayed as a pre-
cognitive event in the works of my chosen authors, it always requires the 
presence of a sensing body-subject. Affect, however, does not always work as a 
mere antecedent to conscious thought, as some critics have suggested. Marta 
Figlerowicz, for example, is not interested ‘in the unconscious rawness of 
affective experiences’ but rather ‘in the means by which they make their way into 
our or somebody else’s consciousness’ (5). But feelings, as a phenomenological 
reading of modernism shows, do not necessarily ‘make their way’ to 
consciousness. In other words, modernist characters do not always make sense 
of their feelings but simply sense as a result of their corporeal imbrication in their 
surroundings.  
The type of feeling in which this thesis is interested, is neither a purely 
third-person nor a first-person experience, if by the latter we mean a Cartesian 
ego. Rather, as Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi argue, phenomenology shows 
how ‘[m]ost of our encounters are not third-person puzzles solved by first-person 
procedures. They are second-person interactions in which I easily have a sense 
of what is going on with the other person based on our common pragmatic or 
socially contextualized interactions.’ (176) The human subject is not simply 
affected like a piece of inert bodily lump but also affecting (even if not necessarily 
in a conscious-rational way). This interplay of being affected while affecting 
creates a space of encounter in which second-person communication becomes 
possible.  
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 When it comes to discussions of modernist emotion, the question of 
gender is significant. Attempts to recuperate feeling in modernism have often 
been linked to gender. In her 1991 book, Sentimental Modernism, Suzanne Clark 
suggests that there is a direct link between the critical neglect of feelings and 
women writers in modernist studies. She argues that female writers were 
considered to be ‘entangled in sensibility, were romantic and sentimental by 
nature, and so even the best might not altogether escape this romantic 
indulgence in emotion and sublimity’ (2). Words such as ‘entangled’ and 
‘indulgence’ show how women’s writing was seen as emotionally chaotic in 
comparison with the ‘clear hard’ works of the ‘Men of 1914’. Feelings, therefore, 
were associated with women, or at least with writers who were considered in 
some way feminine and indulgent. Lawrence represented one of the most evident 
examples of this latter category. Anthony Cuda describes Lawrence’s novels as 
works ‘blaze[d] through with fiery revelations’ (2), while Maude calls him ‘anti-
rational’ (Bloomsbury Companion 10). As such, Lawrence’s style seems to differ 
significantly from the so-called hard and rational male modernists, such as Eliot 
and Pound.  
Nevertheless, critics have recently started to soften the hard lines of 
demarcation between female (or feminine) emotional writing and rational male 
works. Cuda, for example, demonstrates how emotion, or what he calls ‘passion’ 
– the ‘desire […] to both know and feel what it means to be the moved instead of 
the mover’ – was central to Eliot’s creative work (5). This study concentrates on 
two male and two female authors to show that sympathy cannot be reduced to a 
feminine mode of feeling and thinking. This, however, does not mean that gender 
is unimportant in the following chapters. Woolf, for example, critiques some 
Edwardian male writers for their tendency to present characters as hyper-visible 
and completely knowable through the detailed description of their material 
environment. For Woolf and Bowen, this method of characterisation remains 
imbued with a sense of falsity and authorial arrogance, representing thus the lack 
of writers’ sympathy for fictional characters. Woolf also challenges gender 
stereotypes in her engagement with ancient Greek statuary in Jacob’s Room, by 
focusing on the anonymous and neglected female “sculptor”-figures of the 
interwar period, whose attempts at memorialisation differ strikingly from the 
monument-making efforts of their male counterparts. As such, while gender 
remains an underlying presence throughout this thesis, the type of fellow feeling 
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at the centre of this study resists the privileging of female or feminine emotions. 
Though in somewhat different ways, feelings mattered for many modernists, and 




The strand of emotional modernism explored in this thesis is concerned with a 
form of sight that differs from the ironic and detached gaze that Nicholls 
associates with modernism. Vision, as interpreted in this study, is intricately 
intertwined with other senses, especially touch, while being characterised by a 
sort of sensual mistiness that nourishes intimacy. Before analysing the 
importance of phenomenological sight to modernism, however, it is important to 
offer a brief overview of the history of vision in Western culture. After all, Nicholls’s 
interpretation of sight as satiric detachment is far from being unfounded. 
Vision has been linked to ideas of distance, irony, subordination and 
importantly, rationality in Western culture at least since the time of ancient 
Greece. In Greek philosophy and science, vision was synonymous with abstract 
and rational knowledge: as Bruno Snell notes, the Greek word for knowledge, 
eidenai, means ‘the state of having seen’ (Snell 198; qtd. in Jay 24). Greek 
philosophy celebrated sight as the manifestation of ‘disinterested, monologic, 
epistemic truth over mere opinion or doxa’ (Jay 26). Vision was deemed more 
valuable than other senses because it made possible the creation of objective 
and measurable knowledge instead of fleeting and subjective impressions. 
Another cultural period that seemed to embrace the Greeks’ lionisation of vision 
was the Enlightenment. One of the most famous philosophers of French 
Enlightenment, René Descartes (1596–1650), put forward a theory of vision 
based on the mechanical operation of the eyes. In Dioptrique (1637), he 
interpreted light as rays reflected from the surface of an object, which hit the eye. 
However, the eyes prove to be insufficient, since images on the retina appear in 
an upside-down format, and it is the role of the mind to “turn” them and facilitate 
vision (qtd. in Johnson, The Retrieval 25). To put it in a simplistic way, Descartes 
defined sight as a two-phase phenomenon: the mechanical operation of the eyes 
followed by the mind’s activity of reversing images on the back of the retina (25). 
This theory of vision allows us to comprehend the reasons for which Merleau-
Ponty found Descartes’s views problematic (besides the latter’s separation of 
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mind and body). Merleau-Ponty rejected both empiricism and intellectualism, 
since the first objectified the body, presenting it as a biological automaton, while 
the latter completely dismissed corporeality in favour of the immaterial mind.21 
According to Merleau-Ponty, vision cannot be reduced to either a third-person 
mechanical bodily schema or first-person intellectual model. Sight happens not 
in the biological body or abstract mind, but through the phenomenal body’s 
movements in the world.  
 Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty, vision is never a form of distant spectatorship 
but touch and sight intricately intermingle in our everyday perceptions and 
interpersonal relationships. The visible is not an unreachable realm, available 
only to the eyes, but represents the sensuous flesh of the world surrounding the 
perceiver. To put it differently, the visible is not in front of the subject but all around 
him/her. The phenomenological gaze is imbued with tactile properties, and 
‘envelops, palpates, espouses the visible things’ (VI 133). Or as the philosopher 
puts it in ‘Eye and Mind’: ‘Vision is the meeting, as at a crossroads, of all the 
aspects of Being’ (147). Vision thus represents a ‘crossroads’, a space of 
meeting, which allows for the unfolding of a complex form of sensory intimacy. 
Merleau-Pontian sight is never unidirectional and cannot be reduced to a 
conscious act of looking or capturing the object of perception. The kind of tactile 
vision advocated by Merleau-Ponty destabilises any dualist categories of subject 
and object, mind and body, rationality and sensuousness.  
 Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about phenomenological vision have attracted the 
attention of modernist critics. Hanaway-Oakley reads Merleau-Ponty’s theory of 
tactile vision in parallel with James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), arguing that sight is 
not a phenomenon that regards only the eyes but the whole, three-dimensional 
body, more precisely the body’s position in space. Both Merleau-Ponty and Joyce 
use the image of the stereoscope to illuminate the embodied nature of sight: ‘For 
                                                        
21 Empiricism is a philosophical theory that argues that perception is rooted in non-intentional 
experience derived from raw sensorial data. Merleau-Ponty rejects empiricism because, as Taylor 
Carman puts it, ‘ordinary perceptual awareness simply is not an awareness of sensations, but of 
things out in the world – people, situations, events’. Taylor Carman. ‘Between empiricism and 
intellectualism.’ Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts, edited by Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds, 
Acumen, 2008, pp. 44–56, p. 44. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty also dismisses intellectualism 
because this fails to take into account the pre-cognitive nature of phenomenological perception. 
In other words, what I see, touch, smell and taste is not a mere projection of my intellect but a 
consequence of my embodied coexistence with a world of sensations. Merleau-Ponty 
summarises the shortcomings of empiricism and intellectualism in Phenomenology of Perception: 
‘Empiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not go 
looking for it; intellectualism does not see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for, 
or again we should not go looking for it’ (30). 
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Merleau-Ponty, the 3D images that stereoscopes present are immediately 
perceived in 3D because of our body’s immediate repositioning of itself, rather 
than through a separate action of the intellect’ (88, emphasis in original). In other 
words, the phenomenological subject is not limited to the role of detached 
onlooker but (s)he becomes a dynamic participator in the act of perception. 
Joyce, nevertheless, was not the only modernist preoccupied with the embodied 
nature of vision. Lawrence, Woolf and Bowen rejected detached and rational 
sight in favour of a softer vision that brought the object of perception in 
sympathetic, semi-luminous proximity without completely erasing the bodily 
distance between seer and seen. As Woolf wrote in ‘Street Haunting: A London 
Adventure’ (1927): The eye, ‘the central oyster of perceptiveness’, is ‘not a miner, 
not a diver, not a seeker after buried treasure’ (Essays 4: 481, 482). The soft eye 
that has cast off its rough ‘shell-like covering’, is finally able to observe the beauty 
of a winter street, the ‘floating islands of pale light’, which gently illuminate ‘men 
and women’ (481). Woolf’s wandering eye acquires a flexibility, or even plasticity 
that allows the beholder to sympathetically reach out to the surrounding world. At 
the same time, the female flâneur’s gaze, in contrast with Baudelaire’s spectator, 
poises delicately between abstract aesthetics and corporeal reality. As she 
watches the ‘dwarf’ in the shoe shop, Woolf’s beholder muses on the beauty of 
the little woman’s gestures and movements:  
 
Look at that! Look at that! she seemed to demand of us all, as she thrust 
her foot out, for behold it was the shapely, perfectly proportioned foot of a 
well-grown woman. It was arched; it was aristocratic. […] She got up and 
pirouetted before a glass which reflected the foot only in yellow shoes, in 
fawn shoes, in shoes of lizard skin. She raised her little skirts and 
displayed her little legs. (483) 
 
At a first glance, the description of the feet might suggest the seer’s wish to 
transform the ‘dwarf’ into an aesthetic object. The ‘shapely, perfectly 
proportioned’ and ‘arched’ foot almost reminds the reader of a smoothly chiseled 
ancient Greek statue. Yet the prose resists such a straightforward interpretation. 
While zooming in to the feet, the spectator’s eyes neither freeze the woman’s 
body nor reduce her whole-body existence to a mere close-up of her feet. Though 
absorbed in the abstract beauty of the scene, the beholder’s gaze is never entirely 
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divorced from the embodied reality of the perceived. The seer’s attention rests 
delicately on the subtleties of the ‘dwarf’s’ gestures: the pirouetting movements 
of her legs and the wobbling of her clothes. Woolf’s female flâneur feels an 
irresistible attraction for the little woman, who is at once a statuette-like art object 
and a flesh-and-blood human being, whose thoughts and feelings remain partially 
hidden from the beholder’s eyes. The onlooker can never know with certainty but 
only guess the ‘dwarf’s’ state of mind: ‘Seeing nothing but her feet, she [the 
‘dwarf’] imagined perhaps that the rest of her body was of a piece with those 
beautiful feet’ (483, my emphasis). This perhaps-quality of sight represents a 
central topic in the modernist period, when the need for an alternative kind of 
vision, characterised by softness, flexibility and haziness, acquired an 
unprecedented urgency. The tactile gaze favoured by the authors central to this 
thesis, was able, to borrow Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s words, to ‘reach out, to 
fondle, to heft, to tap, or to enfold’, while acknowledging its epistemological 
limitations (14). 
 In the aftermath of the First, and even more emphatically, the Second 
World War, writers and philosophers started to become increasingly worried and 
suspicious about sight as a method of gaining knowledge about others. Sight 
became associated with rigidity, distance, superiority and violence, attributes that 
were at odds with sympathy and related feelings of love, kindness and 
compassion. In his essay on Merleau-Ponty, Edward Said wrote that the Second 
World War made possible the emergence of a kind of philosophy – of which 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology was an example – that rejected mechanistic 
views and became weary of ‘ossified precision that seemed incapable of touching 
man’ (55). Phenomenologists advocated a different way of relating to the world, 
which in contrast to Cartesian dualism, examined the workings of the living body, 
and presented a theory ‘that seemed capable of touching man’.  
Indeed, the Second World War marked a significant rupture not only in 
history, but one could argue, in the history of philosophy too. As Said suggests, 
in the philosophy of post-Second World War French philosophers, one can detect 
a tendency of returning to the living body as the primary locus of interpersonal 
sympathy. By no means do I want to suggest a homogenous reading of post-war 
philosophy. The philosophers who started to publish during and after the war 
employed at times radically different perspectives and methodologies, and they 
often violently fell out with each other after long periods of friendship, as Merleau-
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Ponty’s case with Sartre demonstrates.22 Though the reason for their alienation 
from each other can be mainly put down to political disagreements, the two 
philosophers’ interpretation of vision (and the visual) also differs on various 
points. While Merleau-Ponty argues that vision allows for the unfolding of the 
subject’s sympathetic relationship with the other, Sartre elaborates on the 
dangerous and paranoid nature of sight. In Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre 
reverses previous philosophical theories that approached the problem of other 
minds exclusively from the seer’s perspective, and suggested that in 
interpersonal relationships actually the Other is ‘the one who looks at me and at 
whom I am not yet looking, […] the one who is present to me as directing to me 
but never as the object of my direction’ (360). Despite their different views, 
nevertheless, what unites Merleau-Ponty with Sartre, and other mid-century 
French philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), is their shared 
suspicion of clear and omniscient sight that permits an unmediated access to 
other minds.23 Instead, they associate clear and rational vision with ideas of 
violence and supremacy, which culminated in the brutal violation of the other’s 
corporeal existence and integrity, most poignantly illustrated in the two world 
wars.24 
As the philosophical and literary works examined in this thesis show, the 
objectifying and penetrating gaze is imbued with cruelty and lack of attentive care 
for the vulnerability of the other’s embodied existence. Vulnerability represents 
an important precondition of sympathy in the philosophy and fiction of the post-
                                                        
22 Merleau-Ponty could not accept Sartre’s radical left views, and in 1953, he not only ended his 
friendship with Sartre but also stepped down from the editorial board of Les Temps Modernes, an 
influential journal that the two philosophers edited together for years. See Taylor Carman. 
Merleau-Ponty. Routledge, 2008, p. 5. 
23 Levinas’s (a Lithuanian-born Jew whose whole family was killed in the Second World War) 
philosophy is rooted in the face-to-face encounter between self and other, which he defines as 
the foundational ethics in human relationships. In Totality and Infinity (1961), he writes: ‘For the 
presence before a face, my orientation toward the Other, can lose the avidity proper to the gaze 
only by turning into generosity, incapable of approaching the other with empty hands. This 
relationship established over the things henceforth possibly common, that is, susceptible of being 
said, is the relationship of conversation. The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding 
the idea of the other in me, we here name face.’ (50) As Jill Robbins observes, it is important to 
note the anti-visual nature of Levinas’s reading of facial encounters, in which the gaze transforms 
into generosity and language: ‘The (ethical) necessity for this transformation stems from Levinas’s 
assertion that vision is a violent way of relating to the other. […] [I]t is unable to respect what is 
infinitely other’ (137). See Jill Robbins. ‘Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas’s Totality and Infinity.’ 
Yale French Studies, no. 79, 1991, pp. 135–149. 
24 In Downcast Eyes, Martin Jay includes among anti-visual French philosophers Jacques Lacan, 
Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray and others. Jay argues that 
what united these philosophers is their ‘profound suspicion of vision and its hegemonic role in the 
modern era’ (14). 
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war period. As Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity: ‘Love aims at the other; it 
aims at him in his frailty [faiblesse]. […] To love is to fear for another, to come to 
the assistance of his frailty.’ (256) At the same time, being attentive to the other’s 
fragility also presupposes the beholder’s own vulnerability, openness and 
willingness to go beyond his/her position as the supreme possessor of 
epistemological truth. It involves the acceptance of one’s limitations in seeing and 
comprehending other minds. If I am unable to embrace my own fragility and 
behold my fellow being from a vulnerable perspective, I ignore the reversible 
nature of my position: the fact that I am seen as well as seer, and in these 
functions I am interlaced with the visible: the flesh of the world. Sympathetic sight 
does not work like a stage lamp suddenly illuminating the object of perception 
from above. Indeed, the authors central to this thesis often showed a deep 
suspicion of unambiguous, blinding light the aim of which is to reveal or “catch” 
its object. 
Out of the four novelists of this thesis, Lawrence was probably the most 
distrustful of light, which he often associated with technology and warfare. As 
such, Chapter One argues that in Lawrence’s fiction written during and after the 
First World War, he advocates darkness as a form of sensuous and sensual unity 
between people as well as humans and the universe. In Women in Love, he 
interprets obscurity as the medium in which the pre-conscious, sensual gestures 
of the body are free to unfold without the restrictions imposed by the rational mind. 
In Women in Love and his essays written in the 1920s, Lawrence identifies as 
one of the major problems of modern society humans’ inability to reconnect with 
the primordial, anti-visual darkness of certain ancient civilisations, such as the 
Egyptians. At the same time, while undoubtedly preferring darkness to light (at 
least artificial light), he was also aware of the dangers of total obscurity, which 
risked annihilating humans’ individual contours, transforming them into 
undistinguishable masses, a concept linked to warfare in Lawrence’s writings. 
Towards the end of his life, despite never entirely abandoning the contradictions 
at the heart of his earlier writings, Lawrence became increasingly suspicious of 
extremities such as light and darkness. Instead, as his posthumously published 
Sketches of Etruscan Places (1932) demonstrates, he viewed the perfect 
manifestation of sympathy in the half-illuminated cave paintings of the Etruscans. 
The concept of sympathetic semi-luminosity was further developed and became 
a central topic in Woolf’s oeuvre.  
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Chapter Two discusses how Woolf often associates excessive luminosity 
with the characterisation methods employed by Edwardian male writers, who try 
to capture characters through painstaking material descriptions, placing them 
under the sharply illuminating rays of a lamp. In Jacob’s Room, Woolf critiques 
her predecessors’ approach, showing its failure to reveal the feelings and 
thoughts of the phenomenal body-subject. Instead, for Woolf, intimacy is 
analogous to the hazy searchlight of the lighthouse, which gently envelops living 
and dead, past and present in a delicate halo of sympathy. Although the damage 
created by the war cannot be mended or the dead resurrected, To the Lighthouse 
suggests that in the shadowy zone of sympathy there are still possibilities of 
forging bonds.  
Bowen was also suspicious of too much clarity in interpersonal 
relationships, as I show in Chapter Three. Karen, the protagonist of The House 
in Paris (1935), muses on the violent nature of her mother’s penetrating gaze, 
which transforms people into sharply illuminated mechanisms, whose emotions 
and actions can be reduced to well-defined reasons and motivations. In her 
wartime short fiction, Bowen draws a link between luminosity and cruelty. The 
opening of ‘Mysterious Kôr’ (1944), describes how the full moon inundates 
London, exposing it to the eyes of air bombers, and making the blackout 
‘laughable’ (728). The moon’s cruel all-searching gaze affects whole communities 
of Londoners but also individual people, such as the hopelessly wandering pair 
of Arthur and Pepita, who are unable to find an intimate space of their own, far 
from the surveying eyes of intruders. At the same time, while locating sympathy 
in the semi-luminous sphere of ambiguity, Bowen also suggests the insufficiency 
of haziness in fellow feeling. In her Second World War novel, The Heat of the 
Day, Bowen shows the limitations and dangers of half-light as a meeting zone 
between individuals. Instead of gently enveloping humans, mistiness can also 
lead to a form of mis- or non-understanding that erases any possibilities of 
sympathy and love. 
McEwan’s insistence that fellow feeling is rooted in the ‘real’ world might 
seem at odds with the form of imperfect and sensual vision celebrated by 
Lawrence, Woolf and Bowen. Yet, as Chapter Four argues, Atonement and 
Saturday show that the ‘real’ world, including human beings and art works, is far 
from being transparent and easily comprehensible. Through the image of the 
broken and partially mended vase in Atonement, McEwan suggests the complex 
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and complicated nature of intertextual sympathy: the cracks remain faintly visible 
in the glaze of the porcelain, reminding the reader at once of the breakage with 
modernist tradition, and of the latter’s emphatic presence in the matter of the 
contemporary novel. McEwan’s later novel, Saturday, draws attention to the 
limitations of the omniscient (medical) gaze, highlighting the importance of the 
non-visual, or at least half-visual affective gestures that will never lead to 
complete understanding of other minds, but which represent the preconditions of 
our sympathetic embeddedness in the world. 
This study, therefore, traces the pleasures and difficulties of feeling for and 
with others in the modernist and contemporary novel. A phenomenological 
reading of sympathy allows for the emergence of a kind of modernism, which 
does not necessarily prefer abstraction to embodiment and irony to emotion but 
which is preoccupied with the sensuous and vulnerable body: its potentials and 
limitations of forging emotional bonds. Sympathy, the works of Lawrence, Woolf, 
Bowen, and McEwan suggest, does not lead to a direct and unambiguous access 
to other minds, but it nevertheless creates a semi-transparent zone of intimacy 
where the perceiver’s eyes can gently caress the other’s hazy silhouette. This 
study will explore the empathic yet often unsettling presence of fellow feeling in 
modernism, while also touching on the legacies of modernist sympathy in 
contemporary fiction, showing how sympathy continues to pose urgent questions 





D. H. Lawrence: the ‘widening circle’ of sympathy 
 
Pervin moved about almost unconsciously in his familiar surroundings, 
dark though everything was. He seemed to know the presence of objects 
before he touched them. It was a pleasure to him to rock thus through a 
world of things, carried on the flood in a sort of blood-prescience. He did 
not think much or trouble much. So long as he kept this sheer immediacy 
of blood-contact with the substantial world he was happy, he wanted no 
intervention of visual consciousness. […] It was a pleasure to stretch forth 
the hand and meet the unseen object, clasp it, and possess it in pure 
contact.  
[…] 
The rich suffusion of this state generally kept him happy, reaching its 
culmination in the consuming passion for his wife. But at times the flow 
would seem to be checked and thrown back. Then it would beat inside him 
like a tangled sea, and he was tortured in the shattered chaos of his own 
blood. He grew to dread this arrest, this throw-back, this chaos inside 
himself, when he seemed merely at the mercy of his own powerful and 
conflicting elements. How to get some measure of control or surety, this 
was the question. And when the question rose maddening in him, he would 
clench his fists as if he would compel the whole universe to submit to him. 
But it was in vain. He could not even compel himself. (54, emphasis in 
original) 
 
In the above quotation from Lawrence’s short story ‘The Blind Man’ (written in 
1918, published in 1922 in the collection England, My England), the protagonist, 
Maurice Pervin, muses about the pleasures and difficulties of living in darkness. 
Pervin lost his sight after a war injury, which left him not only blind but also with 
a visible facial scar. Nevertheless, despite his disability, Pervin has not only 
learned to manage everyday tasks around the farm but he also developed a 
sensuous ‘blood-contact with the substantial world’, which, the short story 
suggests, represents a more authentic mode of existence than that of sighted 
characters, such as Isabel or her friend, the socially awkward but intelligent 
lawyer, Bertie Reid. Pervin moves in a pre-conscious unity with the world, in a 
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blind tactile contact that allows him to become an organic part of the ‘flood [of] 
blood-prescience’. There are times, nevertheless, when the unseen harmony 
transforms into a feeling of helplessness and deep frustration, giving space to an 
irrational desire for violence: ‘he would compel the whole universe to submit to 
him’. Pervin’s attempt, however, is doomed to failure, as the world seems to 
exceed his human power. In such moments, the wish for cosmic unity comes 
under increased threat, and the universe risks becoming an annihilating power, 
devouring the subject and erasing his/her individual contours.  
 ‘The Blind Man’ represents a perfect illustration of the contradictory nature 
of what Lawrence called in Women in Love (1920) the ‘dark knowledge’ of the 
ancient Egyptians (319).25 From the early 1910s until his untimely death in 1930, 
Lawrence never ceased to show interest for a form of embodied sympathy based 
on the unseen union of people, as well as humans and their surrounding 
environment. He located this kind of intimacy in the sentient body, more precisely 
‘in the sheer immediacy of blood-contact’, the blood representing the vital fluid 
responsible for the circulation of fellow feeling. Lawrence explicitly formulated his 
theory of ‘blood-sympathy’ as early as 1915, though he had been concerned with 
these ideas earlier (A Propos of ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ 326). In December 
1915 he wrote to Bertrand Russell: 
 
Now I am convinced of what I believed when I was about twenty – that 
there is another seat of consciousness than the brain and the nerve 
system: there is a blood-consciousness which exists in us independently 
of the ordinary mental consciousness, which depends on the eye as its 
source or connector. […] This is one half of life, belonging to the darkness. 
And the tragedy of this our life […] is that the mental and nerve 
consciousness exerts a tyranny over the blood-consciousness, […] which 
is only death […]. (Letters 2: 470) 
 
The genuine source of sympathetic coexistence, according to Lawrence, is 
rooted in blood-consciousness, the ‘half of life belonging to darkness’, which can 
only be activated through sensuous tactile contact rather than visual means 
associated with cognitive supremacy. A life dominated entirely by the brain and 
                                                        
25 Hereafter WL. 
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nerves is, in Lawrence’s opinion, wasted, due to its disconnection from the vital 
source of sympathy.  
 Though Lawrence had been interested in questions of ‘blood-sympathy’ 
before 1915, it is not coincidental that he started to formulate his thoughts as a 
kind of doctrine during and after the war, in a period when phrases such as ‘death’ 
and ‘tyranny’ acquired unprecedented weight. Lawrence’s dismissal of the 
‘tyranny’ mental consciousness ‘exert[ed] over […] blood-consciousness’ can be 
linked to his hatred for the war, which he repeatedly described as a force 
ruthlessly tearing the fabric of embodied sympathy. In another letter written in 
December 1915, he said to Katherine Mansfield: 
 
I want you and Murry [John Middleton Murry, Mansfield’s husband] to live 
with us, or near us, in unanimity: not these separations. […] Let us […] keep 
together, several of us, as being of one spirit. Only let there be no personal 
obligation, no personal idea. Let it be a union in the unconsciousness, not in 
the consciousness. […] [L]et us all try to be happy together, in unanimity, 
not in hostility, creating, not destroying. (Letters 2: 482, emphasis in original)    
 
Lawrence invited the Murrys to stay with him and Frieda in Cornwall, where he 
intended to move from London, partly as an escape from the destroying effects 
of the war in the capital.26 In his letters written at the end of 1915, Lawrence 
repeatedly urged his friends to engage in an ‘unconscious’ and ‘impersonal’ 
intimacy, which facilitates creation, not destruction.27 Lawrence often used terms 
such as ‘unconscious’, ‘impersonal’ and ‘inhuman’ interchangeably, to denote a 
                                                        
26 In the autumn of 1915, Lawrence repeatedly described London as an apocalyptic city, partly 
due to the frequent Zeppelin bombings. In a letter addressed to Lady Ottoline Morrell, he wrote: 
‘Last night we [Lawrence and Frieda] were coming home when the guns broke out, and there was 
a noise of bombs. Then we saw the Zeppelin above us, just ahead, amid a gleaming of clouds: 
high up, like a bright golden finger, quite small, among a fragile incandescence of clouds. And 
underneath it were splashes of fire as the shells fired from earth burst. […] It seemed as if the 
cosmic order were gone […]. So it seems our cosmos is burst, […] the stars and moon blown 
away, the envelope of the sky burst out, and a new cosmos appeared, with a long-ovate, gleaming 
central luminary, […] with its light bursting in flashes on the earth, to burst away the earth also.’ 
(Letters 2: 390)  
 
27 It is important to note that Lawrence’s use of the term ‘unconscious’ differs from Freud’s 
psychoanalytic concept. Lawrence disliked Freud’s theories because the latter associated the 
unconscious with repressed feelings, while for Lawrence it represented the sensuous-sensual 
core of human existence. In Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious (1922) Lawrence mocked 
psychoanalysts: ‘They have crept in among us as healers and physicians; growing bolder, they 
have asserted their authority as scientists; two more minutes and they will appear as apostles’ 
(7). 
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form of physical consciousness that differed strikingly from ‘the ordinary mental 
consciousness’. As Michael Bell puts it, the impersonal ego did not mean the 
cognitive, Cartesian self for Lawrence, but rather the ‘non-moral awareness of a 
“beyond self” which provides the ultimate imperative for all life decisions, the non-
teleological “purpose” of existence’ (‘Lawrence and modernism’ 186). In other 
words, Lawrence does not set the body, as mere biological matter, against the 
rational mind, but he views the living and feeling body as the locus of a different 
kind of mentality, which he calls ‘blood-consciousness’ or ‘physical mind’ (WL 
318).  
Indeed, the question of impersonal existence represented a topic of great 
interest for Lawrence, as several critics have recently noted. Jeff Wallace 
suggests that Lawrence’s preoccupation with the nonhuman originates from his 
readings of materialist theories advocated by scientists such as Charles Darwin, 
Herbert Spencer and T. H. Huxley. Wallace shows how despite Lawrence’s own 
anti-scientific assertions, ‘it would not be implausible to read the whole of [his] 
creative project, as sharing with post-Darwinian science, [the] exploratory quest 
to delineate man’s place in nature’ (17). Fiona Becket examines Lawrence’s 
interest in the non-conscious self from a psychoanalytic point of view, arguing 
that unlike many of his contemporaries, Lawrence pinpoints ‘the birth of 
consciousness not in thought or language but in the blood, and advocates the 
values of “blood consciousness” as a non-deliberate, non-cerebral feature of 
human being’ (226). However, as Becket points out, in Lawrence’s vocabulary 
blood refers to a kind of universal life fluid rather than racial difference (226). 
Kirsty Martin reads Lawrence’s works through the lens of vitalism, proposing that 
while he locates sympathy in the body, he also pays attention to how fellow 
feeling is driven by energies transcending human volition (132–187). At the same 
time, Martin highlights the perils of Lawrence’s emphasis on purely sensuous-
sensual sympathy, which risks annihilating people’s autonomy, creating space 
for brutality, as shown, for example, in The Plumed Serpent (1926) (133).  
While drawing on the above-mentioned scholarly works, this chapter 
focuses on the impersonal from a different perspective. Women in Love (written 
during the First World War) shows how Lawrence’s quest for impersonal ‘dark 
knowledge’ was at once a deeply desired and anxiety-inducing state. While 
darkness represents the medium in which bodies can sensually and mindlessly 
communicate, blind union is simultaneously imbued with the danger of 
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annihilating socially and historically determined individuals, who merge into a kind 
of primeval obscurity associated by Lawrence with ‘primitive’ cultures.28 Reading 
Women in Love in parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of the phenomenal 
body, this chapter suggests that intimacy happens between sensing and living 
bodies, capable of intertwining with the texture of the world without losing the 
solidity of their individual boundaries. Yet this sympathetic harmony often proves 
to be fragile, turning from gentle coexistence to uncontrollable violence, as shown 
in the opening quotation from ‘The Blind Man’. Contradictory forces of light and 
darkness, brain and blood consciousness, rationality and sensuality pervade 
Lawrence’s oeuvre, from The Rainbow (1915) and Women in Love to his non-
fictional works of the late 1920s, such as his essays on Paul Cézanne and 
Sketches of Etruscan Places (written in 1927, and published posthumously in 
1932). As such, this chapter takes up the challenge to explore Lawrence’s above-
mentioned writings in parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, throwing 
light on, but with no intention to fully illuminate, the unresolved conflicts at the 
heart of Lawrence’s works.  
 
‘I am a historical structure’: the social nature of sympathy 
 
In Women in Love, in the chapter entitled ‘Rabbit’, Gudrun and her private art 
tutee, Winifred, Gerald’s youngest sister, spend some time in the garden, where 
they try to tame Winifred’s erratic rabbit, aptly named Bismarck. When Gudrun 
finally manages to lay hands on it, the rabbit violently grazes her arm and tries to 
escape, but Gerald’s sudden appearance saves the situation, as he succeeds in 
momentarily immobilising the animal. Gudrun’s and Gerald’s tussle with the 
rabbit, anticipates the lovers’ tumultuous, forcefully violent relationship. The 
description of the fight between Gudrun, Gerald and the animal, bears a striking 
similarity to later sex scenes in the novel. The rabbit is depicted as ‘lusty’, a 
‘thunder-storm’ that literally shakes Gudrun as she struggles to hold it in her arms 
(240). The animal’s forceful movements, in turn, awaken a ‘passion of cruelty’ in 
the woman (240). When Gerald takes the rabbit from Gudrun, the furious animal 
                                                        
28 As Michael Bell suggests, the word ‘primitive’ should always be understood ‘within implicit 
quotation marks’, as it reflects not so much the aesthetic values of pre-modern art forms but the 
biased perspective of Western art history. Michael Bell. ‘Primitivism: Modernism as Anthropology.’ 
The Oxford Handbook of Modernisms, edited by Peter Brooker et al., Oxford University Press, 
2010, pp. 353–367, p. 353. 
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makes ‘itself into a ball in the air, and lashe[s] out, flinging itself into a bow’ (241). 
Man and woman become united in the irrational, viscerally frightening fight 
against the uncontrollable beast: Gudrun is passionately drawn to ‘the power of 
lightning in Gerald’s nerves’, his ‘magical, hideous white fire’ (242).  
Erotic desire and aggression intricately intertwine, foreshadowing the 
dangers inherent in the couple’s later liaison. They feel connected in their 
passionate wrath against the rabbit, and the narrative indicates the perils of their 
alliance, rooted in feelings of vindictiveness and rage, ultimately leading to 
destruction: ‘There was a league between them, abhorrent to them both. They 
were implicated with each other in abhorrent mysteries.’ (242) The first thing that 
strikes the reader in this passage is a complete absence of tenderness. The 
lovers’ attachment acquires a mechanical, artificial overtone, as the words 
‘league’, ‘abhorrent’, and ‘implicated’ suggest. Being in a ‘league’ fails to provide 
a safe and intimate space, where Gerald and Gudrun could engage in a mutually 
reassuring gentleness; on the contrary, their strange, ‘abhorrent’ alliance is 
fuelled by the very same violence against which they set out to unite their forces 
in the first place. The rabbit, which after a moment of stillness, ‘burst[s] into life 
[…] as if shot from a gun’, and starts to run around the court, creates a ‘tense 
hard circle that seemed to bind their brains’ (243). This newly established bond 
between the lovers, precisely due to its ‘hard’ and cerebral nature (resisting 
sympathetic softening and opening to the other), anticipates the annihilating 
nature of their passion.  
 At a later moment in the novel, when Gerald visits Gudrun in her family 
home during the night, their sexual encounter bears uncanny echoes of the 
rabbit-scene. As Gerald enters Gudrun’s room stealthily, and starts to undress, 
the woman ‘listened, watching, hoping no one would hear the starched linen 
crackle. It seemed to snap like pistol-shots.’ (344) The rigidity of the linen, whose 
cracking resembles gunshots, envelops the lovers in a ‘tense, hard circle’, inside 
which their bodies unite in a form of togetherness shadowed with traces of 
violence and isolation:  
 
Into her he poured all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he 
was whole again. […] And she, subject, received him as a vessel filled with 
his bitter potion of death. She had no power at this crisis to resist. The 
 46 
terrible frictional violence of death filled her, and she received it in an 
ecstasy of subjection in throes of acute, violent sensation. (344) 
 
Their sexual interaction reminds the reader of a forceful fight, doomed to end in 
the subjects’ painful destruction. Though Gerald feels restored to a kind of pre-
natal wholeness (‘as if he were bathed in the womb again’), his sensation of 
totality is achieved at the cost of the dissolution of the woman, who transforms 
into a passive object in his arms (344). In other words, wholeness is not created 
in the phenomenological hollow between two touching bodies, but rather in the 
isolated, closed-off sphere of separate individuals. Instead of feeling complete 
with the woman, Gerald reaches fulfilment through his lover, an act that makes 
Gudrun feel an immense loneliness: ‘And here was she, left with all the anguish 
of consciousness, whilst he was sunk deep into the other element of mindless, 
remote, living shadow-gleam. They would never be together.’ (346) The 
relationship between Gudrun and Gerald is doomed to failure partly because, as 
Graham Hough suggests, ‘even the sensual bond between them is never 
complete’ (83).  
 Gerald’s possessive, and arguably selfish gestures in the first sex scene 
inevitably raise the question of misogyny, and Lawrence has been accused of the 
latter on numerous occasions. One of the most well known critiques of 
Lawrence’s treatment of female sexuality can be attributed to Kate Millett, who 
claimed that Lawrence’s sexual politics is based on his refusal to allow his female 
characters to achieve emancipation and individual freedom (260). Such a 
reading, however, runs the risk of missing out on the complexity of Lawrence’s 
views on male-female relationships and the intricacies of erotic desire in Women 
in Love. Gudrun might indeed, for a moment, seem like a helpless victim 
subordinated to Gerald’s selfish passion. But at the same time, for Gudrun, as 
shown in the rabbit-scene, eroticism and aggression often go hand in hand; their 
fusion not only fuels the lovers’ sexual attraction but also anticipates the 
destructive nature of their bond. 
 Marianna Torgovnick suggests that one of the most significant differences 
between The Rainbow and Women in Love can be grasped in the way they 
‘narrate’ sexuality. While in the earlier novel, sex is ‘integrated into the texture of 
experience’, several erotic scenes in Women in Love are ‘abrupt and isolated’, 
severed from a ‘spiritual dimension’ and ‘family context’ (38, 41). Though I do not 
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necessarily think that this sharp contrast is unequivocally true for all sex scenes 
in the two novels, I agree that the failure of Gudrun’s relationship with Gerald lies 
partially in their isolation, not only from each other, but also from what we might 
call, after Merleau-Ponty, the flesh of the world.  
Near the end of Women in Love, when the two sisters accompanied by 
their partners, arrive to the Alps, Gudrun and Gerald retreat to their room, before 
joining Ursula and Birkin for tea. Gudrun is fascinated by the texture and colour 
of the wooden panel, and describes her sensation ‘like being inside a nut’ (400). 
Yet this feeling of warm homeliness proves to be fragile. As Gudrun looks out of 
the window, she becomes more and more oblivious of Gerald’s closeness behind 
her, until she gradually transforms into a ‘crystal in the navel of snow’, and ‘[is] 
gone’ (401). Gerald experiences an acute sense of loneliness: he feels endlessly 
separated not only from the woman, whose body he cannot connect to, but also 
from the outside world, the snowy landscape, into which Gudrun seems to have 
melted: ‘He saw […] the great cul de sac of snow and mountain peaks, under the 
heaven. And there was no way out. The terrible silence and cold and the 
glamorous whiteness of the dusk wrapped him round […]’ (401). Gerald’s 
thoughts can be read as a prediction of the end of the couple’s relationship as 
well as of the man’s literal death: ‘the glamorous whiteness of the dusk’ 
foreshadows Gerald’s death in the snow, preceded by his lonely skiing 
experience, after which he returns to Gudrun ‘isolated as if there were a vacuum 
round his heart’ (460). Sympathetic coexistence remains an impossible 
endeavour for the lovers, because they remain sealed off in their own separated 
worlds, in an inescapable state of lonely togetherness.  
Similarly to Gerald, who feels disorientated in the ‘cul de sac of snow’, 
Gudrun, despite her enchantment with the beauty of the rose-tinted blue twilight, 
experiences a sense of irreparable loss: ‘She could see [the landscape], she 
knew it, but she was not of it. She was divorced, debarred, a soul shut out.’ (403, 
emphasis in original) Sight, in this passage, becomes synonymous with a mere 
physical property of the body: the eyes’ capacity to register visual stimuli. This 
kind of mechanical immersion in the visible, however, as both Lawrence and 
Merleau-Ponty suggest, is burdened with dangers. Merleau-Ponty highlights that 
phenomenological perception, including sight, cannot be reduced to the biological 
functions of disparate sense organs: ‘Blue is what solicits a certain way of looking 
from me, it is what allows itself to be palpated by a specific movement of my gaze. 
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It is a certain field or a certain atmosphere offered to the power of my eyes and 
of my entire body.’ (PP 218) Gudrun’s gaze has lost its tactile capacity, a faculty 
of the phenomenal body necessary for the subject’s corporeal engagement with 
the world, including other human beings. Her look becomes empty and distant, 
thus failing to bring the external world in tangible closeness. Her body, to borrow 
Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, exists in a ‘[de]synchronized’ unity with the flesh of the 
universe, as she transforms into an ‘inert milieu’, passively ‘affected’ by a quality 
of the visible (PP 219).  
          As Merleau-Ponty highlights in Phenomenology of Perception, 
phenomenological interaction between self and world presupposes the activation 
of what he calls binocular vision. This form of sight does not result from the 
mechanical summing up and union of images perceived separately by the two 
eyes. Instead, one is able to see in the phenomenological sense of the word 
‘when the two eyes cease to function in isolation and are used as a single organ 
by a unique gaze’ (241). The synthesising capacity of the eyes, however, ‘is not 
accomplished by the epistemological subject, but rather by the body […] which 
carries itself through all of its resources toward a single term of its movement’ 
(241). In other words, binocular vision, which facilitates the forging of intimacy 
with other people and the surrounding world, cannot be reduced to either a 
conscious activity of the mind or a simple mechanism of the biological body; 
rather, it can be defined as a capacity of the phenomenal body to reach out and 
feel the ‘carnal presence’ of other entities (242). This ‘perceptual synthesis’ 
cannot be ‘accomplished in the transparency of consciousness’, but requires ‘all 
of the latent knowledge that my body has of itself’ (241). Gudrun fails to engage 
with the twilight landscape, or indeed with Gerald, in a phenomenological sense 
partly because her sympathy is not rooted in a ‘latent’, pre-conscious bodily 
knowledge, but rather in a detached, rational sight that ‘divorce[s]’ her from the 
flesh of the visible, making her ‘a soul shut out’.   
While in Gerald’s affair with Gudrun, the characters’ withdrawal into their 
own individual sphere leads to an irreconcilable isolation and the impossibility of 
meaningful communication, through Birkin’s liaison with Ursula, Lawrence shows 
a different, though not unproblematic, version of union-in-separateness. In the 
chapter entitled ‘Excurse’ the lovers go for an afternoon drive, which, after Birkin 
telling Ursula that he must go back to Shortlands to have tea with Hermione, 
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transforms into ‘a crisis of war between them’ (306).29 Ursula accuses Birkin of 
being dependent on his ‘spiritual brides’, who, at the same time ‘aren’t common 
and fleshly enough’ to satisfy him (306). Her furious remarks make it clear that 
she prefers to be identified with the second category. Partly echoing Lawrence’s 
derogatory opinion on getting ‘sex in [the] head’,30 Ursula calls Birkin a ‘purity-
monger’, ‘deathly thing’, ‘obscene and perverse’ (307).31  
Yet Ursula’s viewpoint is not unequivocally presented as the dominant one. 
Birkin suggests that Ursula and Hermione represent two extremities, both of 
which are flawed in their own ways: ‘“It may all be true, lies and stink and all,” he 
said. “But Hermione’s spiritual intimacy is no rottener than your emotional-jealous 
intimacy”.’ (308) Birkin is torn between Hermione’s abstraction and Ursula’s 
physicality, and he considers both a form of ‘hateful tyranny’, a desire for violent 
appropriation: ‘Why could [the two women] not remain individuals, limited by their 
own limits? […] Why not leave the other being free, why try to absorb, or melt, or 
merge?’ (309) Birkin’s musings are problematic, if not for other reasons, at least 
for their tendency to reduce Hermione and Ursula to a well-defined personality 
trait. As such, he seems oblivious to the fact that he is committing the same 
‘hateful tyranny’ of which he blames the two women. Nevertheless, his inner 
torments illuminate the complexity and difficulty of his vision of ‘the perfect 
relation’: ‘star-equilibrium which alone is freedom’ (316, 319).  
Lawrence’s musings on the link between intimacy and freedom can be 
brought into dialogue with Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about the nature of liberty, as 
elaborated in the final section of Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty 
questions the existence of an individual self, separated from the world 
surrounding it, including other human and nonhuman beings. As such, individual 
                                                        
29 It is important to note the linguistic play at stake in Lawrence’s use of the word ‘excurse’. 
According to the OED, ‘excurse’ is an obsolete noun, defined as ‘an outrush, raid, hostile sally’. 
Online Oxford English Dictionary. www.oed.com. Accessed 4 November 2018. Ursula’s 
interaction with Birkin in this chapter is not devoid of violent outbursts, both on verbal and physical 
levels. For example, she forcefully throws some rings (received from Birkin) in the man’s face. 
Furthermore, Lawrence’s vocabulary throughout the chapter is peppered with military allusions.  
30 The phrase getting ‘sex in your head’ appears, for example, in Lawrence’s review of Ben 
Hecht’s Fantazius Mallare: A Mysterious Oath (1922): ‘The tragedy is, when you’ve got sex in 
your head, instead of down below where it belongs […]’ (216). D. H. Lawrence. Introduction and 
Reviews, edited by N. H. Reeve and John Worthen, Cambridge University Press, 2005.  
31 Ursula’s accusation against Birkin reveals the complexity of Lawrence’s works. While Birkin 
has often been considered Lawrence’s mouthpiece, in ‘Excurse’, the male protagonist stands for 
ideas Lawrence firmly contested elsewhere: abstraction, rationality, falseness. Sheila MacLeod 
claimed that Birkin is ‘certainly [Lawrence’s] mouthpiece’ (38), while Graham Hough argued that 
Birkin is ‘the embodiment of Lawrence’s ideas; in fact, the first of many self-dramatisations of 
Lawrence the prophet’ (75). Sheila MacLeod. Lawrence’s Men and Women. Heinemann, 1985. 
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freedom is necessarily a ‘freedom together’, as Birkin puts it in of his 
conversations with Ursula (152, emphasis in original). In Merleau-Ponty’s words: 
‘Far from my freedom being forever alone, it is in fact never without accomplices, 
and its power of perpetually tearing itself away leans upon my universal 
engagement in the world.’ (PP, 479) According to the phenomenologist, our 
embodied existence is interlaced with the world (by which he means social, 
historical, and cultural relations) to such an extent that we are unable to find a 
sense of liberty through cutting off these intricately entangled ties. As he 
formulates: 
 
I am a psychological and historical structure. Along with existence, I 
received a way of existing, or a style. All of my actions and thoughts are 
related to this structure […]. And yet, I am free, not in spite of or beneath 
these motivations, but rather by their means. For that meaningful life, that 
particular signification of nature and history that I am, does not restrict my 
access to the world; it is rather my means of communication with it. (PP, 
482) 
 
This ‘means of communication’, however, also presupposes the subject’s ability 
to delineate his/her individual place in the world in a historically and socially 
determined moment in time. In other words, the form of sympathy Merleau-Ponty 
advocates in Phenomenology of Perception is not merely a transhistorical union 
with the universe, since any human being, from the moment of coming into the 
world, is already a ‘psychological and historical’ structure, circumscribed by a 
socio-cultural context that influences his/her bonds with the surrounding 
environment. In Women in Love, Lawrence is highly aware of the historically 
determined nature of sympathy, while at the same time he also shows how the 
boundaries of fellow feeling are flexible enough to open, even though briefly, to a 
timeless mythical realm. 
 The paradoxical nature of sympathy – being at once historically 
circumscribed and impossible to locate in time – can be best captured in the figure 
of Ursula. In ‘Excurse’, after Ursula and Birkin leave ‘behind [the] memorable 
battle-field’ of their violent fight, and experience ‘peace, just simply peace’, they 
decide to have high tea in a Southwell inn called Saracen’s Head (311, 310). On 
their way to the inn, they pass by a cathedral, which Ursula recognises as her 
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father’s beloved minster, often visited by her parents at the beginning of their 
courtship (312). As the dusk starts to settle and the minster bells play a hymn, 
Ursula feels suspended, like in a dream: ‘It was like dim, bygone centuries 
sounding. Above she could see the first stars. […] This was no actual world, it 
was the dream-world of one’s childhood – a great circumscribed reminiscence.’ 
(312) In Ursula’s ‘great circumscribed reminiscence’ personal, historical, and 
mythical dimensions intertwine in complex ways. The cathedral represents at 
once the remnant of a historical period (similarly to the fourteenth-century inn, in 
the courtyard of which she listens to the bells), and a space imbued with the 
personal memories of a more recent, familial past (the minster being a kind of 
sacred meeting place for Ursula’s parents). At the same time, the melody coming 
from the clock tower transports Ursula into a realm that transcends the 
boundaries of historical reality: ‘The world had become unreal. She herself was 
a strange, transcendent reality.’ (312) The woman’s memories, strangely 
entangled with fantasies, go beyond historical time by stretching back into a 
distant world of mythical past. Ursula’s twilight experience differs significantly 
from Gerald’s and Gudrun’s sense of dusk in the Alps. Gerald is overwhelmed by 
a feeling of suffocating terror as he feels himself ‘wrapped’ in the ‘cold and 
glamorous whiteness of the dusk’, while Gudrun experiences a sense of poignant 
loneliness due to her inability to reach out to the rose-tinted sky with her whole 
body, instead of gazing at it with a mechanical-detached look from behind the 
window. For Ursula, on the other hand, the slowly settling dusk, which gently 
reveals the shape of the minster, ‘below in the hollow’, opens up a faintly luminous 
space of sympathy, in which she can feel connected both to her immediate 
surroundings and a dream world transcending physical reality (312). 
Ursula’s ‘circumscribed reminiscence’ can be linked to Merleau-Ponty’s 
ideas about subjectivity and interrelatedness. He writes in Phenomenology of 
Perception that we cannot achieve total subjectivity by severing our bonds with 
our surrounding reality, because ‘even in [our] most radical reflection, [we] must 
already grasp around [our] absolute individuality something like a halo of 
generality’ (474). In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty employs the 
same word as Lawrence to describe the relationship between self and world: 
‘From the sole fact that I circumscribe [the other], […] [(s)he] is cut out in my 
universe; there is an intersection of my universe with that of the other’ (80, my 
emphasis). It is perhaps not coincidental that both writers use a circular image to 
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capture the complexity of self-other relationships. Similarly to Merleau-Ponty’s 
subject, who is enveloped in ‘a halo’ of socio-historical relations, Ursula feels her 
existence being encircled by forces beyond her consciousness. This 
phenomenological net, however, does not divorce Ursula from her environment 
but rather connects her to it, while at the same time ensuring the preservation of 
her individual bodily contours.  
Ursula is perhaps the Lawrence heroine who comes closer to embodying 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological philosophy. From a very young age, as 
shown in The Rainbow, she struggles to fulfil her desire for freedom and 
autonomy, while simultaneously remaining attached to her family. The Rainbow 
captures Ursula’s contradictory feelings in the image of the kite. Shortly before 
moving from Cossethay with her family, Ursula is overwhelmed by a burning 
desire to escape from the place where she spent her childhood:  
 
It hurt her that she could not be at ease with [the people at Cossethay] any 
more. And yet – and yet – one’s kite will rise on the wind as far as ever 
one has string to let it go. It tugs and tugs and will go, and one is glad the 
further it goes, even if everybody else is nasty about it. So Cossethay 
hampered her, and she wanted to go away, to be free to fly her kite as 
high as she liked. (The Rainbow 389)  
 
The above passage can be found in a chapter suggestively entitled ‘The 
Widening Circle’. The expanding circle, just as Ursula’s ‘circumscribed 
reminiscence’ in Women in Love, and Merleau-Ponty’s halo, represents an 
important motif in Lawrence’s novels, as it indicates the flexible, semi-soft nature 
of circular boundaries. The circle does not rigidly enclose the subject, separating 
him/her from the environment, but its borders can be stretched in order to 
incorporate new possibilities and relationships. The widening circle creates a kind 
of phenomenological hollow, a tactile-visual meeting space, at once limited by 
and open to the world. The image of the kite, at the same time, encapsulates the 
essence of Lawrence’s concept of ‘freedom together’. The kite is freely and 
uncontrollably carried by the wind but the former is also anchored to the hands 
holding its string. If the hands released their hold, the kite would dissolve in the 
universe, curtailing the possibility of sympathetic coexistence. Ursula’s concept 
of independence and her later love for Birkin in Women in Love, are grounded in 
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a simultaneous wish to break free from parental ties and a constant, 
unexplainable urge to let her kite be guided back to her familial roots. Her 
seemingly paradoxical attitude represents one of the fundamental differences 
between her and Gudrun’s views on sympathy and love. Despite being at times 
violently hostile towards her family, Ursula, nevertheless, remains attached not 
only to her personal past but also to a more distant mythical time. Gudrun, on the 
other hand, for the most part of the novel, remains enclosed in her ‘tense, hard 
circle’, feeling isolated and disconnected from past and present bonds.  
 
Women in Love and the dangers of ‘primitive’ darkness 
 
Ursula is not the only character connected to the historical and mythological past. 
In ‘Excurse’ Birkin is repeatedly described as an ‘Egyptian Pharaoh’, ‘seated in 
immemorial potency, like the great carven statues of real Egypt’ (WL 318). He 
feels a mysterious power in his body, ‘a force in darkness’ which makes him 
‘awake and potent in that other basic mind, the deepest physical mind’ (318). 
While driving the car with Ursula by his side, he finds it difficult to verbally express 
his feelings, and instead abandons himself to the ‘pure living silence, subtle, full 
of unthinkable knowledge and unthinkable force’ (318). Birkin’s perfectly still 
darkness, nevertheless, is momentarily interrupted by a ‘lambent intelligence’ 
located in his upper body: ‘His arms and his breast and his head were rounded 
and living like those of the Greek, he had not the unawakened straight arms of 
the Egyptian, nor the sealed, slumbering head’ (318). It is not coincidental that 
Lawrence likens Birkin’s upper body, especially his head to Greek physiognomy. 
The head represents the locus of sight and consciousness, which, in Lawrence’s 
interpretation, dominate the lower, more sensual and instinctive parts of the body. 
As he formulates in Fantasia of the Unconscious (1922): ‘[B]elow the waist we 
have our being in darkness. Below the waist we are sightless. When […] our life 
is polarised upwards, towards the open, sun-wakened eyes and the mind which 
sees in vision, then the powerful dynamic centres of the lower body act in 
subservience […]’ (189). Lawrence accuses ancient Greek civilisation of breaking 
‘the spell of “darkness”’, contributing thus to the ‘development of the conscious 
ego’ (‘Art and Morality,’ Study of Thomas Hardy 165). In contrast, in ancient 
Egypt, humans did not ‘see straight’ but fumbled in the dark […] and felt their own 
existence surging in the darkness of other creatures’ (165, emphasis in original). 
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According to Lawrence, while the absence of ‘straight’ sight in Egypt allowed for 
a form of coexistence rooted in tactile proximity, or what he calls in Fantasia of 
the Unconscious seeing with ‘the dark soul’ (103), the Greeks destroyed the 
preconscious harmony between self and world by placing the conscious ego in 
the limelight. 
Lawrence’s interest in ancient Egyptian culture can be traced back to the 
1910s, around the years when he was working on Women in Love. In a letter to 
Gordon Campbell, dated 21 September 1914, Lawrence wrote about his visit to 
the British Museum, where the Egyptian and Assyrian sculptures inspired him to 
formulate his theory of vision: 
 
We want to realise the tremendous non-human quality of life – it is 
wonderful. It is not the emotions, nor the personal feelings and 
attachments, that matter. These are all only expressive, and expression 
has become mechanical. Behind us all are the tremendous unknown 
forces of life, coming unseen and unperceived as out of the desert to the 
Egyptians […]. (Letters 2: 218) 
 
In his letter to Campbell, Lawrence made it clear that the ‘unknown’ and ‘unseen’ 
force he sought were different from Freud’s concept of the unconscious: ‘I am not 
Freudian and never was – Freudianism is only a branch of medical science – 
interesting’ (218). Lawrence did not think of the non-conscious ego as consisting 
of repressed feelings, but he considered it the deepest and most authentic part 
of the self, which had come under increased threat due to the mechanisation and 
intellectualisation of human life. What is more, Lawrence associated the 
mechanical explicitly with warfare, which, as he poignantly put it, ‘makes [him] 
sick’ and hateful towards mankind: ‘They are fools, and vulgar fools […]. I don’t 
even mind if they’re killed. But I do mind those who, being sensitive, will receive 
such a blow from the ghastliness and mechanical, obsolete, hideous stupidity of 
war, that they will be crippled beings […]’ (218). According to Lawrence, the kind 
of vision that might save humans from mechanical death can be found in ancient 
Egyptian culture. The Egyptians did not ‘see straight’ but instead employed a sort 
of backward vision, which allowed them to grasp the ‘tremendous unknown forces 
of life’ ‘behind’ them, and by blindly ‘fumbl[ing] in the dark’, become united with 
the surrounding universe. Lawrence pits against the dark union, advocated by 
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Egyptian art, the illuminated and perfectly ‘rounded’ Greek statues, which, as he 
puts it in an essay entitled ‘Him With His Tail in His Mouth’ (1925), illustrate the 
‘cutting apart business’ (Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine 316). ‘Greek 
rationalism’, according to Lawrence, is partly to be blamed for the loss of 
harmonious coexistence between humans and environment, a form of unity that 
characterised many older, ‘primitive’ artistic styles, such as the Egyptian, Aztec 
or Etruscan civilisations (Sketches of Etruscan Places 58).  
In the decades preceding Lawrence’s writing career, many art historians, 
especially in German-speaking countries, started to interpret art history as a kind 
of evolutionary theory that evolved from ‘primitive’ cultural trends (rooted primarily 
in tactility) to refined and complex styles, founded on vision, the allegedly noblest 
sense. In 1901, Austrian art historian, Alois Riegl (1858–1905), published a book 
entitled Late Roman Art Industry, in which he introduced the term Kunstwollen (a 
kind of zeitgeist, the artistic expression of the spirit of a particular historical 
period), which explains the shift from pre-modern artistic styles to classical and 
late Roman periods. Among Riegl’s areas of research was Egyptian art, which 
he associated with tactility, in contrast with Greek architecture and statuary, 
which appealed more to sight. However, the distinction between touch and sight 
remained problematic for the Austrian art historian. He described Egyptian art as 
nahsichtig (literally ‘near-sighted’), interpreted as a kind of tactile vision that 
presupposes the object’s bodily proximity (25). On the other hand, Greek culture 
illustrates the concept of Normalsicht, a form of perception that privileges sight 
but at the same time does not completely disregard tactility (25). Though, as 
Fiona Candlin suggests, Riegl did not wish to establish a hierarchy of different 
artistic periods and their corresponding sense perceptions, he nevertheless 
provided a theory according to which Egyptian art is ‘the result of a primitive 
sensory apparatus that could not easily distinguish individual objects. The 
Egyptians were like small children learning to focus’ (Candlin 140). Candlin’s 
summary of Riegl’s views might help us to reassess the problematic nature of 
Lawrence’s fascination with ‘primitive’ cultures.  
  Towards the end of ‘Excurse’ Birkin’s ‘fumb[ling] in the dark’ acquires 
explicitly sensuous and erotic connotations. After sending a telegram to Ursula’s 
parents, he steps out of the ‘lighted’ post-office, and the couple is enveloped in 
total obscurity (319). As they drive in the night, the lovers are overwhelmed by an 
irresistible desire for tactile contact. Ursula wishes ‘[t]o touch, mindlessly in 
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darkness to come in pure touching upon the living reality of him, […] his thighs of 
darkness’, while Birkin knows ‘her darkly, with the fullness of dark knowledge, 
[…] like an Egyptian, steadfast in perfectly suspended equilibrium’ (319). When 
they arrive to ‘a little circle of grass’, Birkin immediately extinguishes the lamps of 
the car. The sense of sight cancelled, he seeks tactile unity with Ursula, as he 
embraces ‘her forever invisible flesh’: ‘Quenched, inhuman, his fingers upon her 
unrevealed nudity were the fingers of silence upon silence, […] never to be seen 
with the eye, or known with the mind, only known as palpable revelation of living 
otherness’ (320). Though this visionless, mystical unity proves to be fragile, Birkin 
and Ursula nevertheless, succeed in momentarily creating Birkin’s ideal of ‘star-
equilibrium’: ‘a pure balance of two single beings’, who experience, through tactile 
union, each other’s ‘living otherness’ (WL 319, 148).  
Some critics have interpreted the final scene of ‘Excurse’ as an illustration 
of Lawrence’s phallic vision. Linda Ruth Williams, for example, argues that the 
form of obscurity lionised by Lawrence is always associated with males, while 
female characters are simply drawn (if not forced) into their father’s or lover’s 
aura of darkness (22–23). As she puts it, Birkin’s darkness ‘infects’ Ursula, who 
submits mindlessly to his blind sensuality (36). Indeed, Birkin’s description as an 
‘immobile, supremely potent’ Egyptian pharaoh, ‘full of unthinkable knowledge 
and unthinkable force’ poses some difficult questions (318). In Women in Love 
and his non-fictional writings Lawrence repeatedly depicts Egyptian statues as 
potent and robust, possessing a ‘pure and magic control, […] a force in darkness’ 
(WL 318). Evidently, this representation of Egyptian statuary is problematic for 
various reasons: besides its connotations of masculine supremacy, Lawrence’s 
tendency to reduce Egyptian art to the sculptures of pharaohs (as omnipotent 
rulers) is also disconcerting.  
Nevertheless, as Bell persuasively argues, Lawrence’s view on the 
‘primitive’ remains a complex problem in Women in Love. Bell suggests that 
Lawrence is the most successful at presenting the ‘primitive’ other when he pays 
attention to the spatial, temporal and cultural distance that separates modern 
humans from ancient civilisations. Birkin’s reaction to the wooden statuette of an 
African woman in labour, which he sees in Halliday’s flat, represents such as an 
example. Birkin’s ability to see the statuette as an aesthetic object, expressing a 
worldview that differs significantly from his own, allows him to ‘appreciate its 
nature without supposing that he can, or should, identify with it in a literalistic way’ 
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(Bell, Language and Being 129). He senses in the statuette something that he, 
as a modern man, has lost and though he longs for this pre-conscious spirit of 
wholeness, he also remains aware of the impossibility of reaching it through direct 
identification with the ‘primitive’.  
In ‘Excurse’, on the other hand, the ‘primitive’, this time associated with 
the figure of the Egyptian pharaoh, becomes problematic precisely due to Birkin’s 
failure to take into consideration his own historical distance from the mythical 
past. As Bell puts it, Birkin’s literal identification with the Egyptian ruler creates 
tension because ‘there is an emotional rhetoric which tries to render directly an 
experience fundamentally alien to his consciousness’ (129). In contrast to Ursula, 
who manages to maintain her historically ‘circumscribed’ identity while 
simultaneously being transported to a timeless-magical realm, Birkin is cut off 
from historical time in his mainly unsuccessful attempt at dissolving within the 
mythical. His failure originates partly from his refusal to accept his historically and 
socially determined human condition. He believes in his ability to breach the 
confines of historical time and attain a total union with the Egyptian pharaoh, an 
illusion that impedes him to realise the impossibility of his endeavour caused by 
the fact that the ‘awakened’ Greek spirit is already indelibly impregnated in his 
(upper) body. Birkin’s Egyptian ‘dark knowledge’ acquires connotations of danger 
because it threatens to erase differences between living beings. Obscurity 
cancels the contours of individual shapes, and renders the human flesh ‘forever 
invisible’. As shown in ‘Excurse’, Lawrence runs the risk of straining the meaning 
of inhuman mythical darkness to such an extent that the phrase loses its original 
significance of sensuous-sensual knowledge, and instead comes to denote an 
inhumane force that threatens to dissolve the essential interpersonal differences 
at the heart of sympathetic coexistence. In other words, the ‘tremendous non-
human quality of life’, associated with Egyptian darkness and initially set against 
the ‘mechanical […] stupidity of war’, risks becoming another form of violence, 
showing, in a paradoxical way, uncanny similarities with militarism.   
In ‘With the Guns’ (1914), an essay written around the time when he was 
working on The Rainbow and Women in Love, Lawrence explicitly linked 
darkness with the inhumane treatment of soldiers in the war. He recalls a scene 
he witnessed in Germany, at the bottom of the Alps: ‘amid woods and corn-clad 
hills […] [there] were three quick-firing guns, with the gunners behind. At the side, 
perched up on a tiny platform at the top of a high pair of steps, was an officer 
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looking through a fixed spy-glass’ (Twilight in Italy and Other Essays 81). The 
guns are described as possessing a will of their own, while the soldiers become 
mere prolongations of the ‘cold machine’ (82), executing, in a state of blind 
subordination, the orders of the officer looking at them rigidly through his ‘fixed 
spy-glass’. In a further passage Lawrence describes a night attack in which the 
soldiers formed  
 
a mass of scarcely visible forms, lying waiting for a rush. […] If [a] shell 
[…] had dropped among them, […] [t]here would just have been a hole in 
the living shadowy mass; that was all. Who it was it did not matter. […] 
There was only the mass lying there, solid and obscure along the bank of 
the road in the night. (82) 
 
Lawrence’s portrayal of soldiers under fire reveals the underlying violence in 
presenting people as mere obscure masses, devoid of unique contours. The 
depiction of humans as ‘solid and obscure’ abstractions curtails any feelings of 
sympathy due to the failure of caring for the individual differences impregnated in 
the ‘flesh and blood, […] soul and intelligence’, which constitute the living human 
matter that has been ruthlessly ‘shed away’ by the ‘iron insensate will’ (82). One 
of the main reasons why Lawrence hated the war can be captured in militarism’s 
tendency to make human subjects invisible, erasing their bodily outlines, which 
melt into a universal and seemingly invulnerable darkness. This illusory sense of 
immunity gives the essay its viscerally poignant tone. If soldiers are abstract 
masses, their wounds are equally abstracted: the exploding shells create unseen 
holes in the shadowy matter, an image that reinforces a sense of complete 
indifference to the fragile and bruised human flesh. Darkness transforms soldiers’ 
bodies into a kind of black hole that absorbs violent blows whose effects remain 
unperceivable in the living human fabric.  
While in Women in Love, darkness associated with pre-modern 
civilisations, despite its connotations of danger, remained a desirable state, 
representing a way of returning to the ‘physical mind’, in other writings, such as 
in ‘With the Guns’, Lawrence explicitly linked obscurity to military power and 
cruelty, which leave no space for sympathetic coexistence. Lawrence’s 
contradictory ideas about dark unity continued to occupy central stage in his later 
works too. While he never abandoned his theory of dark vision as a sensuous 
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bodily immersion in the world, in some of the writings preceding his death, such 
as Sketches of Etruscan Places, he started to explore the possibilities of a form 
of sympathy rooted in half-luminosity rather than total obscurity. Before turning to 
Sketches, however, the next section will explore the aesthetic affinities between 
Lawrence’s writings and Paul Cézanne’s art, a parallel that allows a better 
understanding of Lawrence’s interpretation of embodied vision as an important 
prerequisite of sympathy.  
 
Lawrence and Cézanne: the ‘appleyness’ of human character 
 
In his essay ‘Introduction to These Paintings’ (1929), Lawrence contemplates not 
only the artistic merits of Cézanne’s pictures but also, implicitly, the similarities 
between his own and the French painter’s methods. Lawrence describes 
Cézanne as ‘the sublime little grimalkin […] [which has] come back […] to form 
and substance and thereness, instead of delicious nowhereness’, the latter being, 
in Lawrence’s opinion, a characteristic of Impressionism (Late Essays 197, 
emphasis in original).32 What Lawrence admires in Cézanne is the latter’s ability 
to convey the world in its material substance, though not in the form of a mere 
realist imitation appealing to the eyes, but rather through a sense of physicality 
that yields not so much to vision as to touch: Cézanne ‘wanted to touch the world 
of substance once more with the intuitive touch, to be aware of it with the intuitive 
awareness, and to express it in intuitive terms’ (211). As the frequent repetition 
of the adjective ‘intuitive’ implies, Lawrence turns to Cézanne’s paintings because 
in the former’s view, the real value of the French painter’s art lies in the 
abandonment of the Impressionists’ ‘optical cliché’ and the embracing of the 
bodily and non-rational dimension of the object of perception (211). As Lawrence 
puts it, Cézanne ‘wished to displace our present mode of mental-visual 
consciousness, the consciousness of mental concepts, and substitute a mode of 
consciousness that was predominantly intuitive, the awareness of touch’ (211).  
Lawrence’s interpretation of Cézanne’s art chimes with Merleau-Ponty’s 
appreciation of the French painter who, according to the philosopher, wanted ‘to 
make visible how the world touches us’: ‘[In Cézanne’s pictures] we see the 
depth, the smoothness, the softness, the hardness of objects’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
                                                        
32 My aim here is not to comment on the artistic validity of Lawrence’s artistic claims, but rather 
to trace some similarities between his literary aesthetics and Cézanne’s art. 
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‘Cézanne’s Doubt’, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Readers, 70, 65, emphasis in 
original).33 Besides the tangible qualities of Cézanne’s paintings, Merleau-Ponty 
also notes the presence of an ‘inhuman’ element in the painter’s portraits, which 
makes his people seem ‘strange’: his pictures ‘suspend [existing] habits of 
thought and reveal the base of inhuman nature upon which man has installed 
himself’ (‘CD’ 66). By exploring Lawrence’s and Merleau-Ponty’s shared 
attraction to Cézanne, we can gain a better insight into Lawrence’s understanding 
of people’s inhuman nature and its role in interpersonal relationships.  
In his essays on visual art, Merleau-Ponty often reflects on Cézanne’s 
motivations for painting human faces as objects. In ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ Merleau-
Ponty quotes Cézanne, who reportedly said that portraying the human face ‘as 
an object’ does not obscure the subject’s psyche (66). In the philosopher’s 
interpretation, Cézanne did not wish to paint lifeless and mechanical models, 
devoid of thoughts and feelings. On the contrary, the painter wanted to capture 
his subjects’ complex inner world in an indirect way, through colour rather than 
minutely detailed, sharp outlines. As Merleau-Ponty writes: ‘One’s personality is 
seen and grasped in one’s glance, which is, however, no more than a 
combination of colors. Other minds are given to us only as incarnate, as 
belonging to faces and gestures.’ (‘CD’ 66) Merleau-Ponty is fascinated by 
Cézanne’s art because the former finds in it a confirmation of his own 
phenomenological ideas of embodiment: a person’s inner world is not concealed 
by an opaque corporeal layer but becomes visible precisely in and through the 
body. 34  This effect does not render the subject alien or lifeless but rather 
motivates the viewer to engage with the art object on a more sensuous and 
affective level, involving what Lawrence called ‘the whole imagination’, ‘that form 
of complete consciousness in which predominates the intuitive awareness of 
forms, images, the physical awareness’ (‘Introduction to These Paintings’ 212, 
207, emphasis in original). 
                                                        
33 Hereafter ‘CD’. 
34 Several art historians have commented on Cézanne’s ability to imbue his  figures with life and 
mobility, while simultaneously creating an ‘appley’ effect. Susan Sidlauskas, for example, argues 
that Cézanne did not reify his human models but rather ‘injected a capacity for near-human 
empathy and response into everything he painted’, including nonhuman entities (n.p.). Susan 
Sidlauskas. ‘Emotion, Color, Cézanne (The Portraits of Hortense).’ Nineteenth Century Art 
Worldwide, vol. 3, no. 2, 2004, 19thc-artworldwide.org/autumn04/67-
autumn04/autumn04article/299-emotion-color-cezanne-the-portraits-of-hortense. Accessed 26 
August 2018. 
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A genuine appreciation of Cézanne’s art presupposes the beholder’s bodily-
affective approach, or as Lawrence put it in ‘Art and Morality’ (1925), seeing ‘with 
your blood and your bones, as well as with your eyes’ (167). Lawrence’s view 
was shared by some of his fellow writers too. The Austrian poet Rainer Maria 
Rilke (1875–1926), for example, wrote how Madame Cézanne’s figure can be 
truly apprehended only in the blood: ‘my blood describes it within me, but the 
naming of it passes by somewhere outside and is not called in’ (70). Since 
Lawrence felt attracted to Cézanne’s paintings due to their depiction of bodily 
matter, he vehemently rejected any interpretation of Cézanne’s art as purely 
abstract, focusing exclusively on geometrical forms and spatial structure. 
Lawrence partly wrote his essay ‘Introduction to These Paintings’35 as a critique 
of Clive Bell’s and Roger Fry’s interpretation of Post-Impressionism, and 
importantly, their introduction of the term ‘significant form’.36 Bell defined the 
concept as ‘a combination of lines, or of lines and colours, that moves me 
aesthetically’, and considered Cézanne’s art a perfect example of how ‘significant 
form’ awakens aesthetic emotions in the beholder (12). In ‘Introduction to These 
Paintings’ Lawrence accuses ‘the critics’ of having turned Cézanne’s apples into 
abstractions: ‘Then [they] stepped forth and abstracted his good apple into 
Significant Form […]’ (203). Lawrence harshly critiques the Post-Impressionists’ 
reliance on ‘Significant Form’, which he considers a mannered abstraction 
without essence, a shadowy replica of palpable, living substance. In a 
passionately aggressive attack, he calls certain modernist painters, such as Henri 
Matisse and Maurice de Vlaminck, ‘shadows, minds mountebanking and playing 
charades on canvas’, while art critics appreciating the mentioned painters’ art are 
‘enlightened corpses of connoisseurs’ (204).37  
It is not coincidental that Lawrence reproached Bell and Fry for turning 
Cézanne’s apples into abstractions. For Lawrence, the apples represent the 
                                                        
35 Hereafter ‘ITP’. 
36 In a 1928 letter to S. S. Koteliansky, Lawrence asked his friend to send him a copy of Roger 
Fry’s book on Cézanne. Lawrence then added: ‘It would make a good starting point for me to 
write a good peppery foreword against all that significant form piffle’ (Letters 7: 82). A few weeks 
later, in January 1929, Lawrence wrote to Kot again, telling him that he had finished his essay on 
Cézanne, in which ‘[I have] slain Clive Bell. […] What a fool Clive Bell is!’ (Letters 7: 125).  
37 Lawrence’s allegedly straightforward dismissal of Bloomsbury art critics’ celebration of abstract 
form, however, can be misleading. As Anne Fernihough argues, Lawrence’s and Fry’s writings 
on Cézanne show at least as many similarities as disagreements, and Lawrence was probably 
more influenced by Fry’s criticism than the former admitted in ‘Introduction to These Paintings’ 




hallmark of Cézanne’s art: instead of lecturing the viewer about the painting’s 
geometrical composition, they confer a sense of tangibility, almost prompting the 
beholder to stretch out and grasp them. This mysterious sensuousness of the 
apples has the power to arrest the viewer, who turns his/her bodily-affective 
attention to the work of art. However, the tangibility of apples is far from being 
realistically restrictive: the fruit do not create the impression of being rigidly fixed 
within the borders of the picture. Rather, Cézanne achieves an effect of 
dynamism as though the apples were engaged in a sympathetic interaction with 
each other. Cézanne’s refusal to pin down the “identity” of apples fascinated 
Lawrence, and the latter applied what he called the subject’s ‘appley’ nature to 
Cézanne’s portraits too (‘ITP’ 212). 
In ‘Introduction’ Lawrence quotes the French painter’s notorious words – ‘Be 
an apple!’ – which the latter allegedly told his models when they failed to sit still. 
Lawrence interprets this imperative in a way that chimes with his own literary 
aesthetics:  
 
It is the appleyness of the portrait of Cézanne’s wife that makes it so 
permanently interesting: the appleyness, which carries with it also the feeling 
of knowing the other side as well, the side you don’t see, the hidden side of 
the moon. For the intuitive apperception of the apple is so tangibly aware of 
the apple that it is aware of it all round, not only just of the front. The eye 
sees only fronts, and the mind, on the whole, is satisfied with fronts. But 
intuition needs all-aroundness, and instinct needs insideness. The true 
imagination is for ever curving round to the other side, to the back of 
presented appearance. (212, emphasis in original) 
 
Lawrence admired Cézanne’s ability to capture the mysterious, unseen 
‘appleyness’ of his models, that not-easily-grasped dimension which cannot be 
directly conveyed through conventional visual techniques. According to 
Lawrence, the essence of human character lies precisely in that part of the 
subject’s being which is only partially captured through sight and rationality. The 
‘appley’ nature of the other is revealed only if one approaches him/her intuitively, 
with a tangible-physical awareness, an affective, ‘all round’ attention to the 
hidden, invisible parts of his/her bodily existence. As both Lawrence and Merleau-
Ponty suggest, Cézanne’s portraits succeed in awakening and retaining the 
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beholder’s attention because instead of offering a straightforward insight into the 
subject’s mind, they direct the viewer’s tactile-visual awareness to the indistinctly 
visible. By refusing to provide clear answers, or to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s words 
quoted earlier, by ‘suspend[ing] habits of thought’, Cézanne’s portraits expose 
the ‘appleyness’ of the models, whose existence cannot be pinned down to a 
particular idea or feeling but remains open to a multitude of interpretative 
possibilities.  
Lawrence’s intuitive reading of Cézanne has been recently corroborated 
by the infrared reflectograms of the paintings. Similarly to X-radiography, infrared 
reflectography is a technique that allows art historians to examine different paint 
layers and better understand the technical composition of a painting. Underlining 
Lawrence’s interpretation, Dita Amory suggests that the infrared reflectogram of 
Madame Cézanne in the Conservatory (1891) shows how Cézanne ‘was 
concerned primarily with the placement of the figure, but rather than definitive 
contours, he drew, very freely, multiple lines – zones of possibility – that allowed 
him to keep his options open and gradually home in on contours as he applied 
color’ (49). Lawrence tries to capture Cézanne’s ability to create ‘zones of 
possibility’ in the concept of ‘appleyness’, on which he elaborated in detail in 
‘Introduction to These Paintings’ and ‘Art and Morality’.  
 In order to better grasp Lawrence’s understanding of humans’ ‘appley’ 
nature, it is important to briefly return to his earlier essay ‘Art and Morality’, in 
which he contemplated the artistic value of Cézanne’s still lifes. The French 
painter’s apples represent the opposite of what Lawrence calls the ‘All-seeing 
Eye’, a form of conscious vision that separates figures from other figures and the 
background, thus making ‘each man […] an identity, an isolated absolute […] a 
Kodak snap, in a universal film of snaps’ (165). Cézanne’s apples, are not realistic 
in the sense that, in Lawrence’s view, a snapshot is, but rather they encapsulate 
a plethora of reading possibilities: ‘[s]ometimes they’re a sin, sometimes they’re 
a knock on the head, sometimes they’re a bellyache, sometimes they’re part of a 
pie, sometimes they’re sauce for the goose’ (166). In other words, the ‘unsteady’ 
nature of the fruit allows for the unfolding of their multifaceted existence, 
ungraspable through conscious sight, or the movements of the ‘All-seeing Eye’ 
(166). As such, Lawrence was drawn to the French painter’s works due to their 
resistance to let themselves be rigidly nailed down.   
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  In ‘Introduction to These Paintings’ Lawrence identifies as one of his 
favourite paintings the portrait of Madame Cézanne in a red dress because he 
considers it a perfect illustration of the principle of ‘appleyness’ (212). In 
Lawrence’s opinion, Cézanne made the hands and face of his figures – including 
his wife – ‘rudimentary’ ‘because if he had painted them in fully they would have 
been cliché’ (212). Lawrence’s appreciation of the Madame Cézanne portraits 
stems from their ‘rudimentary’ and blurred qualities, which subtly hint at the 
unseen and unknown aspects of her personality without unambiguously exposing 
them to clear light. During his life, Cézanne painted at least twenty-nine portraits 
of his wife, Hortense Fiquet (1850–1922), in several of which Madame Cézanne 
wears a red dress (Amory 3). In his essay Lawrence does not specify which 
portrait he has in mind, but two of the most famous paintings he probably knew 
were Madame Cézanne in a Red Dress (1888–90, currently held at the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York) and Madame Cézanne in a Yellow Chair 
(1888–1890, currently held at the Art Institute of Chicago). A detailed analysis of 
these art works goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but a brief glance on the 
second portrait is important insofar it illuminates Lawrence’s literary aesthetics.  
In Madame Cézanne in a Yellow Chair, Hortense sits in a chair in a long red 
dress, with her hands joined and her eyes slightly averted. One of the first things 
that strike the viewer is her perfect oval-shaped face, which almost creates the 
impression of being sculpted, its surface smoothed, excluding any irregularities. 
This technique, however, does not result in a minutely detailed, realist 
representation. The peculiarity of the woman’s face comes partly from its 
fragmentariness: the distorted quality of her eyes and mouth, and the strange 
illusory absence of her left ear, which render her persona mysterious, making the 
beholder continuously reappraise his/her abilities to capture the painted figure’s 
inner world.  
At a first glance, the ‘appley’ and statuesque face of Madame Cézanne 
might seem rigid and impenetrable, devoid of any identifiable thoughts and 
feelings. Nevertheless, what Lawrence found fascinating in the portrait is 
precisely Cézanne’s ability to soften hard borders, and reveal the 
interrelatedness of human and nonhuman shapes.38 Although the viewer sees 
                                                        
38 Cézanne’s biographer, Alex Danchev also notes that the artist’s tendency to paint his models’ 
heads like apples, does not necessarily suggest a desire for objectification or lack of emotion; on 
the contrary, it can be interpreted as a sign of love: ‘everyone [Cézanne] loved is associated with 
fruit, sooner or later’ (158). Alex Danchev. Cézanne: A Life. Profile Books, 2012.  
 65 
only a fragmentary part of Hortense’s complexion, the woman’s body creates an 
impression, to appropriate Lawrence’s phrase, of ‘all-aroundness’. The oval-
shaped outlines of the face do not seal off an unreachable, hidden mind but they 
rather open up the body’s boundaries to the domestic environment in which the 
subject’s corporeal existence is already imbricated. We cannot visually grasp the 
woman’s topknot, left ear or nape but we are intuitively aware of their existence, 
their interlacing with the colours of the background, just as the front of her body 
forms a soft-hued prolongation of her surroundings. The ‘grey-blue greenness’ of 
the wall (as Fry put it) is reflected in her eyes, neck and fingers but also in the 
folds of her dress and in the abstract motifs of the chair (Fry, Letters 2: 465). 
Furthermore, the red shades of her dress appear on her cheek, the yellow tints 
of the chair can be detected in her eyebrows and forehead, and the brown line in 
the wall is painted with the same colour as her hair. Cézanne’s mastery of colour 
creates an effect of firmly soft solidity: although different shapes can be relatively 
clearly delineated in the painting, their contours are not rigidly fixed but retain a 
great degree of flexibility, which in turn transmits a sense of malleability to the 
viewer him/herself. This kind of plasticity is what Lawrence called the 
‘appleyness’ of Madame Cézanne, which invites the beholder’s bodily response 
to the work of art. As Lawrence formulates, a genuine appreciation of Madame 
Cézanne’s portrait presupposes the viewer’s ‘physical awareness’, a form of ‘true 
imagination’ through which one does not pin down the object of perception with 
a fixing gaze but rather caressingly envelops it with an exploring look. Lawrence’s 
‘true’ or ‘whole’ imagination can be defined as a bodily-intuitive attention that 
transcends the limitations of rational sight by being able to ‘curve round to the 
other side’ and reveal the ‘back of presented appearance’: the hidden parts of the 
subject’s existence.  
 Lawrence did not dwell too much on the use of colour in the Madame 
Cézanne portrait, but he observed the intricate interrelatedness of subject and 
environment, which he attributed to Cézanne’s ability to create a harmony of 
movement and rest, ‘to make the human form, the life form, come to rest. Not 
static – on the contrary. Mobile but come to rest. And at the same time he set the 
unmoving material world into motion. Walls twitch and slide, chairs bend or rear 
up a little, cloths curl like burning paper.’ (‘ITP’ 213) In other words, Lawrence 
suggests that in Cézanne’s portraits human figures are not artificially separated 
from the background but they are interlaced with their environment in a way that 
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they almost represent an extension of their surroundings. Humans exist in a 
mutually formative relationship with non-living entities: subjects incorporate the 
stillness of objects while the latter acquire a lively quality, which is then (re-
)transmitted to human figures in an infinite cycle of interactions, or as Rilke 
famously put it: ‘[i]t’s as if every part were aware of all others’ in Cézanne’s 
paintings (71). The sense of consciousness Rilke mentions is not a rational 
phenomenon but is closer to what Lawrence called the ‘physical awareness’, a 
form of sensuous perception that creates space for sympathetic coexistence. 
Merleau-Ponty also notices the dynamic aspect of Cézanne’s paintings in which 
the world becomes ‘a system of colors across which the receding perspective, 
the outlines, angles, and curves are inscribed like lines of force; the spatial 
structure vibrates as it is formed’ (‘CD’ 65). This vibratory quality allows for a 
dynamic interaction between figure and background, which can no longer be 
unequivocally separated but become interwoven in the intricate tapestry of 
sympathy.  
 In Lawrence’s and Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation, Cézanne refused to 
view human figures and objects as rigidly solid and fixed entities; instead, he 
wished to capture them in the act of becoming, in their dynamic interweaving in 
the phenomenal flesh of the world. As Lawrence put it, Cézanne had an ‘intuitive 
feeling that nothing is really statically at rest […] as when he watched the lemons 
shrivel or go mildewed, in his still-life group, which he left lying there so long so 
that he could see the gradual flux of change […] (‘ITP’ 213–4, emphasis in 
original). Cézanne believed that the artist’s aim is to capture what Lawrence 
called in ‘Art and Morality’ the ‘intertwining flux’ (167), a sense of dynamism that 
appertains neither strictly to the object of perception nor to the sensing subject 
but is born in the interaction between self and world, or to appropriate Merleau-
Ponty’s words, in an ‘inter-world where I make as much room for the other as I 
do for myself’ (PP 373). Commenting on his own landscape paintings, Cézanne 
said: ‘[T]he earth [in Provence] always has a vibrant quality, a sharpness which 
makes the light tremble and the eyes flicker, but feel how subtle, how soft it is’ 
(Gasquet 160). The ‘vibrant quality’ represents a characteristic of the earth but at 
the same time it belongs to the perceiving subject, whose eyes start to ‘flicker’ as 
an act of response to the spectacle. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-
Ponty describes the subject’s rapport with the universe in terms of vibration:  
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[M]y movements and the movements of my eyes make the world vibrate – 
as one rocks a dolmen with one’s finger without disturbing its fundamental 
solidity. With each flutter of my eye-lashes a curtain lowers and rises, though 
I do not think for an instant of imputing this eclipse to the things themselves; 
with each movement of my eyes that sweep the space before me the things 
suffer a brief torsion, which I also ascribe to myself […]. (VI 7) 
 
On a first reading it might seem that Merleau-Ponty’s idea is a reverse formulation 
of Cézanne’s: the philosopher seems to suggest that the world’s vibration is 
actually a consequence of the perceiver’s eye movements. However, one can 
detect a slight hesitation in Merleau-Ponty’s argument. While he attributes 
objects’ mobility to the subject’s blinking gesture, at the same time he 
acknowledges the impossibility of identifying the precise origin of vibration: things 
become distorted in front of the flickering eyes but the subject’s stability is also 
shaken in the act of perception. Lawrence’s and Merleau-Ponty’s fascination with 
Cézanne thus stems partly from the painter’s ability to capture the vibratory 
existence of his object matter while simultaneously showing how this sense of 
dynamism is neither the inherent property of the thing nor the projection of the 
viewer’s gaze, but rather a phenomenon dependent on the intercorporeal 
coexistence of beholder and world. The emphasis falls on the word 
‘intercorporeal’, suggesting how Cézanne himself and his later admirers, among 
them Lawrence and Merleau-Ponty, thought that both the creation and 
interpretation of art transcend the realm of conventional forms of seeing. As art 
critic Jonathan Crary argues, Cézanne’s work ‘coincides with much more than a 
domain of the optical. […] [The painter] became attentive to the body, its pulsings, 
its temporalities, and to the intersection of that body with a world of transitions, of 
events and of becoming’ (289). Lawrence formulates a similar idea in ‘Art and 
Morality’, where he emphasises the non-visual (or at least non-conventionally 
visual) merits of Cézanne’s oeuvre, drawing a contrast between Cézanne’s art 
and humans’ condemnable ‘habit’ of ‘visualizing everything’ (165, emphasis in 
original):  
 
Each man to himself is a picture. That is, he is a complete little objective 
reality, complete in himself, existing by himself, absolutely, in the middle of 
the picture. All the rest is just setting, background. To every man, to every 
 68 
woman, the universe is just a setting to the absolute little picture of himself, 
herself. (165) 
 
What Cézanne’s later critics, Lawrence, Merleau-Ponty and Crary, appreciate, is 
the painter’s ability to ‘disclose the provisional and fluid nature of visual 
experience’ through the distortive flickering of the glancing eye, rather than 
through sharpness and clarity associated with the fixed, unmoving eye (Crary 
300). Cézanne’s art questions Western metaphysical definitions of sight as a 
source of objective, infallible knowledge; instead, his oeuvre (especially his later 
works) activates the phenomenological gaze: the movements of the flexible eyes 
that do not stare at the object of perception, trying to freeze it, but rather, to 
borrow Merleau-Ponty’s beloved word, envelop the other, ‘curving round to the 
other side’ and unveiling the concealed parts unavailable to conventional vision. 
In Lawrence’s opinion, Cézanne achieves this effect through revealing the 
‘appley’ nature of his figures: their soft solidity that allows for their intimate 
imbrication in the flesh of the world.  
  Nevertheless, an examination of Lawrence’s views on Cézanne would be 
incomplete without briefly elaborating on the writer’s tendency to present 
Cézanne as a ‘primitive’ painter. Lawrence’s repeated emphasis on the intuitive 
and physical nature of the painter’s works, and more importantly the sharp 
contrast he draws between Cézanne’s and other Post-Impressionists’ oeuvre, 
pose some problematic questions. As already mentioned, in ‘Introduction to 
These Paintings’ Lawrence accuses Matisse and Vlaminck of creating dead 
shadows, formal abstractions without any bodily essence. Cézanne, on the other 
hand, chose to ‘draw’ differently not because he did not understand anything 
‘about drawing or significant form or aesthetic ecstasy [but because] he didn’t 
give a spit for them’ (206). In Lawrence’s interpretation, Cézanne became a great 
artist when he abandoned the struggle between mental-rational and bodily 
consciousness, which characterised the initial phase of his career, and embraced 
the physical and sensual qualities of life (206–7). As such, Cézanne showed 
‘honesty’, while Matisse was nothing more than ‘a clever mental creature’ who 
‘prostitute[d] [his] body to [his] mind’ (207). 
The contrast Lawrence makes between Cézanne and his fellow painters, 
however, is not only untenable but also runs the risk of offering a highly 
subjective, and partially falsified portrait of the French artist. Cézanne, after all, 
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was heavily influenced by Post-Impressionism, and as several art historians have 
argued, he did ‘give a spit’ for formal qualities and technical accuracy. The 
infrared reflectograms of his paintings reveal his preoccupation with geometrical 
shapes, and though his paintings contain unfinished spaces, or to borrow 
Amory’s phrase, ‘zones of possibilities’, the composition of his works – from the 
arrangement of apples to the position of Madame Cézanne’s eyes – suggests a 
conscious, and indeed measured, artistic choice. Charlotte Hale, who has 
examined the portraits of Madame Cézanne in detail, claims that Cézanne had a 
habit of going back to certain details on the painting after the paint had dried, and 
the model was no longer present (qtd. in Elderfield 133, 136).39 Furthermore, a 
close look at the artist’s sketchbooks shows that he was a conscious draftsman 
who did indeed utilise his academic training (in drawing) when planning his 
paintings (Shelley 109). Ultimately, by locating Cézanne in an anti-Post-
Impressionist canon, Lawrence risks neglecting the cultural context from which 
the painter emerged and which determined his artistic development. By trying to 
save Cézanne from ‘ready-known cliché[s]’, Lawrence, at times, ignores certain 
aspects of the painter’s art, while celebrating others, in order to make them fit his 
own literary aesthetics of physical sympathy (‘ITP’ 212). In Sketches of Etruscan 
Places, written roughly in the same years as his Cézanne-essays, Lawrence 
elaborates on an artistic theory that resembles his reading of Cézanne in many 
ways. In Sketches, however, Lawrence paid a more careful attention to the 
historical-cultural context in which the Etruscan cave frescoes were painted. This, 
to an extent, proved to be a more suitable task for Lawrence because the 
Etruscan paintings were literally created in a pre-modern period, an era that 
Lawrence associated with cosmic sympathy: humans’ harmonious bodily 
coexistence with the universe.  
 
Towards ‘complete vision’: Sketches of Etruscan Places 
 
As Simonetta de Filippis remarks in her introduction to Sketches of Etruscan 
Places, Lawrence’s interest in Etruscan culture dates back to his early twenties, 
when he immersed in books such as Honoré de Balzac’s The Magic Skin (1831) 
and James G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890–1915) (de Filippis xxiii). 
                                                        
39  The exhibition catalogue to which Elderfield refers, is Charlotte Hale. ‘A Template for 
Experimentation.’ Madame Cézanne. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 2014–2015.  
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However, Lawrence started to consider writing a book on the Etruscans only in 
1926, when he was staying in Italy, and planned to visit the archeological 
remnants of Etruria (de Filippis xxiii). Due to health reasons and his 
preoccupation with Lady Chatterley’s Lover (he was working on the first and 
second drafts), he was forced to postpone his trip, but when he finally had the 
opportunity to admire the Etruscan cave frescoes, he became fascinated with 
Etruscan art, which he viewed as a perfect illustration of his ideas of embodied 
sympathy: 
 
The subtlety of etruscan [sic] painting, as of Chinese and Hindu, lies in the 
wonderfully suggestive edge of the figures. It is not outlined. It is not what 
we call ‘drawing.’ It is the flowing contour where the body suddenly leaves 
off, upon the atmosphere. […] There is actually no modelling. The figures 
are painted in flat. Yet they seem of a full, almost turgid muscularity. It is 
only when we come to the late Tomb of Typhon that we have the figure 
modelled, Pompeian style, with light and shade. (123–124, emphasis in 
original)      
 
Lawrence preferred the frescoes of earlier periods, in which he detected an 
organic and harmonious relationship between figure and background, in contrast 
with the ‘modelled’ paintings, heavily influenced by the Roman style. What is 
more, he made an evident link between Roman culture and military violence, 
more precisely fascism that started to gain power at the time. He resented the 
fact that the original name of the Etruscan town Corneto-Tarquinia was changed 
by the Fascists into Tarquinia, to reflect the Roman origins of Italy: on the plaque 
located on the city gateway one can see the ‘Latinised etruscan [sic]’ name 
‘Tarquinia’, ‘put up by the Fascist power to name and unname’ (31). At the same 
time, it is important to mention that Lawrence’s wish to establish a contrast 
between the Etruscan and Roman styles, led to an arbitrary and somewhat 
falsified presentation of Etruscan art. As David Ellis argues, Lawrence tends to 
ignore certain aspects of Etruscan civilisation, such as their cruel treatment of 
slaves. Ellis notes how Lawrence ignores historical facts that proved the violent 
nature of the Etruscans, such as ‘a painting in one of the tombs, which shows a 
man with a sack over his head being attacked by a dog held on a leash’ (352). 
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Similarly to his reading of Cézanne, Lawrence neglects facts that did not suit his 
goals, and magnified those characteristics that justified his own perspective.    
Despite its highly subjective nature, Sketches nevertheless remains an 
important text in helping critics to gain a better understanding of Lawrence’s 
literary aesthetics. Lawrence set against the Romans’ aggressive form of 
memorialisation and racial supremacy the Etruscans’ ability to exist in a common 
‘blood-stream’ with the universe (124). The ‘small, dainty, fragile, and 
evanescent’ ‘wooden temples’ and frescoes of the Etruscans, with their ‘freely-
modelled’ figures, ‘gay dancing creatures, rows of ducks […] and faces grinning 
and putting out a big tongue’ preserve the ‘fluid and changing’ quality of life more 
authentically than the ‘heavy monuments’ of the Romans (32). Therefore, the 
Etruscans’ artistic achievement ‘is a task surely more worthy […] than conquering 
the world or sacrificing the self or saving the immortal soul’ (33). Lawrence 
showed an acute sensibility for the fragility and ephemerality of human life, which, 
in his opinion, the Etruscans rendered masterfully in their cave paintings, 
statuettes and buildings, ultimately, in the ‘things that are alive and flexible, which 
won’t last too long and become an obstruction and a weariness’ (33).  
At the same time, Lawrence’s antipathy for the Romans nods back to his 
earlier ideas about an evolutionary approach to art history, as put forward by 
Riegl. In Lawrence’s view, the ‘primitive’ style of the Etruscans and Egyptians, 
based on universal tactile contact rather than rational vision, is far more authentic 
and easier to sympathise with than the allegedly more sophisticated artworks 
created by the Greeks and Romans.40 All the things Lawrence appreciates in 
twentieth-century Italy (at least his own version of Italy) originated from Etruscan 
culture, which he considers the opposite of an oppressive, violent regime, 
epitomised by the Romans: 
 
Because the Roman took the life out of the Etruscan, was he therefore 
greater than the Etruscan? Not he! Rome fell, and the Roman 
phenomenon with it. Italy today is far more etruscan [sic] in its pulse, than 
                                                        
40 Lawrence believed that Etruscan art, similarly to Egyptian culture, evoked the sense of touch. 
He considered the banquet scene in the Tomb of the Painted Vases as a perfect illustration of 
the ‘slow flow of touch’: ‘Rather gentle and lovely is the way [the man] touches the woman under 
the chin, with a delicate caress. That again is one of the charms of the etruscan [sic] paintings: 
they really have the sense of touch; the people and the creatures are all really in touch. […] Here, 
in this faded etruscan [sic] painting, there is a quiet flow of touch that unites the man and the 
woman on the couch, the timid boy behind, the dog that lifts his nose, even the very garlands that 
hang from the wall’ (54).   
 72 
Roman: and will always be so. The etruscan [sic] element is like the grass 
of the field and the sprouting of corn, in Italy: it will always be so. Why try 
to revert to the Latin-Roman mechanism and suppression? (36) 
 
The image of the growing grass and sprouting corn suggests a sense of 
regeneration, corroborated by the repetition of the phrase ‘it will always be so’. 
The cornfield evoked in Sketches differs strikingly from the apocalyptic image of 
the ‘corn-clad hills’ in ‘With the Guns’, where the ‘iron’ soldiers create a dark mass 
of abstraction totally incompatible with the golden hill, the ‘beautiful blue sky’ and 
‘white clouds from the mountains’ (Twilight in Italy 81). 
 Furthermore, as de Filippis briefly mentions, Lawrence’s view of Etruria 
owes much to Frazer’s The Golden Bough, especially to chapter IX, entitled ‘The 
Worship of Trees’ (xxiii). Indeed, in this section Frazer elaborates on the sacred 
significance of trees for different nations, and at the beginning of the chapter he 
mentions how a Roman general led his troops in the previously unexplored forest 
separating Rome from central Etruria: ‘it was deemed a most daring feat when a 
Roman general, after sending two scouts to explore its intricacies, led his army 
into the forest and, making his way to a ridge of the wooded mountains, looked 
down on the rich Etrurian fields spread out below’ (8). There is a sense of violence 
in this passage, as though the Roman general committed sacrilege by literally 
invading the forest and then looking down on the fertile Etruscan fields from the 
top of a mountain, with the evident desire of conquering them. As such, the 
general bears a slight resemblance to the officer in ‘With the Guns’, ‘perched up’ 
on the top of the steps and staring at the abstract mass of soldiers through a ‘spy-
glass’. In Sketches Lawrence formulates his evident rejection of military 
suppression in general, and more particularly his implicit critique of the Fascist 
Party and its glorification of Roman heritage. Instead, he believes that modern 
humans should (at least partially) embrace the preconscious harmony that 
characterised many ancient civilisations, such as the Etruscan and Egyptian.  
Indeed, we can see a striking resemblance between Lawrence’s views on 
Etruscan and Egyptian art. 41  As Abbie Garrington observes, in Lawrence’s 
                                                        
41  In Sketches Lawrence drew explicit parallels between the two civilisations. He likened a 
tumulus at Cerveteri to an Egyptian tomb: ‘Beyond again is a rock doorway, rather narrow, and 
narrowing upwards, like Egypt. The whole thing suggests Egypt […]’ (17). Later, Lawrence 
described his visit in a tumulus at Vulci as ‘burrowing inside some ancient pyramid’, literally 
groping his way in the cave dimly lit by the guide’s flickering candle (150–1). 
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writings, the ‘hieroglyphic way of seeing’ becomes ‘quintessentially haptic, given 
the conflation of figure and ground offered by Egyptian depictions that do not 
contain shadow or foreshortening, and therefore invite the touch’ (157). Following 
in the footsteps of Riegl, Lawrence associates techniques such as shadowing 
and foreshortening with the mental and ocularcentric art of the classical Greek 
and Renaissance periods, which ‘crucified’ the ‘procreative body for the 
glorification of the spirit, the mental consciousness’ (‘ITP’ 203). Lawrence 
considers Plato ‘an arch-priest of this crucifixion’, as the latter’s cave allegory 
transformed palpable matter into mere shadowy abstraction, thus making the 
world a ‘wide tomb full of ghosts, replicas’ (203). Partly distorting Plato’s original 
idea, Lawrence formulates an idiosyncratic definition of the notion of shadow: 
‘[B]y shadow I mean idea, concept, the abstracted reality, the ego. We are not 
solid. We don’t live in the flesh.’ (203) For Lawrence, ‘liv[ing] in the flesh’ means 
a state of bodily-sensuous immersion in the surrounding world, which is best 
represented in ‘primitive’ arts that require a sort of hieroglyphic vision.  
As Garrington also notes, Lawrence draws a parallel between the 
hieroglyphic sight of ancient civilisations and the intuitive perception of the child: 
‘When a child sees a man, what does the child take in […]? Two eyes, a nose, a 
mouth of teeth, two straight legs, two straight arms: a sort of hieroglyph which the 
human child has used through all ages to represent man’ (‘Art and Morality’ 164, 
emphasis in original). For Lawrence, the flat, two-dimensional stick man figures 
drawn by Egyptians and Etruscans illustrate the organic bodily harmony humans 
established with their environment: a form of coexistence in which the human ego 
did not occupy a position of dominance. Instead, the ‘flowing contour’ of the flat 
silhouettes allowed for the subject’s sensuous intertwining with the world, without 
annihilating his/her individual borders. In Etruscan paintings, ‘things appeared 
alive […] in the dusk of contact with all things’, yet at the same time, ‘each thing 
had a clear outline’ and was related to other entities in a common ‘blood-stream’, 
‘unbroken, yet storming with oppositions and contradictions’ (Sketches 124, 125). 
The phrase ‘dusk of contact with all things’ recalls Ursula’s experience in 
‘Excurse’, when gently enveloped in the fading luminosity of the twilight, she 
immerses in the flesh of the world. 
 Lawrence’s depiction of the Etruscan frescoes echoes his ideas on 
Cézanne’s portraits formulated in ‘Introduction to These Painting’ and ‘Art and 
Morality’. The ‘suggestive edge[s]’ of the Etruscan figures recall the softly blurred 
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outlines of Madame Cézanne’s body, which appears as a continuous 
prolongation of the pictorial background. Furthermore, in Sketches Lawrence 
defines ‘the dusk of contact’ as an emotional ‘fusing’ of ‘mentally contradictory’ 
things, ‘so that a lion could be at the same moment also a goat, and not a goat’, 
in a similar vein as Cézanne’s apples could represent ‘sometimes […] a sin, 
sometimes […] a knock on the head’ or a ‘bellyache’ (Sketches 124; ‘Art and 
Morality’ 166). The impossibility of pinning down the identity of the ‘thing’ with 
exactness, however, is not an artistic flaw, but just as in Cézanne’s still lifes and 
portraits, imprecision suggests the subject’s multifaceted nature and allows the 
viewer’s greater interpretative freedom. As Wallace succinctly puts it: what is at 
stake in Sketches ‘is the ability to think the human in terms of multiplicity and 
synchronicity, to reconsider organicism not as wholeness but as an “unthinkable” 
agglomeration of contradictory states which together constitute only a “potential”’ 
(189). What Lawrence calls in ‘Introduction to These Paintings’ Madame 
Cézanne’s ‘appleyness’, appears in Sketches as the ‘horsiness’ of the Etruscan 
horse, admired by Lawrence during his visit in The Tomb of the Baron (510–500 
B.C.):  
 
What is it that a man sees, when he looks at a horse? […] For a man who 
sees not as a camera does when it takes a snapshot, not even as a 
cinema-camera, taking its succession of instantaneous snaps; but in a 
curious rolling flood of vision […]. [T]he camera can neither feel the heat 
of the horse, his strange body; nor smell his horsiness; nor hear him neigh. 
[…] The eye really ‘sees’ all this. It is the complete vision of a child, full and 
potent. But this potent vision in us is maimed and pruned as we grow up 
[…]. (127–128)  
 
As in his musings on Cézanne, in Sketches Lawrences advocates an alternative 
vision, a kind of perception that differs significantly from the realistic ‘camera 
vision’ that sees things ‘as they are’ (Sketches 127, emphasis in original). The 
cold and rigid camera-eye is unable to register the ‘horsiness’ of the horse, which 
cannot be simply defined as the mere sum of visual impulses but consists of an 
amalgamation of sensorial attributes, requiring the activation of touch, smell and 
hearing alike. The traces of this ‘complete vision’ which, Lawrence deemed, 
modern humans have lost, can be found in the child’s way of looking at the world 
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as well in the cultural artifacts of certain pre-modern civilisations. At the same 
time, Lawrence’s emphasis on ‘complete vision’ draws attention to the 
importance of sight in artistic (and interpersonal) sympathy. Undoubtedly, 
Lawrence continued to dismiss sharp visual clarity, but in contrast with the 
uniform Egyptian darkness advocated earlier in Women in Love, in Sketches his 
attention turned towards the partially dim, semi-luminous atmosphere 
surrounding the frescoes. He considered the sight of figures (as mere imitations 
of reality) insufficient for a genuine artistic experience, but he also realised that 
total obscurity curtails the very possibility of the viewer’s emotional response. The 
artistic value of the Etruscan frescoes lies in their ability to reveal how things are 
‘alive […] in the dusk of contact with all things’, a state of half-luminosity in which 
silhouettes do not merge into an indistinguishable mass of darkness but retain 
their softly drawn individual borders. 
In order to truly appreciate Etruscan art and Cézanne’s paintings, 
Lawrence suggests, it is not enough to visually interpret the interplay of forms 
and colours, or what Bloomsbury art critics called ‘significant form’. Instead, the 
fixed and rigid eye needs to acquire a sense of softness and flexibility, qualities 
which result in a form of tender vision that is capable of enveloping the object of 
perception, revealing not only the front but also the ‘back of presented 
appearance’. This kind of sight (similar to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of binocular 
vision) represents the opposite of rational, sharp focalisation that is unable to 
perceive figure and background in unity, instead it emphasises the centrality of 
the (human) subject, which becomes a symbol of dominance for Lawrence. As 
he puts it in ‘Art and Morality’: the human figure becomes ‘a complete little 
objective reality […] in the middle of the picture. All the rest is just setting […]’ 
(165). Lawrence’s artistic vision is close to Noël Carroll’s concept of emotional 
attention.42 The kind of attention advocated by Carroll can be described as a 
process of sympathetic selection, which does not place one figure above or in 
front of the other, but while collecting all details into ‘significant wholes’ (in the 
sense of ‘potentials’, as Wallace puts it), it preserves their individual boundaries: 
‘The emotions operate like a searchlight, foregrounding […] details in a special 
phenomenological glow’ (226). The ‘phenomenological glow’ of the searchlight 
                                                        
42 Martin uses Carroll’s quotation to show the contradiction between emotional attention and ‘the 
monotonous surface of The Plumed Serpent’ (179). 
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does not fall sharply on one privileged detail but rather embraces the figures in a 
semi-luminous halo, the ‘widening circle’ of sympathy. 
Lawrence knew well what it meant to explore paintings under the dim glow 
of a ‘searchlight’. His beloved Etruscan frescoes were painted on the walls of 
subterranean tombs that could be visited with a guide, who used an acetylene 
lamp to light the way (Sketches 44). Lawrence described his encounter with the 
first fresco in the Tomb of Hunting and Fishing as a softly luminous experience, 
devoid of sharp clarity not only due to the absence of daylight but also because 
of the damaging effects of time. However, the marks of the ‘paleness of time’ (45) 
do not hinder the viewer in appreciating the artwork; on the contrary, they facilitate 
a deeper response by activating ‘complete vision’: a complex bodily reaction 
characterised by an amalgamation of various sense perceptions. Indeed, 
Lawrence depicted the acetylene lamp as an object that activates not only sight 
but smell too: ‘[t]he lamp begins to shine and smell’ (Sketches 44). Furthermore, 
acetylene lamps (or carbide lamps) were also known to produce heat, and were 
used by cavers and miners to prevent hypothermia (Matthews 30). As such, 
besides sight and smell, the lamp also presupposed the sense of tactility. At the 
same time, the type of carbide lamps used in caves, had a reflector behind the 
flame, which made the light cast in a semi-circle, improving peripheral vision, 
instead of sharply directing the rays onto a specific point in space, creating thus 
the perfect ambience for a whole-body, sympathetic exploration.43  
Lawrence’s ‘widening circle’ of sympathy, though never devoid of 
contradictions and conflicts, achieves its full roundness in Sketches. In his 
musings on Etruscan art, Lawrence formulates a theory of fellow feeling based 
on the harmonious and sensuous coexistence of humans and the universe, a 
form of proximity he identified in pre-modern cultures. Though his celebration of 
‘primitive’ darkness remains present in Sketches, a faint beam of light starts to 
make its way into the text, softly illuminating the frescoes surrounded by the 
‘paleness of time’. Virginia Woolf, the central figure of the next chapter, will 
expand on Lawrence’s ideas of semi-luminosity, showing the importance of half-
light in interpersonal and aesthetic sympathy. However, Woolf draws attention to 
the significance of shadows, which, in contrast with Lawrence, she does not view 
as mental abstractions but soft shapes imbued with colour and physical 
                                                        
43  For further details on the operating mechanism of the acetylene lamp, see: 
www.americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_872185.   
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Virginia Woolf: ‘the manner of our seeing’ 
 
 
It is thus that we live, they say, driven by an unseizable force. They say 
that the novelists never catch it; that it goes hurtling through their nets and 
leaves them torn to ribbons. This, they say, is what we live by – this 
unseizable force. (137) 
 
The often-cited quotation from Virginia Woolf’s Jacob’s Room (1922) is fraught 
with references to tactile failure: ‘unseizable’, ‘never catch it’; ‘goes hurtling 
through their nets’.44 Indeed, Woolf’s novel has often been either accused or 
praised for its abstract qualities such as the absence of a clear storyline and the 
disembodied nature of the protagonists. One of the first commentators of the 
novel, Leonard Woolf called the book a ‘work of genius’ but at the same time drew 
attention to the ‘strange’ ephemerality of characters which he described as 
‘ghosts […] puppets moved hither & thither by fate’ (Diary 2: 186). As Woolf 
records in the same diary entry, her husband ‘doesn’t agree that fate works in 
this way’ (186). However, while Leonard considered the novel Woolf’s ‘best work’ 
so far, other reviewers were not unequivocally convinced by her literary 
innovations. W. L. Courtney, a reviewer for the Daily Telegraph, for instance, 
employed the same puppet-metaphor as Leonard Woolf, but in an undoubtedly 
pejorative sense: ‘Mrs Woolf confidently chatters as though she were seated in 
an armchair playing with her puppets’ (Majumdar and McLaurin 104). To 
associate Woolf with a puppeteer, as this chapter argues, falsifies the essence of 
her writing, which is grounded in her rejection of ‘confident’ ‘playing with’ others, 
a form of violent interaction closely linked to patriarchal and military logic.  
                                                        
44 Hereafter JR.  
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Later critics have also observed the “uncatchable” nature of Jacob’s 
character, which resists the reader’s attempt to pin him down. Kathleen Wall 
identifies as one of the defining characteristics of the novel the narrator’s limited 
perspective, which can be noticed in the protagonist’s continuous absence, or 
what she calls the ‘Jacob-shaped hole’ of the narrative (306), while Alex 
Zwerdling calls Jacob a ‘classic instance of psychological inscrutability in fiction’ 
(62). All these metaphors – ghost, puppet, hole – underline Jacob’s elusive 
character, which, according to critics, continuously escapes the reader’s touch by 
retreating into immateriality.  
In her introduction to Jacob’s Room, Sue Roe argues that the modernist 
novel, especially Woolf’s experimental works, have radically questioned the 
relationship between the longing subject and the object of desire: ‘If we cannot 
ever fully know ourselves, how could it ever be possible to possess another 
person? Desire is a striving for that which cannot be known; the object of desire 
constantly falls just outside the boundaries of the subject’s reach.’ (p. xxv). But 
does Jacob completely elude those wishing to capture him? This might be the 
case if we insist on using the term ‘desire’ when discussing interpersonal 
relationships in the novel. After all, desire means yearning for an unreachable 
object (as soon as it is grasped, even if only partially, it ceases to be desire). 
Nonetheless, if we opt for ‘sympathy’, we will find that in Woolf’s fiction human 
beings are not portrayed as infinitely opaque and impenetrable to each other. 
Sympathy, in the sense in which I have used it throughout this study, often 
contains elements of erotic yearning, but is not limited to these. The form of fellow 
feeling at the heart of this thesis is a nuanced, historically and culturally 
determined phenomenon that emerged in the modernist period, plagued by the 
major military conflicts of the twentieth century: the two world wars. Woolf, 
similarly to her fellow writers, Lawrence and Bowen, was deeply concerned with 
the possibilities of feeling for others after the wars as well as following a significant 
artistic shift in literature: the emergence of modernism as a partial reaction to 
earlier literary periods, such as the Edwardian period.  
While working on Jacob’s Room, Woolf had strong reasons to turn against 
Edwardian writers, especially Arnold Bennett, who in 1920 published a series of 
essays under the title Our Women. In his collection Bennett argued that men 
possessed higher cognitive and creative capacities than women, and the latter 
could never reach male intellectual standards, despite their improved access to 
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education. Bennett’s book was reviewed favourably by Affable Hawk (pseudonym 
for literary critic Desmond MacCarthy, 1877–1952) in the New Statesman, a fact 
that compelled Woolf to write an outraged letter to the editor of the newspaper. 
In this letter Woolf defended women’s creativity, going back to Sappho, whom 
even Plato and Aristotle considered a great poetess (New Statesman, 9 October 
1920, 15–16). Indeed, Jacob’s Room abounds in references to ancient Greek 
culture, and Woolf uses Greek allusions (of statuary) to simultaneously critique 
male creativity – characterised by rigidity and hardness – and unveil the 
unrecognised artistic activity of a whole generation of interwar women, who 
provided a softer, more sympathetic way of modelling human nature in the 
aftermath of the First World War.  
 For Woolf, sympathetic character-making means an artistic approach that 
renders the other as finitely and fragmentarily knowable. Sympathy does by no 
means presuppose that one can gain complex knowledge about the other. On 
the contrary, the essence of fellow feeling lies in the impossibility of arbitrarily 
possessing the object of sympathy. Total ownership is a kind of violence firmly 
rejected by Woolf, but the inability to establish tangible intimacy is equally 
disregarded, a fact that has often been overlooked in Woolf criticism. As such, 
Woolf’s characters are not mere ghosts (as Leonard Woolf suggested) or holes 
in the narrative fabric (as Wall remarked) but they can rather be considered 
‘hollows’ in the phenomenological sense of the word.45  
 By reading Woolf’s works in parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of 
sympathetic perception, this chapter explores what it means to feel for the living 
and fragile body, often exposed to violent forces beyond human control. Through 
tracing Woolf’s artistic interests – that range from classical Greek statuary to 
                                                        
45 Sarah Cole has gone so far as to suggest that Jacob’s Room is infused with a sense of 
‘inhumanity’ originating from the protagonist’s unfinished nature: ‘In setting him up for violent 
death, […] Woolf has built obliteration into his very being. At its most extreme, we might even say 
that the novel’s formal proclivities, its construction of pattern and shapes […] is pitted against its 
humanity. To keep true to its vision of people as little bits of historical flotsam, the novel leaves 
its own creations empty, hollow.’ (240) Cole’s interpretation seems indeed ‘extreme’. After all, 
Jacob’s Room, as I will argue, is rather a novel of remembrance than obliteration; or to put it 
differently, a novel built of worn memory shards, carefully put together by the people who have 
once loved, despite only partially knowing, Jacob. Moreover, the novel’s preoccupation with 
‘pattern and shapes’ is not necessarily a sign of ‘inhumanity’ but rather a technique (partially 
influenced by Roger Fry’s Post-Impressionist theories) that allowed Woolf to explore how the 
intricate coexistence of form and colour can trigger our sympathetic response. And finally, while 
people, especially soldiers, are indeed helplessly exposed to violent historical forces, human 
character in Jacob’s Room is not always an empty hole but a hollow whose flexuous borders 
encircle softly its fragile contents. Sarah Cole. At the Violet Hour: Modernism and Violence in 
England and Ireland. Oxford University Press, 2012.  
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nineteenth-century photography and Post-Impressionism – I examine the 
possibilities and dangers of capturing human character in Jacob’s Room and To 
the Lighthouse (1927).46 For Woolf, at least in her 1920s novels, ideas about 
knowing human nature intertwine with acts of memorialising: narrator and 
characters alike are preoccupied with ways of memory preservation. By rejecting 
official forms of memorialisation (such as the erection of grandiose war 
monuments), Woolf advocates an alternative form of remembrance, which 
instead of glorifying either famous statesmen or anonymous masses, turns, with 
careful attention, to the individual contours of vulnerable and imperfect bodies.  
 
‘If I were a painter’: Post-Impressionism and the phenomenology of touch 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s and Woolf’s ideas about intimate coexistence elucidate each 
other on several levels. During a visit at the home of his friend, Timmy Durrant, 
Jacob meets his sister Clara, whose attraction is hard to resist. Jacob offers to 
help Clara pick grapes in the greenhouse, where, while holding the ladder for her, 
he is mesmerized by her ineffable beauty:  
 
‘There’s another bunch higher up,’ murmured Clara Durrant, mounting 
another step of the ladder. Jacob held the ladder as she stretched out to 
reach the grapes high up on the vine.  
‘There!’ she said, cutting through the stalk. She looked semi-transparent, 
pale, wonderfully beautiful up there among the vine leaves and the yellow 
and purple bunches, the lights swimming over her in coloured islands. 
Geraniums and begonias stood in pots along planks; tomatoes climbed 
the walls. 
‘The leaves really want thinning,’ she considered, and one green one, 
spread like the palm of a hand, circled down past Jacob’s head. (51) 
 
As he admires Clara among the ripe bunches of grapes, Jacob observes how 
she gradually becomes half-transparent, at once pale and inundated with the 
colours of nature. Her paleness acquires an almost ghostlike quality, an idea 
further corroborated by her actions, her mounting of the step, which renders her 
out of Jacob’s reach. But Woolf, notoriously preoccupied with every single word 
                                                        
46 Hereafter TTL. 
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written on the pages of her novels, is careful enough not to portray her female 
protagonist as a mere bodiless phantom.47 Instead, the narrator emphasises the 
semi-transparency of Clara, who is not clearly see-able and easily graspable nor 
completely obscure and untouchable. Indeed, she is partly hidden by the hanging 
vine leaves and grapes but at the same time she becomes a prism, absorbing 
sunlight and emanating the colours of the rainbow that correspond to the hues 
present in her natural environment: yellow and purple (grapes), and green 
(leaves). Clara’s depiction reminds the reader of a Post-Impressionist painting, 
an idea further corroborated by a passage in Woolf’s unfinished memoir, ‘Sketch 
of the Past’ (1939–1940), in which she explicitly likens her writing activity to visual 
arts. After describing the recalling of childhood memories as a state of ‘lying in a 
grape and seeing through a film of semi-transparent yellow’, she continues: 
 
If I were a painter I should paint these first impressions in pale yellow, 
silver, and green. […] I should make a picture that was globular; semi-
transparent. I should make a picture of curved petals; of shells; of things 
that were semi-transparent. I should make curved shapes, showing the 
light through, but not giving a clear outline. Everything would be large and 
dim; and what was seen would at the same time be heard […]. The sound 
seems to fall through an elastic, gummy air; which holds it up; which 
prevents it from being sharp and distinct. (79–80)  
 
For Woolf, the idea of semi-translucency is closely bound up with blurred shapes 
that absorb and diffuse light without allowing the gaze to draw their clear outlines. 
Moreover, Woolf’s imaginary painting does not merely appeal to the eyes but 
invites a complex amalgamation of sensuous reactions: ‘what was seen would at 
the same time be heard’, and touched, one might add. The sound acquires a 
material weight and becomes held up by the ‘elastic’ air, which, as a net48 
                                                        
47 While working on To the Lighthouse, Woolf wrote in her diary: ‘Dear me, how lovely some parts 
of To the Lighthouse are! Soft & pliable, & I think deep, & never a word wrong for a page at a 
time’ (21 March 1927; Diary 3: 132). Note how Woolf uses adjectives related to tangibility to 
describe her novel.  
48 In The Nets of Modernism Maud Ellmann also elaborates on the importance of nets in modernist 
works, mostly from a psychoanalytic perspective. As she puts it, the writings of Henry James, 
James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, and Sigmund Freud ‘portray the human subject as enmeshed in 
relations of exchange – sexual, linguistic, financial, pathogenic […]’ (1). Maud Ellmann. The Nets 
of Modernism: Henry James, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, and Sigmund Freud. Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, Cézanne also used the term ‘net’ to describe 
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(Woolf’s beloved metaphor), gently envelops the voices, softening but not 
annihilating their borders.49  
 The qualities Woolf cherished in Post-Impressionist art correspond to the 
hallmarks of Cézanne’s paintings, which, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
encapsulate the core of sympathetic coexistence. In ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’, the 
philosopher celebrates Cézanne’s works, which in contrast with Impressionist 
paintings, do not portray their subjects as ‘lost in [their] relationships to the 
atmosphere’ but as ‘subtly illuminated from within’, creating ‘an impression of 
solidity and material substance’ (The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader 62). 
According to Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Cézanne, the fusion of colours does not 
blur but rather reinforces the boundaries of the object, which exists in harmonious 
unity with its surroundings without being incorporated by them. The close 
intertwining of colour and form in Cézanne was also noticed by Woolf’s friend, art 
critic and painter Roger Fry, the organiser of the Post-Impressionist Exhibitions 
at Grafton Gallery, London in 1910 and 1912. He observes how in Cézanne’s 
paintings: 
 
colour has ceased to play a separate rôle from drawing. It is an integral 
part of plastic expression. He did not attempt to use it with the same 
brilliant purity and luminosity as some of the Impressionists, and although 
as compared with them he re-established the unity of the picture surface, 
he never practiced the opposition of simple masses of local colour. 
(Transformations 218–219)  
 
Fry’s rejection of Impressionism foreshadows Merleau-Ponty’s argument in 
‘Cézanne’s Doubt’, in which the latter praises Cézanne for his ‘subtle illumination’ 
of objects, in contrast with their ‘reflections’ on Impressionist paintings (62). Woolf 
partially shares Fry’s opinion when she critiques Impressionist painting 
techniques in Jacob’s Room and To the Lighthouse, to which I will turn later.  
                                                        
his painting technique: ‘[Cézanne] would explain that the landscape had to be tackled neither too 
high nor too low, caught alive in a net which would let nothing escape’ (‘CD’ 67). 
49  Some critics have linked this quote to Impressionism. Jack F. Stewart, for instance, has 
remarked that Woolf’s ‘verbal painting has the glowing indistinctness of an Impressionist canvas: 
colors, shapes, sounds, and rhythms merge into a synthesis of sense and emotion’ (237). Jack 
F. Stewart. ‘Impressionism in the Early Novels of Virginia Woolf.’ Journal of Modern Literature vol. 
9, no. 2, 1982, pp. 237–266. However, I think that Woolf’s insistence on making ‘curved shapes’ 
suggests a strong artistic agency, which transcends the mere registration of external sensations, 
attributing central role to the act of artistic choice, a characteristic of Post-Impressionism.  
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Merleau-Ponty revels in Cézanne’s pictures because they constitute the 
visual representations of his philosophical theory of alterity-in-unity, proposed in 
Phenomenology of Perception (published in the same year as ‘Cézanne’s 
Doubt’). In his analysis of Post-Impressionist paintings, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
a mid-way between clear-cut, hard shapes and the total absence of any 
distinguishable forms: ‘Not to indicate any shape would be to deprive the objects 
of their identity. To trace just a single outline sacrifices depth – that is, the 
dimension in which the thing is presented not as spread out before us but as an 
inexhaustible reality full of reserves.’ (‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ 65) Merleau-Ponty’s 
reading of Cézanne’s paintings as deep (‘not spread out’ flatly) and intimating 
towards a multitude of interpretative possibilities chimes with Woolf’s own 
comments on Cézanne’s still lifes.  
In April 1918 Woolf had the chance to see the original of Cézanne’s Still 
Life with Apples (c. 1878), bought by her friend, the Bloomsbury economist, John 
Maynard Keynes: ‘There are 6 [in reality seven] apples in the Cézanne picture. 
What can 6 apples not be? I began to wonder. Theres [sic] their relationship to 
each other, & their colour, & their solidity.’ (Diary 1: 140, emphasis in original) 
What Woolf finds fascinating in the Cézanne-painting is the union of colours, 
which instead of blurring the contours of objects, reinforces their solidity, opening 
the way for various interpretative possibilities. In other words, Woolf and Merleau-
Ponty seem to agree that a work of art will leave a profound impact on the viewer 
only if it presents a world made up of distinct shapes harmoniously relating to but 
not dissolving into each other. In this way, borders do no longer serve the function 
of divorcing two irreconcilable elements but rather of indicating their individual 
existence among, and importantly, with other entities.       
Woolf’s fascination with Cézanne’s apples chimes in several ways with 
Lawrence’s interpretation of the French painter’s works. Both writers admire 
Cézanne’s ability to convey the fleshy solidity of the fruit and their sympathetic 
coexistence with each other and the environment, while also retaining their 
individuality. Furthermore, they both observe the liveliness and flexibility of the 
apples that emanate a sense of continuous movement and change, resisting thus 
the viewer’s attempt to fix them with his/her rigid gaze. Lawrence and Woolf also 
agree on the fact that in order to genuinely engage with Cézanne’s apples, one 
needs to approach them with a form of whole-body vision, ‘seeing with your blood 
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and your bones’, as Lawrence puts it, or activating a ‘sight of intoxication’, as 
Woolf writes in her comments on Cézanne’s Still Life with Apples:  
 
Roger [Fry] very nearly lost his senses. I’ve never seen such a sight of 
intoxication. He was like a bee on a sunflower. Imagine snow falling 
outside, a wind like there is in the Tube, an atmosphere of yellow grains of 
dust, and us [Virginia, Vanessa and Roger] all gloating upon these apples. 
[…] The longer one looks the larger and heavier and greener and redder 
they become. (Letters 2: 230) 
 
Woolf describes Fry’s reaction to the painting as simultaneously senseless 
(beyond rationality) and deeply rooted in corporeal senses: sight (snow falling), 
hearing (wind) and even touch (grains of dust). A genuine enjoyment of art 
transcends mentality, and engages the viewer in a sensuous-sensual bodily 
delight, a kind of sensory intoxication.  
Yet what differentiates Lawrence’s and Woolf’s opinion on Cézanne is 
their diverse interpretation of formal qualities. While Lawrence firmly dismisses 
Bell’s ‘significant form’ in favour of what the former calls ‘insignificant form’ (‘ITP’ 
205), Woolf recognises the significance of form in conveying aesthetic-emotional 
meaning. In contrast to Lawrence, who equates form with mental abstraction and 
mere mannerism, for Woolf, shape is inseparable from colour, and the intricate 
interplay of the two results in the viewer’s ‘gloating’ sensation. The activation of 
whole-body vision allows the beholder to observe how Cézanne’s apples become 
‘larger and heavier’ as their colour intensifies. As Ann Banfield notes, Woolf’s 
artistic taste as well as literary style were heavily influenced by Fry’s theoretical 
writings on Post-Impressionism, especially his ideas on Cézanne’s ‘use of 
geometrical forms’ (52). For Woolf, colour is not a secondary attribute but the 
precondition of shape. This sympathetic coexistence of colour and shape confers 
Cézanne’s objects a tactile solidity. 
The kind of solidity that triggered Woolf’s admiration, nevertheless, is not 
synonymous with rigidity, and can be better comprehended through Fry’s concept 
of ‘plastic form’. As Christopher Reed remarks, the term ‘plastic’ became central 
in Fry’s critical vocabulary in the early 1910s, immediately after the First Post-
Impressionist Exhibition, when he wrote extensively on French paintings and 
sculptures (123). Although ‘plastic’ acquired slightly different meanings in Fry’s 
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essays on sculpture and painting, it mainly designated ‘a quality that is the 
opposite of realism yet that retains an emphasis on three-dimensionality to 
distinguish it from flat pattern’ (Reed 123). Comparing the Impressionists’ two-
dimensional juxtaposition of colours to Matisse’s Post-Impressionist technique, 
Fry remarks about the latter’s works: ‘[t]he flat surface takes on the whole 
curvature of the visual hemisphere and objects spring into clear relief’ (qtd. in 
Banfield 280). The noun ‘relief’ introduces the idea of a statue’s three-
dimensionality, an attribute Fry values in modernist art. This statuesque quality, 
however, is not coterminous with hardness; similarly to Woolf, Fry also draws 
attention to the dynamic flexibility of the figure’s contours. As such, Woolf’s and 
Fry’s views seem at odds with Lawrence’s rejection of ‘round’ Greek sculptures 
in favour of flat Egyptian hieroglyphs, uniformly melting into a kind of primordial 
darkness. For Woolf, three-dimensionality means the interplay of shape and 
colour, which forms the basis of our sympathetic coexistence with the world. 
Colour represents the vital, life-giving element that fills up form, drawing the 
individual borders of objects with delicacy and care.  
In Jacob’s Room, Woolf presents the total absence of light and colour as 
dangerous:  
 
[T]he wind was rolling the darkness through the streets of Athens, rolling 
it, one might suppose, with a sort of trampling energy of mood which 
forbids too close an analysis of the feelings of any single person, or 
inspection of features. All faces – Greek, Levantine, Turkish, English – 
would have looked much the same in that darkness. (142) 
 
Darkness, associated with military forces (‘trampling energy’), threatens to erase 
the individual features of people, those unique attributes that represent the 
essence of the ‘single person’, what Woolf aptly names the ‘flesh’: ‘But who […] 
see[s] things thus in skeleton outline, bare of flesh?’ (142) Obscurity strips the 
body of the living flesh, the soft fabric of life that makes human existence 
meaningful. As the night wears off and the first colours of the dawn start to return, 
‘[run] up the stalks of the grass; [blow] out into tulips and crocuses […] and [fill] 
the gauze of the air’, things gradually regain their individual shapes, and the 
rhythm of daily life is resumed (143).  
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Woolf’s musings on the life-giving force of colours are close to Merleau-
Ponty’s ideas about Cézanne’s technique. Merleau-Ponty, drawing on Joachim 
Gasquet’s recollections of Cézanne, explains how the painter ‘began to paint all 
parts of the painting at the same time, using patches of color to surround his 
original charcoal sketch of the geological skeleton. The picture took on fullness 
and density; it grew in structure and balance […]’ (‘CD’ 67). For Cézanne and 
Woolf, therefore, colour represents the ‘flesh’ of things, the vital element capable 
of restoring the plastic boundaries of figures without isolating them from their 
surroundings. 
At the same time, as Catherine Malabou reminds us, the word ‘plastic’ can 
be etymologically traced back to the Greek plassein (‘to mould’) (8). As an 
adjective, ‘plastic’ has a double meaning: malleable (like certain materials, such 
as clay) and possessing the power to give form (in expressions like ‘plastic 
surgeon’ or ‘plastic arts’) (Malabou 8). As such, plasticity disturbs clear-cut 
categories of object and subject, active and passive. While the art object is plastic 
in the sense of being malleable, the artist also possesses plasticity: (s)he has the 
creative power to give form to shapeless matter. Malleability, however, does not 
mean complete surrender. As Malabou highlights, ‘“[p]lastic” […] designates 
those things that lend themselves to being formed while resisting deformation’ (9, 
emphasis in original). This interpretation, she continues, helps to comprehend a 
further “extension” of ‘plasticity’ into the field of histology, in which the term 
‘represents the ability of tissue to re-form after a lesion’ (9). Plasticity thus can be 
understood as a capacity for self-healing: the regaining of initial form after a 
violent distortion. The plastic object does not wait passively to be shaped by the 
active hands of its creator, but to quote Merleau-Ponty, it ‘gives everything it 
receives’ (VI 144). Fry and Woolf might have relied on the ancient Greek meaning 
of ‘plastic’ when thinking about Post-Impressionist paintings and sculptures. What 
both intellectuals valued most in arts was the firmly soft quality of figures, which 
activated the viewer’s tactile-visual response.  
 
‘Battered’ statues and the possibilities of remembrance 
 
Woolf showed a deep preoccupation with statues throughout her career. Her 
fascination with sculpted forms in Jacob’s Room has been remarked on by 
several critics. Kathleen Wall associates Greek art with Jacob’s death (317), 
 88 
which chimes with Theodore Koulouris’s interpretation, which links Greek culture 
(predominantly literature) with Woolf’s ‘poetics of loss’ (10). Vara Neverow 
elaborates on the erotic dimension of sculptures, arguing that references to 
statues in Jacob’s Room ‘are infused with complex nuances of desire’ (27), while 
Kirsty Martin reads sculpted surfaces as suggestions of superficial knowledge 
(83). Hermione Lee passingly draws a link between Woolf’s character-making 
techniques and the ‘modelling of Greek statues’ but she does not further 
elaborate on the topic (74). The following section builds on the above-mentioned 
scholarly works but it also distances itself from them by focusing on specific 
features such as malleability and incompleteness, which help to better grasp 
Woolf’s ideas about fellow feeling. 
Ancient Greek culture has most often been associated with male 
superiority in Woolf’s works. In her Notes to Jacob’s Room, Sue Roe equates 
Greek civilisation with male dominance (170). This view is also supported by 
Colin Dickey who argues that the figure of the French female photographer, trying 
to get a snapshot of Jacob while he is being absorbed in the statues of the 
Parthenon, ‘offer[s] a critique of the self-satisfied seriousness of men like Jacob 
[…] who judge[s] [his] mates according to classical statues’ (379).50  Indeed, 
sculptures in Jacob’s Room are repeatedly linked to patriarchal order. At the 
beginning of the novel, the narrator urges us to look at the privileged men, dons 
and students, who solemnly proceed towards King’s College Chapel in 
Cambridge:  
 
Look, as they pass into service, how airily the gowns blow out, as though 
nothing dense and corporeal were within. What sculpted faces, what 
certainty, authority controlled by piety, although great boots march under 
the gowns. In what orderly procession they advance. (24) 
 
The sculpted surface of the body is associated with a lack of corporeality: the 
marching professors and students become grotesque ghosts, whose gowns and 
                                                        
50 However, Woolf was admittedly fond of Greek literature, which represented a strong bond 
between her and her beloved brother Thoby. As Hermione Lee has remarked, Thoby introduced 
Virginia to the world of Greek culture, and the siblings had lively debates on Greek literature. 
Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf. Vintage, 1997, p. 147. Furthermore, in her posthumously published 
memoir, ‘Old Bloomsbury’ (probably written in 1921–1922), Woolf claimed to hear the birds sing 
in Greek during one of her mental breakdowns (45). See Moments of Being, edited by Jeanne 
Schulkind, Pimlico, 2002, pp. 43–61. The above examples interrogate Woolf’s unequivocal 
association of Greek culture with patriarchy.   
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boots proceed without any human volition. Furthermore, what confers this kind of 
insubstantiality a genuine threatening air is its implicit connectedness to military 
logic through the use of war vocabulary: ‘pass into service’, ‘boots march’, ‘orderly 
procession’, ‘advance’. In this passage Woolf critiques not only the male-
dominated educational system but through analogy with the armed forces, the 
First World War as well, which transformed young men into mere material 
containers devoid of life, individual thoughts and feelings.  
 Woolf often drew a parallel between superficially sketched outlines and 
ideas of militarism. She dismissed ‘frivolous character-drawing’ associated with 
Mrs Durrant’s company of upper-class educated men, for whom Jacob 
represents ‘exquisite outlines enclosing vacancy […] and mere scrawls’ (136). 
Woolf rejected ‘exquisite outlines’ (echoing the earlier quoted ‘skeleton outline, 
bare of flesh’) because she linked this specific drawing technique to a form of 
aggressive appropriation and war logic: 
 
With […] nonchalance a dozen young men in the prime of life descend with 
composed faces into the depth of the sea; and there impassively (though 
with perfect mastery of machinery) suffocate uncomplainingly together. 
Like blocks of tin soldiers the army covers the cornfield, moves up the 
hillside, stops, reels this way and that, and falls flat, save that, through 
field-glasses, it can be seen that one or two pieces still agitate up and 
down like fragments of broken match-stick. (136) 
 
Soldiers, nonchalantly running up and down the field, become mere marionettes, 
broken and useless toys in the hands of a ruthless superior force that watches 
from distance, ‘through field-glass’, the helpless agony of dying bodies. This 
passage at once corroborates and interrogates Courtney’s and Leonard Woolf’s 
accusation against the novel’s puppet-characters. Woolf manipulates the puppet-
metaphor carefully: by including Jacob among the ‘tin soldiers’, she allows for his 
association with a marionette but she simultaneously withdraws this interpretation 
by harshly critiquing the puppet-makers. The war transforms human bodies into 
perfectly working but insentient automata, and erases their individual identity, 
making mass commodities of them, which are sold by ‘character-mongers’ (135). 
The machine-like bodies of soldiers do not only fail to communicate anything 
about the complexity of the self but they also represent an alien element, totally 
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incompatible with their natural surroundings. Despite the ‘exquisite outlines’ and 
the ‘composed faces’, ‘tin soldiers’ are destined to die physically on the battlefield 
as well as in the individual and collective memory of successive generations.  
The interpretation of soldiers as mass productions is also corroborated by 
the opening sentence of the following paragraph, which explicitly likens the 
marching of gunmen with business and commerce, ironically questioning the 
latter’s role in bringing progress: ‘These actions, together with the incessant 
commerce of banks, laboratories, chancelleries, and houses of business, are the 
strokes which oar the world forward, they say’ (136).51 The bodies of dying men, 
made of metal and resembling machines rather than human flesh, become a form 
of artificial waste, incompatible with and unassimilated by nature. The soldiers’ 
depiction differs significantly from Woolf’s and Fry’s interpretation of plasticity: the 
tin bodies with their rigid borders (echoing Lawrence’s ‘iron’ soldiers in the ‘corn-
clad hills’ in ‘With the Guns’) are doomed to solitary death, forgotten and thrown 
away like broken toys. At the same time, through the implicit reference to Hans 
Christian Andersen’s tale, ‘The Steadfast Tin Soldier’ (1838), Woolf introduces 
an additional connotation of vulnerability. The material of which the gunmen are 
made, is not hard enough to protect the soldiers from destruction: just as 
Andersen’s disabled toy soldier melts in the fire, ‘young men’ in Jacob’s Room 
are destined for annihilation.    
Ideas of plasticity and statuary images, however, do not only express 
Woolf’s rejection of educational inequality and militarism but they also reveal the 
inadequacies of modernist (especially Impressionist) portraiture. The artistic 
struggles of the painter Nick Bramham in Jacob’s Room are indicative of Woolf’s 
own literary dilemmas. As he tries to capture Fanny Elmer on the canvas, he 
realises that the exposure of his model to fixed, ‘unshaded electric light’ will not 
facilitate his artistic endeavours, as the essence of female beauty lies precisely 
in its fluctuation. The painter’s effort to pin down his model, therefore, is doomed 
to failure, as restricting the complexity of a human being within rigid frames 
cannot be considered an artistic success: 
                                                        
51 Woolf resented a business-like approach to novel writing. In ‘Character in Fiction’ (1924), she 
critiqued Arnold Bennett for transforming the act of fiction making into a commercial activity, the 
main purpose of which is marketability: the Edwardians ‘have made tools and established 
conventions which do their business. But those tools are not our tools, and that business is not 
our business. For us those conventions are ruin, those tools are death.’ (Essays 3: 430) Echoing 
the description of soldiers in Jacob’s Room, Woolf associated the commodification of human 
nature with death.  
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Now she is dull and thick as bacon; now transparent as a hanging glass. 
The fixed faces are the dull ones. Here comes Lady Venice displayed like 
a monument for admiration, but carved in alabaster, to be set on the 
mantelpiece and never dusted. A dapper brunette complete from head to 
foot serves only as an illustration to lie upon the drawing-room table. (JR 
100) 
 
Despite their intended role of making the subject more visible and easily 
knowable, ‘fixed faces’ actually create the opposite effect: they dull facial 
contours, transforming individuals into lifeless and unrecognisable entities, 
useless figurines ‘on the mantelpiece’ that serve as mere dust-catcher 
ornaments.  
 Nevertheless, capturing the subject in its ceaseless changeability 
represents another challenge for the artist, and sometimes might even result in 
unfinished artworks, covered in dust and obliterated. Chasing fleeting momentary 
impressions, devoid of any materialistic contours might not be enough for 
creating lasting art and memorable characters. Woolf interrogates Nick’s and 
Fanny’s unwavering belief in evanescence by subtly implying how their worldview 
fails to fulfil a significant role of post-First World War art: the conservation of 
memory. The narrator’s direct exclamation, ‘One must remember —’, remains 
incomplete, creating a hole in the text which continues with the contrastive 
conjunction ‘but’: ‘But Nick perhaps, or Fanny Elmer, believing implicitly in the 
truth of the moment, fling off, sting the cheek, are gone like sharp hail’ (105). 
Exposing the subject from hat to shoes does not represent a valid form of 
characterisation for Woolf, but completely stripping models off any material 
garments is equally flawed, and as Nick’s example illustrates, might ultimately 
lead to creative failure: Fanny’s portrait is left in a sketchy state after, in a moment 
of sudden rage, she definitively abandons the painting studio. Through Nick’s 
unfinished painting, Woolf offers an implicit critique of Impressionism, which by 
relying entirely on present sensations, fails to care for the tangibility of its 
subjects.52 Therefore, neither relying on fleeting impressions nor trying to nail 
down character represents an adequate base for capturing personality. Instead, 
                                                        
52 Note how Fanny is later described as ‘all sentiment and sensation’ (135).  
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the investigation of Woolf’s ideas about statuary in Jacob’s Room and in her early 
travel diaries might provide a better understanding of her views on human nature. 
 From a young age and before writing her first experimental novels, Woolf 
expressed her delight for Greek statues. In the autumn of 1906, Virginia Stephen 
travelled to Greece with her siblings Vanessa, Thoby and Adrian, and their friend, 
Violet Dickinson. They spent some time in Athens and visited the Parthenon, 
where Virginia was mesmerised by the beauty of Greek marbles:  
 
We also visited the Acropolis at sunset. And when you speak of ‘colour’ of 
the Parthenon you are simply conforming to the exigencies of language; a 
painter using his craft to speak by, confesses the same limitations. The 
Temple glows red; the whole west pediment seems kindled, as if for the 
first time, in the sunset opposite […]. No place seems more lusty and alive 
than this platform of ancient dead stone. The fat Maidens who bear the 
weight of the Erechtheum on their heads, stand smiling tranquil ease, for 
their burden is just meet for their strength. They glory in it; one foot just 
advanced, their hands, one conceives, loosely curled at their sides. And 
the warm blue sky flows into all the crevices of the marble; yet they detach 
themselves, & spring in to the air, with crisp edges, unblunted, & still virile 
& young. (A Passionate Apprentice 323) 
 
The caryatids’53 description echoes Clara’s portrayal in Jacob’s Room: in both 
cases the women’s bodies do not merely reflect the colours of the environment 
but they become organic extensions of their natural surroundings. Colour and 
form, as both Merleau-Ponty and Fry observed about Cézanne’s paintings, cease 
to fulfil distinctive roles in Post-Impressionism; rather colour becomes the 
precondition of shape, the element that unites object and background while at the 
same time allowing for the emergence of individual contours. Similarly, the 
silhouettes of the Erechtheum statues are not blurred by the colours of the setting 
sun; on the contrary, they begin to take shape and come to life under nature’s 
gentle touch. ‘The warm blue sky’, flowing into ‘the crevices of the marble’, is 
redolent of Cézanne’s idea about ‘the landscape think[ing] itself’ in the subject, 
                                                        
53 Caryatids are female statues used as pillars to support the roof of a Greek temple. For further 




cited by Merleau-Ponty in ‘Cézanne’s Doubt’ (67) and Phenomenology of 
Perception: ‘I do not lay out in front of [the sky] an idea of blue that would give 
me its secret. Rather, I abandon myself to it, I plunge into this mystery, and it 
“thinks itself in me”’ (PP 222). The blue hues slowly spread out in the white 
marble, redrawing the statues’ borders without annihilating their unique 
hallmarks. Woolf’s careful attention rests on the women’s subtle gestures: the 
slightly advanced feet and ‘loosely curled’ hands. The female figures thus 
preserve their individuality, they ‘detach themselves’, and ‘with crisp edges’ 
‘spring in to the air’ energetically, recalling Lawrence’s description of Etruscan 
paintings in which ‘the flowing contour’ allows ‘the body [to] suddenly [leave] off, 
upon the atmosphere’ (Sketches 123–124). 
Woolf’s sensual and playful language in her journal entry allows for the 
reading of the scene as a seduction narrative. She depicts the Parthenon as a 
‘lusty’ place, where the ‘fat Maidens’ ‘bear the weight’ of the portico while the ‘blue 
sky flows’ into their hollows. The scene might be interpreted as an erotic union 
between caryatids and nature, a fusion that carries the potential of future life but 
simultaneously subverts reproductive stereotypes. The female statues are not 
passive and immobile carriers of ‘their burden’ but while solidly holding ‘the weight 
of the Erechtheum’ on their heads, their energised bodies emanate a sense of 
freedom and ‘virile’ power. Yet the sculptures’ lively description is imbued with a 
sense of vulnerability and mortality. The phrase ‘loosely curled hands’ can be 
read as a euphemism for the actual absence of the caryatids’ arms, destroyed 
through the centuries. Furthermore, though Woolf does not reflect on it in her 
diary, she must have been aware of not only the lack of the statues’ upper limbs 
but also of their nose. The original caryatids, of which Woolf probably took a close 
view in the Acropolis Museum, are famous for their flat noses, or more precisely, 
for the rubbed surface on the face, originally occupied by the nose. In Jacob’s 
Room, the goddess ‘holding the roof on her head’ reminds Jacob of Sandra 
Wentworth Williams, whose memory produces an unexpected effect on the 
young man: ‘He was extraordinarily moved, and with the battered Greek nose in 
his head, with Sandra in his head, with all sorts of things in his head, off he started 
to walk right up to the top of Mount Hymettus […]’ (133).  
The caryatid admired by Jacob, however, is not the only ‘battered’ 
sculpture in the novel. The adjective is also associated with the statue of Ulysses, 
and through implicit analogy, with Jacob himself. In the British Museum, Fanny 
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spends long minutes in front of the ‘battered Ulysses’ in order to refresh her 
memory of Jacob (150). The ‘battered’ statue of the Greek traveller represents a 
source of solace for the woman who secretly hopes that Jacob will eventually 
return to her. At the same time, the state of vulnerability is not only linked to Jacob 
but also to Fanny’s ‘statuesque’ ‘idea of Jacob’, which as her lover’s homecoming 
becomes more and more improbable, starts to ‘wear thin’, similarly to the 
woman’s deteriorating body that appears old and lifeless (149, 150). The motif of 
the unfinished statue suggests the female characters’ memorialising efforts: 
similarly to Fanny, Jacob’s other lovers also try to capture his memory in a 
statuesque form, despite having to confront the impossible nature of their 
endeavour. None of the women manages to bring her artistic activity to perfection: 
Jacob’s statue remains, by the end, ‘left in the rough’ (130).   
However, vulnerability is a two-way phenomenon in Woolf’s novel. The 
fact that Jacob remembers Sandra as ‘battered’ indicates his perception of the 
woman as a vulnerable human being, in need of his (male) protection. This 
reading, nonetheless, might be at odds with Sandra’s portrayal throughout the 
novel. Jacob’s last lover, after all, does not seem to be a very fragile woman: she 
exerts control over her husband and enjoys a great sense of liberty in her 
marriage. Hence, the adjective ‘battered’ might rather be attached to Jacob’s 
persona, suggesting his own frailty and insecurity caused by his turbulent 
emotions for the woman. Reading Jacob’s visit to the Acropolis alongside Woolf’s 
diary entry, nevertheless, provides a more complex explanation for Sandra’s 
depiction as a caryatid.  
Woolf’s erotically charged portrayal of female statues in her travel journals 
represents an important source of inspiration for the creation of Jacob’s Room. 
The link between Sandra and the caryatids can be traced back to a much deeper 
level than a common physical trait. The promiscuous ‘fat Maidens’, bearing their 
‘weight’ with a ‘tranquil ease’ foreshadow the secret erotic encounter between 
Jacob and Sandra, which not coincidentally, takes place on the Acropolis and 
results in Sandra’s pregnancy. In order to protect him from being ‘shocked’, 
Sandra decides not to tell Jacob that he has a son (149). Yet, even though Jacob 
never finds out the truth, the little boy to whom Sandra gives birth, becomes a 
flesh-and-blood monument, the live bond between past and future, death and life, 
ruin and regeneration. The child, called Jimmy, a name derived from Jacob, 
embodies the solid fragility of the future: a period equally marked by absence 
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(Jacob’s death) and presence, suggested by the baby’s emphatic hand-waving 
in the perambulator (149). Woolf’s name choice bears special significance 
because it simultaneously nods back to the past and anticipates the future. The 
name Jimmy appears earlier in the novel, when it is explicitly linked to the war: 
‘And now Jimmy feeds crows in Flanders and Helen visits hospitals’ (83). All the 
reader knows about Jimmy is that he refused to marry a woman called Helen 
Aitken, and he died on the battlefield (82–83). Interestingly, while Helen’s last 
name appears in the text, Jimmy’s remains unrevealed, allowing for the 
substitution of Flanders for his surname. This linguistic play might be read as a 
reference to the millions of anonymous soldiers who lost their lives in the First 
World War, but at the same time it transforms Jimmy into Jacob’s alter ego, the 
latter’s surname being Flanders. Sandra’s decision to name her baby Jimmy (a 
‘small boy’ variant of Jacob, 149) indicates her wish to preserve her lover’s 
memory, while the narrative anticipates – through the allusion to the soldier 
Jimmy’s death – Jacob’s imminent fate. The small baby represents at once a live 
monument (replacing his father’s absent body), and a fragile future hope, an 
affirmation of life that continues in spite of past losses. The little boy’s waving in 
the perambulator acquires a double function: it can be read as a farewell gesture, 
an act of laying the past to rest, but also as the hopeful greeting of a new 
beginning, or to borrow Marina MacKay’s phrase, as an example of ‘bereaved 
survivorhood’ (‘Violence, Art, and War’ 467).  
Sandra’s role of memory preserver, nevertheless, can be traced back to 
an earlier point in the narrative. Prior to the conception of their son, Sandra and 
Jacob visit the museum at Olympia, where the woman tries to ‘get’ Jacob’s head 
‘exactly on a level with the head of the Hermes of Praxiteles’, but as the narrator 
emphasises: ‘before she could say a single word he had gone out of the Museum 
and left her’ (127). Indeed, as Adam Parkes observes, Jacob ‘defeats Sandra 
Williams’s attempt to fix him, as if he himself were a statue, with her 
museumgoer’s stare’ (169). While this is undoubtedly true, I think that Woolf does 
more than simply critique Sandra’s ‘egoism’, as Parkes suggests (169). 
Praxiteles’s Hermes and the Infant Dionysus, the statue with which Sandra 
associates Jacob, is the figure of the god Hermes holding the baby Dionysus in 
his left arm. In her attempt to ‘get’ Jacob’s head, Sandra does not simply want to 
fix the man but she unconsciously wishes to capture a touching but non-existent 
future image: Jacob with their still unborn son in his arms. The baby Dionysus, a 
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small version of Jacob thus encapsulates Sandra’s effort to safeguard her 
beloved’s memory in the fragile soft flesh of their child (the link between Dionysus 
and Jacob is repeatedly reinforced in the novel, as I will shortly discuss).  
Gabrielle McIntire argues that in Woolf ‘continuity with anteriority manifests 
itself as a wish to touch the past through (re)discovering the history of physical 
and corporeal traces whose enigmatic imprints remain legible into the future’ 
(212). In Jacob’s Room, Sandra (and her son) represents the embodiment of this 
‘continuity with anteriority’. The caryatids’ ambiguous relationship with time has 
also been observed by scholars of classical studies: Rex Warner wrote in Views 
of Attica and its Surroundings (1950) that the female statues on the Erechteum, 
instead of simply evoking historical events, reach ‘both forwards and backwards 
in time’ (50). Sandra, the caryatid standing on the remnants of the past, becomes 
a guardian of memory, while her vigorous body stretches upwards, opening into 
the endless sky and bearing the possibilities of the future. 
 
Statues as ‘counter-monuments’  
 
Sculptural surfaces in Jacob’s Room are intricately linked with ideas of absence 
and presence, mourning and regeneration, and the possibilities of getting hold of 
(and holding on to) people. While the grape-picking scene has primarily been 
influenced by Post-Impressionist aesthetics, it also enters into implicit dialogue 
with ideas about statuary. As Clara stretches to reach the bundles, she 
accidentally cuts the stalk of a leaf that, ‘spread[ing] like the palm of a hand’, 
draws an invisible circle around Jacob’s head, before it drops to the ground. The 
palm-shaped leaf, as the prolongation of Clara’s hand, lightly grazes Jacob’s 
head without definitively settling on or claiming possession of it. Read in 
conjunction with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh, this scene illustrates the 
principles of tender togetherness: 
 
For the first time, the body no longer couples itself up with the world, it 
clasps another body, applying [itself to it] carefully with its whole extension, 
forming tirelessly with its hands the strange statue which in its turn gives 
everything it receives; the body is lost outside of the world and its goals, 
fascinated by the unique occupation of floating in Being with another life 
[…]. (VI 144) 
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‘Applying’ her flesh ‘with its whole extension’ to Jacob’s yearning body, Clara’s 
gesture creates a fragile yet enduring moment of physical intimacy: the leaf 
eventually flies past the man’s head but the plant’s brief contact with his body 
opens up the possibility for mythological interpretations. The vine leaf crown 
transforms Jacob into the Greek god Dionysus, and as Vara Neverow has 
observed, Jacob is repeatedly associated with the sculpture of Dionysus in the 
novel (30). The parallel between Woolf’s protagonist and the god of wine and 
carnal joys, can partly explain Jacob’s state of unconscious intoxication in Clara’s 
presence: he ‘is lost outside of the world and its goals’. Yet, while drawing a link 
to Greek mythology, the narrative simultaneously withdraws from unambiguous 
interpretations: Jacob’s head, after all, is not decorated with, only lightly touched 
by vine leaves. Moreover, the text’s linguistic composition warns the reader 
against the complete blurring of boundaries between hand and leaf: the rhetorical 
device indicates a relationship of resemblance, not identification. The simile, ‘like 
the palm of a hand’, interrogates the solid and permanent nature of the tactile 
gesture, and allows for the reading of the grape-picking episode as Woolf’s 
critique of a male artistic tradition rooted in hard and possessive grip. 
  Clara’s implicit association with the figure of the sculptor and her superior 
position on the top of the ladder subvert cultural stereotypes about the active 
male artist looking (down) on and capturing the passive female model. At the 
same time, the grape-picking scene can be interpreted as a double inversion of 
the Greek myth: rather than Pygmalion touching Galatea imploring her to come 
to life, in Woolf’s novel the female artist transforms the male into a statue, albeit 
not a fixed and lifeless one. The original myth, recorded by Ovid in 
Metamorphoses, tells the story of a Cypriot sculptor, Pygmalion, who, being 
repelled by the debauchery of local women, decides to create the perfect female 
form with his own hands. He carves a female statue out of ivory and falls in love 
with his perfect creation, which, with the intervention of Venus, the goddess of 
beauty and love, comes to life: 
 
And [Pygmalion] kissed her as she lay, and she seemed warm;  
Again he kissed her and with marveling touch 
Caressed her breast; beneath his touch the flesh 
Grew soft, its ivory hardness vanishing, 
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And yielded to his hands […] 
His lips pressed real lips, and she, his girl,  
Felt every kiss, and blushed, and shyly raised 
Her eyes to his and saw the world and him. (Book X, 233–4) 
 
The contrast between active and passive, possessor and subordinated is strongly 
accentuated in the Ovidian myth. From body postures to gestures, everything 
underlines the male artist’s superiority. Almost all active verbs are associated with 
him: he kisses, caresses, touches the woman, who in turn, yields to his fingers, 
feels his kisses and shyly raises her eyes to the man leaning over her. Woolf 
questions the Greek myth not only through gender reversal but also through her 
refusal to imbue her female “sculptor” with omnipotent artistic powers. In contrast 
with Pygmalion’s hard touch, Clara’s hand does not actually reach Jacob’s body 
but her tactile gesture remains in a state of suspension. As such, Clara’s 
outstretched hand suggests a kind of tactile failure: after all, she is unsuccessful 
in holding on to Jacob. There is a double loss at stake in this scene: Clara loses 
Jacob to the present (he returns to London) and to the future (he dies in the war). 
In other words, while Woolf rejects the possessive male touch, she also draws 
attention to the dangers of refraining from tactile proximity, which hinders the 
creation of lasting affective bonds.  
 Though a detailed contextual analysis of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century re-workings of the Pygmalion-story lies beyond the scopes of 
this chapter, it is important to mention that Woolf’s appropriation of the Ovidian 
myth was not without precedent. In the 1870s, the Pre-Raphaelite artist Edward 
Burne-Jones painted two series of pictures inspired by the story of Pygmalion 
and Galatea. The fourth painting of the second series, entitled The Soul Attains 
(1878), portrays Galatea’s coming to life. In contrast with the Ovidian version, 
Burne-Jones reverses the subjects’ bodily position: Pygmalion does not lean over 
Galatea from above, but he actually kneels at the woman’s feet, holding her 
hands, as though imploring her to return his love.54 Yet gender reversal is not the 
only issue at stake in Burne-Jones’s art. A pencil study for The Soul Attains, held 
at the New Art Gallery Walsall, reveals Burne-Jones’s preoccupation with artistic 
agency: while Galatea’s bodily contours are almost entirely finished, Pygmalion’s 
                                                        
54 I am grateful to Jana Funke for drawing my attention to Burne-Jones’s paintings.  
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silhouette is limited mostly to his head, making the impression that his sketchy 
outlines are being drawn by Galatea. The blurring of boundaries between active 
creator and passive model represents a theme that also interested authors of the 
early twentieth century, such as George Bernard Shaw, whose 1913 play, 
Pygmalion, became internationally renowned. Shaw’s work centres around Eliza 
Doolittle, a young flower girl, whose education is taken over by phonetics 
professor Henry Higgins. The arrogant Higgins sets out to teach Eliza to speak 
standard English and to transform her into an upper-class lady. He achieves his 
aim at the cost of treating the girl like a controllable speech machine. But his 
success is curtailed at the end when he realises that her Galatea-figure is not a 
subordinated automaton but an independent, live woman who uses her new 
language skills to affirm her agency. Shaw’s play and Burne-Jones’s paintings 
are embedded in a larger cultural context, which reverses the Ovidian myth, often 
to the extent of mockery. In the late nineteenth century, for example, the 
Pygmalion story became widely known from musical burlesques, such as 
Galatea, or Pygmalion Re-Versed (1883), a parody of W. S. Gilbert’s 1871 play, 
Pygmalion and Galatea.  
 While to an extent Woolf continued the tradition of the reversed Pygmalion 
myth, her treatment of the subject was more complex and nuanced. She 
“handled” the Ovidian legend with sympathy, reshaping it without completely 
distorting its original form. In Jacob’s Room, Woolf did not simply parody Ovid’s 
story but she took inspiration from the broader mythological context. In 
Metamorphoses, the story of Pygmalion and Galatea is narrated by the Greek 
hero, Orpheus. After losing his wife, Eurydice, Orpheus goes to the Underworld 
to implore Hades to let Eurydice return to life. Hades agrees with a condition: 
Orpheus is not allowed to look back at his wife until they reach the human world. 
Orpheus cannot resist the temptation and when he turns towards his wife, she 
disappears forever. Woolf borrows the motif of ‘double death’ from Orpheus and 
Eurydice’s story (Ovid 226). By failing to lay hands on Jacob, Clara loses him 
twice: he first leaves to London, and later to the trenches, from where he never 
returns. Through the links to the Ovidian myths, the grape-picking scene 
becomes an omen foreshadowing Jacob’s death. Before he departs to London, 
the Durrants bid him farewell, inviting him again for the following summer. 
However, the narrative subtly implies that there will be no other summers: Mr 
Clutterbuck’s double cry – ‘Mr Flanders! […] Jacob Flanders!’ (52) – remains 
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unanswered, anticipating Clara’s desperate sighs near the end of the novel: 
‘(“Jacob! Jacob!” she thought.)’ (147).  
 Clara’s definitive understanding of Jacob’s death is, not coincidentally, 
linked to a statue, which despite not being created by a Greek sculptor, 
represents a Greek hero. Under the excuse of having to ‘exercise’ her dog, aptly 
named Troy, Clara accepts her friend, Mr Bowley’s invitation for a walk (146). 
During their stroll in Hyde Park, she evokes Jacob’s name four times, before she 
stops in front of the statue of Achilles, and reads out the inscription beneath the 
sculpture: ‘“This statue was erected by the women of England…?”’ (147) A horse 
dashing by hinders Clara in finishing the sentence and causes her to cry out in 
agony:  
 
‘Oh, Mr Bowley! Oh!’ Gallop – gallop – gallop – a horse galloped past 
without a rider. The stirrups swung; the pebbles spurted.  
‘Oh, stop! Stop it, Mr Bowley!’ she cried, white, trembling, gripping his arm, 
utterly unconscious, the tears coming.55 (147) 
 
Clara’s desperate cry can be interpreted in multiple ways: the rider’s enigmatic 
absence reminds her of Jacob whose death becomes an unbearable 
premonition, but her distress might also originate from her self-identification with 
‘the women of England’ who erect statues to dead soldiers. The Achilles-
sculpture, cast from captured French guns, was created in the memory of Arthur 
Duke of Wellington (1769–1852), to celebrate his victories in the Napoleonic 
Wars (1803–1815) (Roe, Notes to Jacob’s Room 184). Throughout the novel, the 
protagonist is repeatedly associated with Wellington: during his trip with Timmy 
Durrant, a stall-keeper takes Jacob for a ‘military gentleman’, which makes Jacob 
‘curse the British army and praise the Duke of Wellington’ (64). Later, in a 
passage immediately preceding Clara’s walk in Hyde Park, Bonamy describes 
Jacob as ‘fixed, monolithic – oh, very beautiful! – like a British Admiral’ (145).56  
                                                        
55 The motif of the horse without a rider appears earlier in the novel when Mrs Jarvis walks alone 
on the moors immersed in random impressions: ‘when the lark soars […], when there are distant 
concussions in the air and phantom horsemen galloping, ceasing […]’ (21). This passage evokes 
the atmosphere of a Gothic novel.   
56 Jane Goldman suggests an anti-patriarchal and anti-colonial reading of this passage, arguing 
that Troy, the dog, ‘marks the statue of “Achilles”, monument to colonial imperialism’ (105). Jane 
Goldman. ‘”Che chien est à moi”: Virginia Woolf and the Signifying Dog.’ Woolfian Boundaries: 
Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Annual International Conference on Virginia Woolf, edited by 
Anna Burrells at al., Clemson University Press, 2007, pp. 100–107. While this interpretation is 
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In front of the Achilles-monument Clara comes to terms with her double 
loss: Jacob’s definitive absence and her own failure as an artist, whose touch 
was not tight enough to keep her beloved safe. As Eurydice in the Ovidian myth, 
Jacob literally filters through Clara’s ‘semi-transparent’ fingers, which are not able 
to hinder the crumbling of his bodily outlines. In other words, the grape-picking 
scene, suggests the importance of bodily connection in the creation of 
sympathetic hollows. After all, the definition of the Merleau-Pontian hollow entails 
physical contact: the only way the subject can make sense of his/her own borders 
is by touching other selves. Hollows do not exist in infinite vacuum but are born 
in the intimate space between interacting bodies. By refraining from tangible 
contact in the grape-picking episode, Clara Durrant fails to fulfil the promise of 
her surname: her hands do not create a solid and enduring monument. Clara 
does not inherit her mother’s ‘iron’ nature (135) but retains an elusive, ‘gauze’-
like quality in the novel (47). Through the artistic “failures” of Nick Bramham and 
Clara, Woolf draws attention to the importance of firmness in portrait making: 
while she rejects earlier literary techniques based on the rigid framing of 
characters, she simultaneously shows the perils of a complete abandonment of 
tangible matter.  
Ultimately, Sandra’s memorialising technique comes closest to Woolf’s 
principles of firm softness. After all, Sandra is Jacob’s last lover and the only 
woman he tacitly admits to love when Bonamy reproaches him for being in love: 
‘”You are in love!” [Bonamy] exclaimed. Jacob blushed. The sharpest of knives 
never cut so deep.’ (145) By giving birth to Jacob’s son, Sandra literally preserves 
her lover’s memory in the soft and fragile human flesh. Though little Jimmy is 
equally subjected to mortality as his father (and even carries the potential of a 
similar death in his name), the baby also embodies the possibility of regeneration: 
a new life marked by past losses, yet yielding to the shaping hands of the future. 
At the same time, Jimmy, together with all the little boys in the novel, embody the 
histological meaning of ‘plastic’, as explained by Malabou. Babies born during 
and after the war represent, at least as Jacob’s Room suggests, a form of (self-
)healing: they become the flesh that can be mourned instead of the absent bodies 
of their fathers, but children also move beyond the past towards a new life. ‘Little 
                                                        
undoubtedly convincing and corroborated by Jacob’s repeated association with Wellington, 
Clara’s strong emotional reaction in front of the statue underlines a more elegiac-nostalgic reading 
of the scene.  
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boys’ are constantly associated with forward movement in Jacob’s Room. During 
her solitary walk in the park, Fanny observes how ‘[t]he eyes of all nurses, 
mothers, and wandering women are a little glazed, absorbed. They gently nod 
instead of answering when the little boys tug at their skirts, begging them to move 
on.’ (103) ‘Nurses, mothers, and wandering women’, representing the ‘women of 
England’, are frozen in their grief, unable to ‘move on’ towards a new life that their 
‘absorbed’ eyes cannot discern. Though children do not provide a straightforward 
way into the future, their life-affirming energy suggests that the ‘little boats’57 they 
launch on the pond in the park might sail towards hopeful destinations (103).58  
The emphasis on the tangible, albeit fragile, human flesh bears great 
importance in the historical context evoked in the novel. As Alice Kelly reminds 
us, the corpses of soldiers were not returned to Britain from 1916, meaning that 
families mourned their beloveds without having the possibility of paying homage 
to physical bodies (79). This represented a significant shock to a nation used to 
Victorian norms of mourning, or deathbed scenes, which presupposed close 
physical contact between the dying and family members, the latter recognising 
the dying’s need for ‘affection and companionship […] when holding the hand or 
                                                        
57 It is an interesting coincidence that Hans Christian Andersen’s tin soldier, after being thrown 
out of the window, also travels in a paper boat, before being swallowed by a fish and through 
various adventures, finally getting home to die with his beloved ballerina by his side. There is no 
evidence that Woolf had in mind Andersen’s tale when writing Jacob’s Room, but one can detect 
subtle links between the two stories. Though Andersen’s protagonist does not escape death by 
the end, he is not killed on the battlefield but literally melts in the fire of love. In Jacob’s Room, 
the paper boats, made by ‘little boys’ – who, like Jimmy, are the sons of ‘tin soldiers’ fighting in 
the war –, might take the children towards a more hopeful future, which is nevertheless not entirely 
devoid of threats and death. 
58 This reading does not intend to diminish Woolf’s complex ambivalence about child rearing. 
Though the selected passage from Jacob’s Room underlines Woolf’s temporary belief in the 
figure of the infant standing for futurity, Woolf also questioned this perspective in many of her 
writings. In her essay ‘Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid’ (1940), for example, she likened the act 
of child-bearing to men’s alleged biological instinct for violence and killing, both of which could be 
‘helped’ by ‘more honourable activities’, such as artistic creativity: ‘Is he [the airman dropping 
bombs] to be blamed for [his] instincts? Could we switch off the maternal instinct at the command 
of a table full of politicians? Suppose that imperative among the peace terms was: “Child-bearing 
is to be restricted to a very small class of specially selected women,” would we submit? Should 
we not say, “The maternal instinct is a woman’s glory. It was for this that my whole life has been 
dedicated […].” But if it were necessary […] that child-bearing should be restricted […], women 
would attempt it. Men would help them. They would give them other openings for their creative 
power. That too must make part of our fight for freedom. We must help the young Englishmen to 
root out from themselves the love of medals and decorations. We must create more honourable 
activities for those who try to conquer in themselves their fighting instinct, their subconscious 
Hitlerism.’ (Essays 6: 244) Daniela Caselli, in an article the starting point of which is a passage 
from Mrs Dalloway (Rezia’s encounter with a child in the park), refutes childhood’s false promise 
to provide ‘unmediated affective access’, ‘heal[ing] the wound of language and restor[ing] fullness’ 
(251). Instead, Caselli suggests, the figure of the child reminds us that affect is never devoid of a 
‘perspective’, a historical, political, cultural frame that encloses our understanding of childhood 
(251). Daniela Caselli. ‘Kindergarten theory: Childhood, affect, critical thought.’ Feminist Theory, 
vol. 11 no. 3, 2010, pp. 241–254.  
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stroking the hair could be more meaningful than words’ (Jalland 27). Evidently, 
after 1916, relatives of deceased soldiers did not have the possibility of saying 
farewell to the bodies of their beloved men. This state, which Allyson Booth calls 
‘corpselessness’ in Postcards from the Trenches (1996), represented a source of 
deep anguish among civilians (Booth 21–49). Jacob’s acute bodily absence 
haunts female characters in Jacob’s Room, from Clara – who is horrified by the 
galloping horse without a rider – to Mrs Flanders’s poignant gesture of holding 
out her son’s empty shoes at the end. As such, the invisibility and intangibility of 
bodies became pressing issues during and after the war. 
Woolf, however, understood transparency in a wider context. She was not 
only interested in the absence of the deceased but also in the invisibility of 
disabled soldiers and civilians (people deemed unfit for enrolment, such as 
women, the elderly, and the physically or mentally impaired), who were 
marginalised in the official memorialisation ceremonies. As Karen Levenback 
remarks, ‘the elevated and dehumanising acknowledgment [of war death] seems 
[…] to have blurred Woolf’s sense of civilian invisibility with a parallel invisibility 
experienced by ex-servicemen’ (30). To a certain degree, Woolf resented the 
rapid spreading of war monuments after 1919, because they worshipped death 
(i.e. absent corpses) rather than survival (Levenback 30). 
Indeed, Jacob’s Room contains an implicit critique of official monument 
making. Robert Reginio suggests that Jacob’s Room might be read as a ‘counter-
monument’, a concept he defines as ‘the desire to memorialize coupled with the 
need to critique memorial collective gestures’ (87). From atop of an omnibus, 
stopped in traffic, Fanny sees a procession with banners, ‘sweeping past 
Government offices and equestrian statues down Whitehall’ (151). While the 
peace parade approaches Whitehall (to pay homage at the Cenotaph, initially 
erected in July 1919), the clerks in the Government offices (among them Timothy 
Durrant) are busy with writing down ‘the statistics of rice-fields, […] plotting 
sedition in back streets, or gathering in the Calcutta bazaars, or mustering their 
forces in the uplands of Albania, where the hills are sand-coloured, and bones lie 
unburied’ (151). The ‘hollow-looking’ clerks resemble the statues of ‘Pitt and 
Chatham, Burke and Gladstone [which] looked from side to side with fixed marble 
eyes’ (151). Woolf critiques the empty stare of clerks and statesmen because 
they betray a total lack of sympathy for the most important issue at stake: the 
unburied bones of the dead.  
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In her diary, Woolf described the 1920 peace parade with scepticism and 
irony:  
 
There’s something calculated & politic & insincere about these peace 
rejoicings. Moreover they are carried out with no beauty, & not so much 
spontaneity… Yesterday in London the usual sticky stodgy 
conglomerations of people, sleepy & torpid as a cluster of drenched bees, 
were crawling over Trafalgar Square, & rocking about the pavements in 
the neighbourhood. (Diary 1: 292–3) 
 
A few lines down she added: ‘It seems to me more & more clear that the only 
honest people are the artists […]’ (293). Woolf resents the rigid artificiality of the 
marching people, who uncannily recall not only the Cambridge dons and students 
but also the soldiers in the cornfield. There is no individual agency left in the 
crowd that Woolf likens to ‘a cluster of drenched bees’, which can hardly drag 
themselves on the streets. The vocabulary she uses suggests a sense of 
heaviness and lack of dynamism, reminding more of the zombie-like ‘crowd 
flow[ing] over London Bridge’ in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (published in the 
same year as Jacob’s Room) than of a cheerful gathering celebrating Peace Day 
(Eliot 25).  
The representatives of official power, ‘calculating’ statistics and concerned 
with commerce and pompous monument making instead of the devastating 
human loss, are reminiscent of Mrs Durrant’s ‘smoothly sculpted’ company of 
gentlemen, who define ‘character-drawing’ as a ‘frivolous fireside art’, outlines 
‘enclosing vacancy’ (136). Tracing back the phrase ‘fireside art’ to an earlier 
passage in the novel, it becomes evident that it refers to the ‘unpublished works 
of women, written by the fireside in pale profusion, dried by the flame, for the 
blotting-paper’s worn to holes and the nib cleft and clotted’ (78). This depiction 
condenses the major objection against women’s art, which, inherited from earlier 
centuries, was still relevant in the modernist period: the (literal) overflowing of 
sentiments, suggesting at once abundance of feelings and soppiness. Jacob’s 
Room, nevertheless, repeatedly pushes against the prejudices formulated by 
men ‘in clubs and Cabinets’ (136).     
The novel, after all, opens with Betty Flanders writing a letter to Captain 
Barfoot: ‘Slowly welling from the point of her gold nib, pale blue ink dissolved the 
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full stop; for there her pen stuck; her eyes fixed, and tears slowly filled them’ (3). 
Objects’ outlines become blurred in front of Mrs Flanders’s eyes as she sees how 
a ‘little yacht was bending like a wax candle in the sun’ (3). The opening lines of 
the novel bear paramount significance because they introduce the central ideas 
of this chapter: the absence of clear-cut, sharp borders and the semi-soft nature 
of flesh. The ink merges delicately with Mrs Flanders’s tears and the salty sea 
vapour, dissolving the full stop – the rigid border of the sentence. The ‘clefts’ and 
‘clots’ the female writer’s nib leaves in the paper remind of the ‘slight irregularity’ 
of Greek statues ‘left in the rough’, admired by Jacob on his visit to the Parthenon 
(130). Mrs Flanders’s letter-writing activity acquires a sensuous tactile-visual 
quality, disrupting the ‘smoothness’ and monotonous linearity of the government 
clerks’ scribbling. Women’s pens do not create mere empty ‘scrawls’, as Mrs 
Durrant’s male friends believe, but their nibs, dipped in ‘pale blue ink’, draw the 
tender silhouettes of vulnerable flesh-and-blood beings, exposing the immense 
fragility of human life.  
Woolf set against the uncompassionate marble stare of admirals and 
clerks the tearful eyes of mourning female characters, who do not remember the 
deceased by marching in a parade and laying wreaths to a tomb ‘enclosing 
vacancy’ (cenotaph literally means ‘empty tomb’) but try to preserve their 
beloveds’ memory in ‘pale blue ink’ and malleable clay. Woolf’s interwar novels 
draw attention to the importance of those ‘invisible’ figures – among them women 
and disabled veterans, such as Septimus Warren Smith in Mrs Dalloway (1925) 
– who were cast off to the periphery of official commemoration (Fanny’s position 
as an outsider, not participating in but only looking at the procession from atop of 
an omnibus might be also telling in this context).  
 
 
Sympathetic picture taking: the legacy of Julia Margaret Cameron 
 
The motif of the glazed female gaze acquires great importance in Woolf’s interwar 
writings, and is imbued not only with the possibilities of capturing human nature 
but also with ideas of mourning. Woolf rejected absolute clarity in portrait making, 
because she associated this technique with a form of violent appropriation, the 
coercion of the subject within predetermined frames. She numbered visual 
sharpness among the failures of Edwardian novels, which described the 
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protagonists and their environment in painstaking details, leaving no room for the 
reader’s imagination to fill in the missing gaps. In Jacob’s Room, Woolf offered 
satirical snippets of Edwardian portraits, thus showing their shortcomings. While 
watching his lover, Florinda, leave on the arm of another man, Jacob is ‘drenched’ 
in light ‘from head to toe’:  
 
You could see the pattern on his trousers; the old thorns on his stick; his 
shoe laces; bare hands; and face.  
It was as if a stone were ground to dust; as if white sparks flew from a livid 
whetstone, which was his spine; as if the switchback railway, having 
swooped to the depths, fell, fell, fell. This was in his face. 
Whether we know what was in his mind is another question. (81) 
 
The light coming from the street lamp inundates Jacob, revealing with painstaking 
clarity the smallest details on his attire: the pattern on his trousers and walking 
stick, his shoelaces, and only at the end his hands and face. But ‘[i]s life like this? 
Must novels be like this?’, asks Woolf in her essay ‘Modern Fiction’ (1925), after 
critiquing the Edwardian novelist, Arnold Bennett, who creates ‘figures [that] were 
to come to life, […] would find themselves dressed down to the last button of their 
coats in the fashion of the hour’ (Essays 4: 160). How can ‘dressing down’ 
according to the latest fashion tell us anything valuable about an individual? How 
does our knowledge about Jacob’s garments help us to better understand him as 
a unique human being and not merely an indistinguishable component of the 
mob? Does his portrait, illuminated with sharp clarity, allow the reader to gain 
insight into his mind, his thoughts and feelings? The kind of hyper-visibility 
advocated by Edwardians and ridiculed by Woolf results in mechanical 
characters, assembled from different pieces that might perfectly fit together but 
that will never compose a valid and living human being, with whom readers can 
emotionally connect. By summing up insignificant details such as trousers and 
shoelaces, the writer throws light on superficial components that render the 
character a badly sewn patchwork figure, an idea also observed in the linguistic 
composition of the text: the semi-colons separating Jacob’s clothing accessories 
have a staccato effect, transforming the clause into a conjunction of broken 
phrases, implicitly reminding the reader of the tin soldiers’ ‘up and down’ 
‘agitation’ in the cornfields. 
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 Woolf firmly dismissed Edwardian characters on the basis of their hyper-
visible and finalised nature that left no room for ambiguity and hence created the 
false illusion of their complete knowability. In her opinion, the problem with the 
novels of Bennett and his fellow writers does not lie so much in the techniques 
they used but more in the fact that their fiction is imbued with ‘falsity and pretence’ 
and creates a picture that is unfaithful to life (Essays 4: 164.). Life does not reside 
in the perfect fitting of parts but in the ‘crevice [where] decay can creep in’, ‘the 
draught between the frames of the windows, or a crack in the boards’ (158). In 
other words, ‘the stuff of fiction’ (164) is born in the hollow, the sympathetic space 
between two intertwining elements. In Woolf’s interpretation, life – which 
represents the subject of fiction – is infused with vulnerability and perishability, 
and by extension a work of art should also accommodate ‘decay’ between its 
imperfectly matching parts. 
Woolf was sceptical of Bennett’s character-drawing techniques because 
she dismissed the idea that a human being can be fully captured. In the same 
year when Jacob’s Room was published, she wrote to her fellow writer, Gerald 
Brenan, that the best a novelist can do is to ‘catch a glimpse of a nose, a shoulder, 
something turning away, always in movement’ (Letters 2: 598). Yet Woolf prefers 
this state of fragmentariness: ‘Still, it seems better to me to catch this glimpse, 
than to sit down with Hugh Walpole, [H. G.] Wells, etc. etc. and make large oil 
paintings of fabulous fleshy monsters complete from top to toe’ (598). According 
to Woolf, a ‘battered’ nose or a sensually lifted foot offers a more complex and 
durable insight into the other’s being than a minutely detailed close-up, which 
transforms humans into grotesque, monster-like figures, impenetrable by the 
viewer’s sympathetic eyes. 
 Instead of magnified images, Woolf seemed to favour snapshots that 
offered brief glimpses of a human being. Indeed, in Jacob’s Room, the 
protagonist is captured in a snapshot made by Madame Lucien Gravé, a French 
tourist ‘perched on a block of marble with her Kodak pointed at his head’ (132). 
The Frenchwoman’s “attack” lasts a brief moment, after which ‘she jumped down, 
in spite of her age, her figure, and her tight boots – having, now that her daughter 
was married, lapsed with a luxurious abandonment, […] into the fleshy grotesque’ 
(132). There is a simultaneous sense of irony and aggression in Madam Gravé’s 
description. Her gestures remind the reader of a soldier waiting in ambush: she 
is ‘perched’ in her ‘tight boots’, ‘pointing’ her camera, like a gun, at Jacob’s head. 
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At the same time, her body posture can be read as a faint echo of the anonymous 
eyes watching the ‘blocks of tin soldiers’ ‘through field-glasses’, as well as 
Lawrence’s officer in ‘With the Guns’, who looks at the soldiers through a ‘fixed 
spy-glass’. After Madam Gravé disappears, Jacob bursts out in disappointment: 
‘“It is those damned women,” said Jacob, without any trace of bitterness, but 
rather with sadness and disappointment that what might have been should never 
be’ (132). The narrator’s satirical comment, following Jacob’s swearing, partially 
invalidates the protagonist’s outburst: ‘(This violent disillusionment is generally to 
be expected in young men in the prime of life, sound of mind and limb, who will 
soon become fathers of families and directors of banks.)’ (132–133) But Jacob’s 
reaction should not be dismissed as mere laughing matter. On the contrary, he 
draws attention to an important shortfall of snapshot photography, which tries to 
grab its subject with a velocity and force that leave no space and time for affective 
exploration.   
 As mentioned earlier, some critics have interpreted the figure of Madame 
Lucien Gravé as emblematic of a new generation of women, ‘represented by 
cheap prints and disposable Kodaks’, whom Woolf contrasts with men longing for 
a past associated with classical statues (Dickey 379). However, as Woolf’s 
ironical depiction of the French photographer suggests, taking snapshots might 
not be sufficient for capturing human nature. In its attempt to catch life in the 
fleeting present moment, the snapshot transforms into a too hurried grasp, which 
does not allow for the creation of lasting bodily contact.59 As such, Woolf partially 
shared Lawrence’s distrust of snapshot photography, albeit their reasons 
differed. While Lawrence discarded ‘Kodak-vision’ because he associated it with 
realistic imitation and fixity, Woolf – at least in some of her novels – considered 
snapshot photography too quick and fleeting in order to meaningfully preserve 
human character. Though Woolf undoubtedly borrowed from photography, as 
many critics have noticed, she did not necessarily regard snapshotting as the 
only or, indeed, most adequate way of capturing humans.60 Rather, she turned 
                                                        
59  On 21 December 1922, an anonymous reviewer for the New Age expressed his/her 
dissatisfaction with Jacob’s Room due to what (s)he described as Woolf’s technique of 
‘snapshotting things with and without meaning’, which results in a ‘rag-bag of impressions’ 
(Majumdar  and McLaurin 108).  
60  For more on Woolf’s preference for snapshots, see Colin Dickey’s ‘Virginia Woolf and 
Photography’. Maggie Humm has provided a detailed analysis of Woolf’s aesthetic engagement 
with her family photo albums in Snapshots of Bloomsbury: The Private Lives of Virginia Woolf 
and Vanessa Bell. Rutgers University Press, 2006. 
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to nineteenth-century photography, especially the pictures of her great-aunt, Julia 
Margaret Cameron, to explore ideas about sympathetic character-drawing. 
While in Jacob’s Room Woolf already exposed some of the shortcomings 
of snapshots, photographic techniques acquire a more important role in her later 
novel, To the Lighthouse, whose protagonist, Mrs Ramsay, bears a striking 
resemblance to Woolf’s photographer great-aunt. Julia Margaret Cameron has 
been considered one of the most important female photographers of the second 
half of the nineteenth century. She used a technique based on soft focus and 
long exposure, which allowed for the registration of her models’ movements, 
imbuing her pictures with a sense of life and energy (Brusius 346–7). Although 
the invention of the collodion (or wet-plate) process in 1851 significantly reduced 
the length of exposure time, photographic subjects were still subjected to long 
moments of motionlessness (Hankins and Silverman 166).61 This represented a 
significant challenge even for adults, not to mention children, whom Cameron 
photographed with great delight. She recorded in her memoir-essay, ‘Annals of 
my Glass House’ (1874), an occasion in which her photograph had been ruined 
by a child’s sudden burst of laughter:  
 
I was half-way through a beautiful picture when a splutter of laughter from 
one of the children lost me that picture, and less ambitious now, I took one 
child alone, appealing to her feelings and telling her of the waste of poor 
Mrs Cameron’s chemicals and strength if she moved. (Cameron 49) 
 
In the end, Cameron’s efforts resulted in victory, and her picture was entitled 
‘Annie’ (1864), on the back of which Cameron wrote ‘My first success’ (Cameron 
49). The images of Woolf’s great-aunt encompass a set of contradictions. She 
scolded her models for not sitting still while at the same time she rejected 
contemporary doctrines that advocated the importance of sharp clarity in 
photography. She wrote in her memoir: ‘When focusing and coming to something 
which, to my eye, was very beautiful, I stopped there instead of screwing on the 
lens to the more definite focus which all other photographers insist upon’ 
(Cameron 51). Cameron did not regard her photographs as mere reproducible 
images made by a ‘machine’ but highlighted their uniqueness as art objects. In a 
                                                        
61 Cameron’s models had to sit still for three to seven minutes (Powell 18).  
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letter to an unknown recipient, she wrote that her photograph of Thomas Carlyle 
‘is more like a block of marble out of Michael Angelo’s hands than a work of such 
a machine as the camera […]’ (Smith and Weaver 66). The fact that Cameron 
compares her work with that of a sculptor bears significance as it reveals the 
tactile dimensions of photography.  
Indeed, in the late nineteenth century, photography was as much a tactile 
as a visual art form. The glass plates Cameron used for developing her 
photographs, had to be handled carefully as they were extremely sensitive to 
external factors, and even a knock or breathing on the surface could destroy the 
negative (Powell 17). Manual skills thus played an important role in photography. 
Furthermore, as the development of negatives took place in ‘semi-darkness’ 
(Powell 17), the artist’s first contact with the picture was a tactile experience: her 
fingers palpated the photograph’s texture before her eyes saw the gradually 
clearing contours of the model. Cameron never regarded her camera as a mere 
technological device but viewed it as a living entity, an organic extension of her 
own body: ‘[f]rom the first moment I handled my lens with a tender ardour, and it 
has become to me as a living thing, with voice and memory and creative vigour’ 
(48). The camera almost acquires an autonomous existence while being linked 
to the photographer’s body and facilitating her interaction with her surroundings, 
like an extra sense organ.62 Interestingly though, Cameron did not view her 
camera simply as a prosthetic eye but rather as an organ able to simultaneously 
register various sense perceptions – sight, sound and touch – all of which 
contribute to the memorialising of the subject. This interplay of different senses 
does not lead to clearer outlines and sharper details; but, under Cameron’s eyes 
and hands, the model transforms into a malleable ‘block of marble’, veiled in 
semi-obscurity and lacking rigid borders. 
Yet as Mirjam Brusius observes, impreciseness was not synonymous with 
the absence of artistic or technical skill in Cameron’s case, but represented a 
conscious choice that ‘encourage[d] viewers to interact with the images while also 
revealing the photographic process’ (342). In a sense, Cameron’s nebulous 
works offered a sharper and more faithful picture of reality because they did not 
                                                        
62  In the second half of the nineteenth century concerns around the photographer–camera 
relationship proliferated, many people giving voice to their worries about the reversal of roles: the 
camera becomes alive while the photographer transform into a machine. For illustrated examples 
see Hankins and Silverman, pp. 161–162. While imbuing her ‘lens’ with life, Julia Margaret 
Cameron did not seem to worry about her body becoming an automaton. On the contrary, she 
used her camera to enhance her sense perceptions and her connection with the world. 
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try to conceal the ephemerality of the subject through superfluous material décor. 
Cameron’s aesthetic thus can be described as a form of firmly soft touch that pins 
down the subject without divesting him/her of free movement. Her photographs 
succeed in lastingly touching the viewer through their ability to create an effect 
of, to borrow Mrs Ramsay’s term, ‘trembling’ light. While being aware of her own 
as well as her guests’ mortality, Mrs Ramsay manages to “catch” a moment of 
genuine intimacy:  
 
It could not last she knew, but at the moment her eyes were so clear that 
they seemed to go round the table unveiling each of these people, and 
their thoughts and their feelings, without effort like a light stealing under 
water so that its ripples and the reeds in it and the minnows balancing 
themselves, and the sudden silent trout are all lit up hanging, trembling. 
So she saw them; she heard them; but whatever they said had also this 
quality, as if what they said was like the movement of a trout when, at the 
same time, one can see the ripple and the gravel, something to the right, 
something to the left; and the whole is held together […]. (116)    
 
Similarly to Cameron’s pictures, Mrs Ramsay’s vision represents an interplay of 
contradictions. While she is convinced of the penetrating clarity of her own sight, 
the narrative draws attention to the inevitable fallibility of her perspective. Her 
vision suffers a double, even triple distortion. The water acts as a first distortive 
element, but Mrs Ramsay’s perspective is also clouded by the movement of the 
fish and her own short-sightedness (15). Her mental image moves in and out of 
focus, refusing to settle on a central point, instead allowing for the simultaneous 
emergence of subject and surroundings, for- and background, ‘something to the 
right, something to the left’. Through the techniques of soft focus and long 
exposure, Mrs Ramsay succeeds in glimpsing into her guests’ inner world, and 
though her insights are often fallible, she nevertheless creates moments of 
sympathy and safety, making those surrounding her feel ‘together in a hollow, on 
an island’, temporarily protected by the threatening ‘fluidity out there’ (106).  
At the same time, Mrs Ramsay’s efforts to freeze time are not entirely 
devoid of violence. Her thoughts and gestures often betray an unconscious desire 
for possessiveness and control over the lives of others. She wishes to preserve 
her children in eternal youth: ‘Oh, but she never wanted James to grow a day 
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older or Cam either. […] Why […] should they grow up so fast? Why should they 
go to school?’ (64, 65) Mrs Ramsay’s gesture of stilling the movements of her 
children echoes the photographic technique of Julia Margaret Cameron, whom 
Woolf described, in an essay written in 1926 – as an artist loving her models yet 
submitting them to almost unbearable physical terror: ‘She cared nothing for the 
miseries of her sitters nor for their rank. The carpenter and the Crown Prince of 
Prussia alike must sit as still as stones in the attitudes she chose, in the draperies 
she arranged, for as long as she wishes.’ (Woolf, ‘Julia Margaret Cameron’ 37) 
Though Mrs Ramsay’s and Cameron’s memory-preserving activity is rooted in a 
kind of motherly love (Woolf likens her great-aunt’s love for photography to a 
tigress’ concern for her cubs, 37), the underlying violence of their endeavour is 
strongly articulated. As Mrs Ramsay admits: ‘[P]eople might say she was 
tyrannical, domineering, masterful, if they chose; she did not mind’ (TTL 65).  
Similarly to Cameron, Mrs Ramsay transforms her environment into a 
photographic studio, which she arbitrarily arranges according to her own artistic 
preferences. This becomes most evident in the dinner party scene, when Mrs 
Ramsay allocates seats (making sure to place potential marriage subjects next 
to each other), arranges table decorations, and supervises the serving of the 
meal. Though she makes a repeated effort to achieve perfection, she constantly 
faces obstacles: the harmonious composition of the fruit dish is broken by a hand 
reaching out to take a pear, the peaceful dinner is disturbed by Augustus 
Carmichael’s asking for another plate of soup, and even the seating arrangement 
turns out to be flawed: Lily does not sit next to Mr Bankes, the perfect husband 
candidate. And yet, despite all these errors, Mrs Ramsay manages to create a 
brief moment of sympathy, in which an ordinary gesture, such as looking at the 
same bowl of fruit, unites people, without blurring the distinctions between them: 
‘[Mrs Ramsay] saw Augustus too feasted his eyes on the same plate of fruit […]. 
That was his way of looking, different from hers. But looking together united 
them.’ (105–106) As the faces of the guests ‘on both sides of the table [are] 
brought nearer by the candle-light’, people are enveloped in a soft, hazy light that 
offers momentary protection against the threatening darkness ‘out there’, which, 
retrospectively, comes to be associated with war and death (106). The motif of 
the melting candle encapsulates Woolf’s ideas about sympathetic union: its light 
is not strong enough to inundate the whole room, yet it gently illuminates people’s 
faces, while the melting wax embodies the principles of firm softness, at once 
 113 
guarding against the fluidity of the night and acting as a memento mori. As in 
Jacob’s Room, To the Lighthouse also sets the fragile, semi-soft and semi-
luminous matter against the ruthless waste of human life. At the same time, 
through Mrs Ramsay’s ambiguous portrayal, Woolf shows how the act of 
capturing character is inherently imbued with a sense of oppression.   
 Woolf was preoccupied with the possibilities of sympathetic coexistence 
throughout her life, but these questions gained special significance for her in the 
aftermath of the First World War. In her essay ‘On Being Ill’, which first appeared 
in T. S. Eliot’s The Criterion in 1926, she wondered about the limits of fellow 
feeling in illness, suggesting that distress and pain are not shareable 
experiences:  
 
We do not know our own souls, let alone the souls of others. Human 
beings do not go hand in hand the whole stretch of the way. There is a 
virgin forest in each; a snowfield where even the print of birds’ feet is 
unknown. Here we go alone, and like it better so. Always to have 
sympathy, always to be accompanied, always to be understood would be 
intolerable. (Essays 4: 320–1) 
 
In this passage sympathy itself becomes an ailment, a dangerous infection that 
dissolves the body’s self-protective layers and intrudes into its intimate recesses, 
almost like a parasite. While in the texts discussed so far Woolf viewed the act of 
‘catching’ others as a prerequisite of sympathy, in ‘On Being Ill’ she drew attention 
to its dangers. The verb ‘catch’, besides referring to the act of taking hold of 
something or someone, also means to contract a disease or be helplessly 
affected by a desire/emotion (OED).63 Through this complex linguistic play Woolf 
subverts categories of active and passive, owner and possessed, suggesting that 
fellow feeling stretches between the two ends of the scale. ‘On Being Ill’ highlights 
the perils of falling into extreme sympathy: excessive openness and softness 
might lead to contamination, a form of identity loss caused by the other’s violent 
penetration into the subject’s body. Total openness and the failure to put up a 
                                                        
63 Online Oxford English Dictionary. www.oed.com. Accessed 10 August 2018. In the eighteenth 
century medical practitioners often described sympathy as a form of contagious illness that 
spread not only among the organs inside the same body but also between different human beings. 
See, for example, the works of the Scottish physician, Robert Whytt (1714–66): Physiological 
Essays (1755) and Observations on Dropsy of the Brain (1768).  
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certain degree of resistance might jeopardise individual boundaries and 
transform the subject into an indistinguishable component of the mass, an idea 
linked explicitly to war logic. Woolf associates constant sympathy seekers (and 
givers) with marching soldiers ‘in the army of the upright’, while she calls people 
who temporarily recoil from fellow feeling, ‘deserters’ (Essays 4: 321).64  
 The image of marching soldiers carries negative connotations in Woolf’s 
works because it indicates the loss of individual human values. During the time 
she was writing ‘On Being Ill’ and To the Lighthouse, Woolf repeatedly returned 
to questions of individual and communal identity. While recovering from a mental 
breakdown in July 1926, she recorded in her diary how reading poetry helped her 
‘bring back a sense of [her] own individuality’, and fuelled her desire to ‘make a 
looking glass with shell frame’ (Diary 3: 103). The motif of the shell-framed mirror 
encapsulates the essence of sympathy for Woolf, which lies in the modelling of 
the self’s outlines from a firmly soft material. The shell frame protectively 
embraces the subject’s silhouette without isolating it definitively from its 
surroundings. The shell – an object that many Woolfian characters were fond of, 
from Jacob to the Ramsay children – has a solid but not impenetrable texture, 
which at once separates from and connects the animal to the environment. After 
a long illness, Woolf gave voice to her need for a sense of unity-in-separateness. 
In the same journal entry, she recorded her reaction on seeing people for the first 
time following her recovery:   
 
My instinct at once throws up a screen, which condemns them [random 
passers-by]: I think them in every way angular, awkward & self assertive. 
But all this is a great mistake. These screens shut me out. Have no 
screens, for screens are made out of our own integument; & get at the 
thing itself, which has nothing whatever in common with a screen. The 
screen making habit, though, is so universal, that probably it preserves our 
sanity. If we had not this device for shutting people off from our 
sympathies, we might, perhaps, dissolve utterly. Separateness would be 
impossible. But the screens are in the excess; not the sympathy. (Diary 3: 
104) 
                                                        
64 Anxiety about excessive sympathy dates back to older times. In the eighteenth century, Scottish 
moralist Henry Mackenzie (1745–1831) drew attention to the problems inherent in unrestricted 
sympathetic communion, which can easily become a tool for manipulation, compelling the 
benevolent subject to perform charity against his/her will. See Csengei p. 38. 
 115 
 
The absence of a ‘screen’ has dangerous consequences as it might lead to the 
disintegration of one’s sense of self, which represents an important precondition 
of sanity, as Woolf put it. Temporarily ‘shutting off’ people ‘from our sympathies’ 
is necessary for the preservation of our mental and physical wellbeing. Yet Woolf 
also draws attention to the drawbacks of humans’ ‘screen making habit’, which 
risks preventing the subject in reaching out to other bodies. Ultimately, Woolf’s 
entry finishes on an affirmative note: ‘But the screens are in excess; not the 
sympathy’. A soft yielding to the other might indeed be dangerous, nevertheless 
constitutes an artistic possibility embraced by Woolf. The ‘snowfield where even 
the print of birds’ feet is unknown’ represents a place at one desired and anxiety-
inducing, poised between two extreme forms of violence: total restraint from 
bodily contact and pain-inflicting touch. Woolf’s understanding of intimacy thus is 
driven by the possibilities of violence, both in the sense of being the recipient of 
violence and perpetrating it, suggesting how sympathy is not simply a question 
of form or aesthetics but a matter of life (and death).  
 
Lily Briscoe and the possibilities of solace 
 
The aesthetic and real-life dimensions of sympathy are intricately intertwined in 
Woolf’s fiction, and represent a central concern of To the Lighthouse, whose 
central character, Lily Briscoe, is an artist. Lily’s artistic activity comprises the 
basic characteristics of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of sympathetic coexistence. 
She wishes to paint a picture which is ‘feathery and evanescent’ on the surface, 
‘one colour melting into another like the colours on a butterfly’s wing; but beneath 
the fabric must be clamped together with bolts of iron’ (186). Lily views her canvas 
as a ‘hollow’, where art and life, past and present, release and tight hold 
interweave: ‘And she began to lay on a red, a grey, and she began to model her 
way into the hollow there. At the same time, she seemed to be sitting beside Mrs 
Ramsay on the beach.’ (186) Through her experiment with colours and shapes, 
Lily gradually comprehends that hollows can be created only through a firmly light 
touch, which cares for the subject’s individual contours without compulsively 
trying to get hold of him/her. She is able to finish her painting when she finally 
accepts the fact that Mrs Ramsay cannot be resurrected in her physical reality 
but her memory can be preserved in the shape of a few purple lines on a white 
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canvas (58). When Lily understands that clear sight is not synonymous with sharp 
outlines and minute details, she succeeds in “catching” Mrs Ramsay both on an 
artistic and affective level:  
 
It was strange how clearly she saw her, stepping with her usual quickness 
across the fields among whose folds, purplish and soft, among whose 
flowers, hyacinths or lilies, she vanished. […] For days after she had heard 
of her death she had seen her thus, putting her wreath to her forehead and 
going unquestioningly with her companion, a shadow, across the fields. 
The sight, the phrase, had its power to console. Wherever she happened 
to be, painting, […] the vision would come to her, and her eyes, half 
closing, sought something to base her vision on. (197) 
 
Genuine sympathetic sight, Woolf suggests, happens in a semi-luminous zone, 
behind the half-closing eyelids of the viewer, where reality, fantasy and memory 
are intricately woven in the tapestry of love. The purple folds, among which Mrs 
Ramsay’s figure continuously vanishes and re-emerges, remind us of Merleau-
Ponty’s fold, a term he uses as a synonym for hollow to describe our ever-
changing relationship with the world: we are folds ‘that [were] made and can be 
unmade’ (PP 223). In Lily’s imagination, Mrs Ramsay becomes an organic part 
of nature’s rhythm, of the gentle undulation of purple landscape in which her 
individual contours dissolve, only to reappear a moment later. The hyacinth or lily 
field transforms into a soft purple fabric in which Mrs Ramsay’s figure becomes a 
fold, at once part of the field’s flesh and separate from it. This image shows a 
striking difference to the soldiers’ agonising trembling in Jacob’s Room. While the 
hyacinth field accommodates Mrs Ramsay’s outlines, allowing her to become part 
of its lifecycle, the cornfield rejects the flat bodies of ‘tin soldiers’, whose artificial 
and rigid contours remain clearly discernible among the yellow corns. Mrs 
Ramsay’s sight as a distant violet fold has an unexpected emotional effect on the 
mourning Lily, who finally finds a sense of solace and peace. As she sets the 
adored woman’s memory free, letting her partially melt in the flower field, Lily 
manages to gently lay hands on Mrs Ramsay and bring the painting to 
completion. Through the implicit comparison between the (flower/crop) field 
scenes in Jacob’s Room and To the Lighthouse, Woolf critiques Edwardian 
portrait-making techniques, characterised by artificiality and minute composition, 
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and she favours instead a character-drawing method closer to Post-Impressionist 
aesthetics.  
 Lily’s vision of Mrs Ramsay among the violet flowers recalls the painter’s 
later musings on the conditions of fellow feeling. Near the end of the novel, Lily 
ponders how love cannot be restricted within the confines of a pre-established 
and fixed form but just as a person can wear many shapes, love also has a 
polymorphous nature: 
 
They [Lily and Mr Carmichael] only mumbled at each other on staircases; 
they looked up at the sky and said it will be fine or it won’t be fine. But this 
was one way of knowing people, she thought: to know the outline, not the 
detail, to sit in one’s garden and look at the slopes of a hill running purple 
down into the distant heather. She knew him in that way. (211) 
 
Thinking about her relationship with Mr Carmichael, Lily concludes that language 
does not represent the most adequate means of getting to know others. Although 
they have barely changed a few words of courtesy, Lily feels deep sympathy for 
Mr Carmichael, whom she knows not in detail but in outline, ‘like the slopes of a 
hill running down into the distant heather’ (211). It is important to note that Lily’s 
interpretation of love, both in the case of Mrs Ramsay and Mr Carmichael, 
contains an element of dynamism. Mrs Ramsay walks across the field, almost 
breathing together with the flowers, while Mr Carmichael’s figure is associated 
with the slopes ‘running down’. Lily’s aesthetics, largely based on Post-
Impressionist principles, suggest that trying to coerce a subject into a fixed 
template fails to account for the polymorphous nature of human beings. This 
might represent, according to Lily, one of the explanations why people often get 
Mrs Ramsay “wrong”. Every character associates Mrs Ramsay with ideal beauty, 
which they equate with flawlessness: the perfect matching of minor details. 
Instead, Lily offers an alternative interpretation:   
 
Beauty had this penalty – it came too readily, came too completely. It stilled 
life – froze it. One forgot the little agitations; the flush, the pallor, some 
queer distortion, some light or shadow, which made the face 
unrecognisable for a moment and yet added a quality one saw for ever 
[sic] after. (193)  
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Lily reacts to Mr Bankes’s definition of beauty, who associates Mrs Ramsay’s 
‘astonishing’ charm with ‘the shape of a woman, peaceful and silent, with 
downcast eyes’, sitting still in her grey dress (192–193). Lily protests against this 
view of Mrs Ramsay because it transforms the woman into a frozen, untouchable 
ideal. As an artist, Lily rejects the idea of restricting human nature within the limits 
of a fixed, clear form. By focusing too heavily on decorative details, one risks 
missing out on the substance of beauty, which lies in the chiasmic space between 
light and shadow, flush and pallor, sharpness and distortion. What remains 
etched in memory is not the clear composition of the face but the blurred outlines 
of a figure swaying rhythmically in the distant purple field. 
 Nevertheless, Lily’s aesthetics do not suggest a total abandonment of 
reality in favour of ephemeral impressions. While she criticises Mr Bankes’s 
depiction of Mrs Ramsay, the narrative subtly highlights the partial validity of his 
views: after all, Mr Bankes is the only character who, despite not fully 
understanding Mrs Ramsay’s portrayal as a purple triangle, shows genuine 
interest for Lily’s art and feelings. For Lily, her artwork does not simply pose an 
aesthetic problem but is intricately bound up with real-life questions: her attempt 
at sympathetic union with Mrs Ramsay. Before Mr Bankes steps behind her 
easel, Lily muses on the difficulties of getting a glimpse into Mrs Ramsay’s 
‘sealed’ interior world, which is likened to a tomb holding ‘sacred inscriptions’ 
(57). As she recognises the inevitability of Mr Bankes’s approach, Lily gets 
alarmed not only because she fears artistic criticism but also because she feels 
that her whole inner life, ‘the residue of her thirty-three years’ has been exposed 
(58). She calls this experience ‘an agony’, while at the same time admitting that 
‘it was immensely exciting’ (58). Mr Bankes’s gentle enquiring about her work 
results in a moment of unexpected sympathy: ‘This man had shared with her 
something profoundly intimate. […] [S]he had not suspected that one could walk 
away down that long gallery not alone any more but arm in arm with somebody’ 
(60). Mr Bankes’s scientific gaze, rooted in realism, and Lily’s affinity for 
abstraction intertwine in a common endeavour to grasp Mrs Ramsay.65 
                                                        
65 Despite their different professions, Mr Bankes’s (botanist) and Lily’s (painter) perspectives have 
more in common than the characters initially think. Woolf creates a link between their worldviews 
through flower imagery, a central element in their work. In Lily’s vision, Mrs Ramsay crosses the 
purple field with a wreath of white flowers around her head. Though the narrative does not reveal 
the name of the flower, the reader suspects that the plant Lily refers to is the asphodel, which is 
mentioned by Mr Bankes earlier in the novel. While talking to Mrs Ramsay on the phone, Mr 
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Lily’s artistic vision thus is rooted in an amalgamation of closeness and 
distance, physicality and abstraction, haziness and clarity. Though one can 
detect fundamental differences between Lily’s Post-Impressionist art and Julia 
Margaret Cameron’s photographs, their attempt at capturing human nature 
shows some essential similarities. Marina Warner’s summary of Cameron’s 
photography can be applied to Lily’s, and by extension, Woolf’s aesthetics: 
 
The images quiver and dissolve in response to the flickering, evanescent 
indeterminacy of thought – the way in which images in memory lack 
definition, especially at the edges, how remembered faces or scenes move 
in and out of focus with gaps and lesions, how mental picturing possesses 
uncanny clarity and presence while simultaneously jumping and wobbling 
and eddying. (217) 
 
Mrs Ramsay simultaneously appears as an uncannily clear presence and 
wobbling illusion: she is both a still shape with downcast eyes – as Mr Bankes 
sees her – and a fluid purple shadow vanishing in the hyacinth field, as Lily 
imagines her. Lily’s and Mr Bankes’s perspective together constitute the core of 
Post-Impressionism: the coexistence of firmness and softness, clarity and blurred 
outlines. These artistic principles transcend not only Edwardian portrait-making 
techniques but also the painting methods of the Impressionists, the latter being 
implicitly critiqued by Woolf in To the Lighthouse.  
Near the beginning of the novel, as Mrs Ramsay walks with Charles 
Tansley on the beach, she observes Mr Paunceforte, the painter in ‘Panama hat 
and yellow boots’, who ‘softly, absorbedly’ imbues ‘the tip of his brush in some 
                                                        
Bankes imagines how her face is composed by the three dancing Graces, who join hands in 
‘meadows of asphodel’ (34). The interwoven hands of the Graces (symbolising grace, charm, and 
beauty) resemble the shape of a wreath, gently encircling Mrs Ramsay’s head, while at the same 
time, reminding readers of her imminent death. In Homer’s Odyssey, the Plain of Asphodel is ‘the 
place in the Underworld where all the dead dwell, leading a shadowy continuance of their former 
life in the world. The asphodel (whence “daffodil”) is a flowering plant of the lily family […]’.  
The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, edited by M. C. Howatson, 2011, 
www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199548545.001.0001/acref-
9780199548545. Accessed 7 July 2018.  
It is probably not a mere coincidence either that the asphodel is part of the lily family, another 
significant flower in the novel. Besides naming her painter character Lily, Woolf also places Mrs 
Ramsay’s figure in a lily field, where the latter walks ‘with her companion, a shadow’, an implicit 
reference to the shadowy existence of the deceased in the Underworld. And the mythological 
threads do not finish here. To the Lighthouse ends with Mr Carmichael, ‘the old pagan god’, letting 
‘fall from his great height a wreath of violets and asphodels which, fluttering slowly, lay at length 
upon the earth’ (225). After Mr Carmichael’s ritualistic burial gesture, Lily succeeds in bringing 
her picture to completion, and ultimately, laying the dead to rest.   
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soft mound of green and pink’ (17). With a slight irony in her voice, Mrs Ramsay 
then adds that ‘[s]ince Mr Paunceforte had been there […] all the pictures were 
like that […], green and grey, with lemon-coloured sailing-boats, and pink women 
on the beach’ (17). What Mrs Ramsay seems to be objecting to in Paunceforte’s 
art is too much softness, which transforms his picture into a totally blurred image, 
indistinguishable from his other works. Mrs Ramsay feels the absence of the 
artist’s individual fingerprint on the canvas. Her critique chimes with Fry’s opinion, 
formulated in ‘The Post-Impressionists’ (1910): 
 
Impressionism encouraged an artist to paint a tree as it appeared to him 
at the moment under particular circumstances. It insisted so much upon 
the importance of his rendering this exact impression that his work often 
completely failed to express a tree at all; as transferred to canvas it was 
just so much shimmer and colour. (82) 
 
Fry identifies as the major shortcoming of the Impressionists the rigid insistence 
on capturing images in their momentary fleetingness, without modifications. 
However, according to Fry, this does not lead to more clarity, but on the contrary, 
to the distortion of the tree, which becomes a random amalgamation of ‘shimmer 
and colour’. In contrast, the tree on Lily’s painting is the result of a deliberate 
artistic choice, preceded by her musings on the geometric composition of her 
picture: ‘Yes, I shall put the tree further in the middle; then I shall avoid that 
awkward space’ (92). Lily’s picture, despite being possibly destined to become a 
mere dust catcher in the attic, represents a unique artistic achievement, unlike 
Mr Paunceforte’s indistinguishable paintings.  
 Woolf’s obsession with statuary and visual arts illuminates her wider 
concerns with ideas about sympathetic coexistence both on an aesthetic and 
real-life level. In her fiction and personal writings she emphasised the importance 
of affective touch in interpersonal as well as artistic encounters. She drew 
attention to the need for tangible bodily contact in intimacy, while also suggesting 
the inherent dangers of touch, which is often heavily invested with a sense of 
oppressive violence. As such, her works oscillate between the desire to pin down 
the subject and the anxiety of perpetrating violence. Yet, Woolf suggests, the 
latter represents a risk one must take in order to create intimate hollows, in which 
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emotional encounters between people as well as between humans and art 
objects can take place.  
In her 1906 travel journey Woolf described one of her most sensuous (and 
sensual) immersions in art. Her first encounter with the sculpture of Hermes at 
the Acropolis is depicted as a form of visceral delight. She describes the stone 
as ‘acquiescent to the sculptors [sic] hand: it is almost liquid, of the colours of 
alabaster, & of the solidity of marble. There is a beautiful polished foot which you 
may stroke with your own soft flesh.’ (A Passionate Apprentice 319) The sight of 
Hermes triggers a strong sense of excitement, experienced in the viewer’s body 
yet transcending corporeal limits: the eyes almost become independent 
‘creatures’, which attach themselves to the statue, freely ‘springing’ in the hollows 
of the marble. ‘Springing’, at the same time, echoes an earlier passage in the 
diary, in which Woolf described Hermes as having ‘a spring in his step’ (319). 
Furthermore, the stone, a combination of softness and hardness, transforms into 
living material, inviting the spectator’s searching gaze and touch. Seeing proves 
to be insufficient in front of ‘such beauty’, which can truly be grasped only via 
tactile perception: the caressing of the marble foot ‘with your own soft flesh’. The 
employment of the same words in the depiction of sculpture and viewer 
momentarily suspends the borders between the two, allowing for the 
interpretation of the contemplating subject as the extension of the art object. The 
marble statue comes to life while the living human subject is “petrified” by the 
sculpture’s ineffable beauty. Woolf drew the figure of the art lover as someone 
who does not, to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s words, ‘look at a thing, fixing it in its 
place’ but lets his/her gaze ‘wander in the halos of Being’ (‘Eye and Mind’ 126). 
By portraying corporeality in its firmly soft materiality, Woolf offered an alternative 
interpretation of the body, which she viewed as malleable matter, yielding to the 
artist’s fingers, without losing its own borders.   
By caring for imperfectly curved, three-dimensional forms, Woolf partly 
questioned Lawrence’s celebration of flat, hieroglyphic figures. The author at the 
centre of the next chapter, Elizabeth Bowen, shares many of Woolf’s 
preoccupations: in her interwar novels Bowen draws attention to the dangers of 
flattening out a human being by trying to sum up his/her traits, and transforming 
him/her into a decorous realist painting. Nevertheless, the Second World War 
(before which Lawrence had died of tuberculosis, and at the beginning of which 
Woolf decided to end her life) marks, in Bowen’s fiction, a partial departure from 
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her predecessors’ concept of sympathy. Bowen, who spent most of her time in 
London during the war, showed with acute sensibility how violence can shatter 









Elizabeth Bowen: ‘that other means of communication’ 
 
In a 1941 essay entitled ‘Virginia Woolf’, Elizabeth Bowen writes: ‘When 
[Between the Acts] ends it is, as at the end of [Woolf’s] other books, as though a 
lamp had been switched off at its base, but the current is still waiting along the 
flex’ (Collected Impressions 74).66 Bowen’s praise of Between the Acts draws 
attention to an important effect of Woolf’s writings: their ability to make the reader 
(at least some readers) feel an irrational attraction towards the fictional world and 
its inhabitants, even after the actual reading process has ended and characters 
have retreated in the shade of the switched-off lamp. In Bowen’s opinion, Woolf’s 
characters do not dissolve in complete obscurity but are enveloped in a kind of 
semi-‘luminous halo’ that invites the reader’s continued affective attention and 
sympathy (Woolf, Essays 4: 160). 
 The complex coexistence of light and shadow, clarity and obscurity forms 
the basis of Bowen’s appreciation of Woolf’s fiction, and also represents a 
prominent aspect of Bowen’s own novels written in the 1930s and 1940s. In her 
first piece of non-fiction, a 1928 essay entitled ‘Modern Lighting’, Bowen 
describes modern light as an element that gently veils the human body through 
an interplay of luminosity and shadow which approaches the eyes tenderly 
instead of violently penetrating and blinding them. Even interwar commerce has 
acknowledged humans’ emotional relationship to light, or what Bowen calls, ‘this 
affectability of ours’: ‘The shops will nurse this fad […] with a certain tenderness. 
Electric candlesticks are delicate with shields, to turn light back against the 
paneling. […] [O]rnate pendant bowls toss light up to the ceiling, away from the 
eyes.’ (People, Places, Things 27). The gentle luminosity of shaded lamps and 
electric candlesticks allows the subject to experience a sympathetic immersion in 
the visible world, which at once yields to the exploring human gaze and withdraws 
into mystery and unknowingness.  
In a later essay, ‘Out of a Book’ (1946), Bowen ponders the similarities 
between feeling for fictional characters and real-life people, identifying as the 
basis of sympathy the blurry, unfixable nature of humans:  
                                                        
66 Hereafter CI. 
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[T]he characters who came out of my childish reading to obsess me were 
the incalculable ones, who always moved in a blur of potentialities. It 
appeared that nobody who mattered was capable of being explained. […] 
I can trace in all people whom I have loved a succession from book 
characters – not from one only, from a fusion of many. ‘Millions of strange 
shadows on you tend.’ (CI 267) 
 
According to Bowen, human nature resists total illumination, the latter being 
synonymous with complex, rational knowledge about other minds. Instead, 
fictional and real subjects alike exist as dynamic beings, caught up in the 
constantly changing interplay of clarity and haziness, light and shadow. The 
novelist, in her encounters with characters and real people, is surrounded, to 
borrow from the Shakespearean allusion, by ‘millions of strange shadows’, which 
impede clear sight, allowing thus for a more sensuous form of affective 
interaction. The sympathetic illumination at the heart of Bowen’s writings remains 
imbued with a degree of shadiness in her later writings too. As she remarks in a 
1969 essay, ‘New Waves of the Future’: ‘Without [shadows], light could be 
meaningless, overpowering! Could one inhabit for long a shadowless world?’ 
(People, Places, Things 43, emphasis in original) Bowen’s rhetorical question 
implies the perils of ‘shadowless’ existence, which leads to invisibility and 
immateriality: the absence of a feeling body capable of leaving imprints in its 
surrounding environment.  
 Indeed, several critics have commented on the incorporeal nature of 
Bowen’s characters by drawing attention to their lack of agency through their 
transformation into abstract symbols.67 In their influential study, Elizabeth Bowen 
                                                        
67 Allan Hepburn occupies a different stance in the critical debate on embodiment in Bowen’s 
fiction. He argues that Bowen’s obsession with protagonists’ bodily nature (or as he puts it, 
‘palpability’) in her 1930s novels, stems from her readings and translations of French realist 
fiction. Hepburn points out how Bowen disliked English writers’ failure to imagine characters’ 
‘palpability’, which she associated with authors’ tendency to fall in excessive sympathy with their 
fictional creatures (1055). Instead, Bowen turned to nineteenth-century French literary tradition, 
especially Gustave Flaubert’s and Guy de Maupassant’s works, to learn ‘objectivity, even cruelty, 
in rendering characters’ (1056). Allan Hepburn. ‘French Translations: Elizabeth Bowen and the 
Idea of Character.’ University of Toronto Quarterly, vol. 79, no. 4, 2010, pp. 1054–1063. While 
French writers’ influence on Bowen’s interwar novels is undeniable, and characters’ physicality 
occupies a significant place in her fiction, this chapter suggests that her commitment to creating 
flesh-and-blood protagonists is not dichotomous with sympathetic principles; on the contrary, it 
represents the basic precondition of feeling for and with others.  
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and the Dissolution of the Novel, Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle have 
argued that bodily contours in Bowen’s novels are dissolved to such a degree 
that characters cease to exist as human beings and they ‘uncannily become 
words and sentences’, a characteristic that hints at postmodernism (xvii, 
emphasis in original). Maud Ellmann has suggested that ‘to call [Bowen’s 
characters] “people” is to misrepresent the inhuman logistics of desire in 
[Bowen’s] texts, whereby persons are reduced to place-holders or algebraic 
variables’ (Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across the Page 23). Whether 
linguistic or mathematical signs, Bowen characters seem to lose their bodily 
connection with the world and each other, and transform into abstractions 
unperceivable through sensuous perception. For a better understanding of the 
above-mentioned critical perspectives, it is important to mention that Bennett and 
Royle examine Bowen’s oeuvre from a deconstructionist point of view, while 
Ellmann reads the Anglo-Irish writer’s works through psychoanalytic lens. As 
such, Ellmann’s emphasis on the ‘inhuman’ nature of interpersonal desire and 
her introduction of the concept of the ‘shadowy third’ (borrowed from the title of 
Bowen’s 1923 short story ‘The Shadowy Third’), as a nonhuman, external force 
intruding into dyadic, heterosexual relationships, can be partly explained by the 
psychoanalytic framework of her investigations (23). Ellmann interprets the notion 
of ‘shadow’ as a threatening element that invisibly haunts protagonists, violently 
penetrating their liaisons and corroding humans’ corporeal outlines until they 
become reduced to two-dimensional mathematical symbols. 
While acknowledging the validity of Bennett and Royle’s, and Ellmann’s 
arguments, my approach diverges from theirs in significant ways. This chapter 
argues that in Bowen’s interwar novels, such as To the North (1932) and The 
House in Paris (1935), shadows are necessary for the unfolding of intimacy, 
which happens between phenomenal bodies, enmeshed in what Merleau-Ponty 
calls the flesh of the world.68 The presence of shadows indicates not only that 
one possesses a corporeal reality but also that, even in close relationships, a 
certain sense of mystery remains: the object of our perception is never fully 
knowable. This, on the other hand, does not imply that the other is infinitely 
unknowable. From a parallel reading of Bowen and Merleau-Ponty emerges a 
form of sympathy sensitive to the vulnerability and senescence of human bodies, 
                                                        
68 Hereafter TTN and HP.  
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without denying their flesh-and-blood materiality and the embodied nature of 
interpersonal connections. A phenomenological interpretation does not exclude 
the ephemerality of bodies (put forward by Bennett and Royle, and Ellmann); on 
the contrary, by taking into consideration the fleeting quality of human existence, 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and Bowen’s fiction elucidate the corporeal 
dimension of the subject’s interactions with the world. 
 At the same time, while in her interwar novels, Bowen seems to value 
blurriness, in her fiction written during the years of the Second World War, she 
complicates ideas about indistinctness. In The Heat of the Day (1949) and her 
wartime short stories, to which I will turn in the last section, Bowen suggests how 
excessive shadowiness can have dangerous, even fatal consequences not only 
in the lives of individuals but also in communities. The Heat of the Day shows 
how complete obscurity might lead to treachery and the loosening of 
interpersonal bonds, while it can also result in a threatening form of dissolution to 
which people in wartime London are helplessly exposed.     
 
‘Deadeningly clear’: The House in Paris and the limitations of hyper-
visibility  
 
Before turning to a reading of Bowen’s writings, it is essential to clarify what 
Bowen meant by bodily matter. Materiality, for Bowen, is not synonymous with 
unchangeable definitiveness and rigidity. On the contrary, as The House in Paris 
suggests, finalised substantiality shuns, rather than nourishes, intimacy. The 
novel is set in the interwar period, in the Parisian home of Naomi Fisher, where 
two children, Henrietta and Leopold spend a day together. From the second part, 
entitled ‘The Past’, the reader learns the tragic love story of Leopold’s parents, 
Karen Michaelis and Max Ebhart. While being engaged to Naomi (Karen’s best 
friend), Max has an illicit love affair with Karen, which results in Karen’s 
pregnancy and Max’s suicide. This tragic end, nevertheless, is preceded by a 
significant moment that illuminates Bowen’s ideas about embodied sympathy. 
After informing her mother about the unexpected engagement of Naomi and Max, 
Karen muses on Mrs Michaelis’s reaction to the news. Mrs Michaelis tries to 
identify Max’s motivation for wanting to marry Naomi, but as Karen observes, her 
mother’s method of pinning down human personality is heavily invested with a 
sense of violence and desire for domination: 
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[Mrs Michaelis’s] well-lit explanations of people were like photographs 
taken when the camera could not lie; they stunned your imagination by 
being exact. Would those unmysterious views in a railway carriage make 
you visit a place, even in dreams? You could not fall in love with the subject 
of an Edwardian camera-portrait, with polished shoulders, coiffure and 
curved throat. The lake showing every ripple, the wood showing every leaf, 
or the stately neck with pearls are too deadeningly clear. It is more than 
colour they lack. Without their indistinctness things do not exist; you 
cannot desire them. (118, emphasis in original)  
 
Echoing Woolf’s famous essay ‘Character in Fiction’ (1924), Bowen gives voice 
to her conviction that hyper-visibility does not lead to more accurate knowledge 
about others. Mrs Michaelis’s ‘well-lit’ explanations, resembling ‘Edwardian 
camera-portrait[s]’, might provide a minutely detailed and exact description of 
people’s exterior appearance (‘coiffure’, ‘stately neck with pearls’), but they 
fundamentally fail to capture human nature, which extends beyond the realm of 
pure visibility. Mrs Michaelis petrifies people and transforms them into 
‘deadeningly clear’ objects with ‘polished shoulders’ and ‘curved throat[s]’, and 
consequently she ceases to care for the other’s feeling body, which, as 
phenomenologists suggest, cannot be restrained within rigid frames. Through 
Mrs Michaelis’s method of portrayal Bowen warns readers against reading 
techniques that try to draw characters’ facial contours with such realistic precision 
that they leave no room for ‘indistinctness’, which represents an essential 
precondition of ‘falling in love’. Mrs Michaelis considers ‘[b]lurs’ and ‘wrong 
shapes, ridgy lights, crater darkness making a face unhuman [sic] as a map of 
the moon’ insignificant artificialities that fail to communicate anything about the 
subject (118). ‘[S]he was blind to those accidents that make a face a face […], 
and float the object, alive, in your desire […]’ (118). What she actually fails to 
apprehend is that these ‘accidents’ represent precisely the preconditions of 
sympathetic perception. The irregular lines of light create, to appropriate Woolf’s 
phrase, a ‘luminous halo’ around the ‘crater darkness’ without definitively 
eliminating its shadiness. As both the narrator of The House in Paris and Merleau-
Ponty highlight, sympathetic coexistence with the other can materialise only if the 
subject becomes attentive to ‘blurs’ and ‘wrong shapes’, which ultimately make 
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the object of perception a living entity, allowing self and other to ‘float’ together in 
‘Being’ (Merleau-Ponty, VI 144).   
 Mrs Michaelis dismisses ‘modern photography’ because she finds it 
‘exaggerated and woolly’, creating ‘an overgreat sense of mystery […] leading to 
artiness’ (119). She considers it ‘inexcusable’ to depict personality as ‘mysterious’ 
and thus to deny the clarity of ‘character’ (119). She discards her daughter’s 
recent photographs taken by some artist friends of Karen, because the pictures’ 
blurred quality, in Mrs Michaelis’s opinion, obscures Karen’s real nature. Though 
Karen partially shares her mother’s ‘anti-romanticism’, the former also 
acknowledges the importance of indistinctness in vision, which opens up the 
affective dimension of our relationship with the sensible: ‘[T]he exercise of any 
sense, sight most, starts up emotion. You cannot debunk everything.’ (119) As 
Merleau-Ponty writes: perception is born ‘from the phenomenon of 
“indeterminacy” [bougè]’ (PP 51). Interestingly, an earlier translation of 
Phenomenology of Perception uses a photographic analogy to define the working 
mechanisms of sensing. According to the 1962 English translation, perception 
comes into existence prior to ‘any science […] from the phenomenon of the 
“blurred” photographic effect’ (50).69 Echoing Woolf’s preference for nebulous 
effects in visual arts, exemplified by Julia Margaret Cameron’s soft focused 
photographs, Bowen also stresses the importance of, what Mrs Michaelis 
derogatively calls, the ‘woolly’ quality of images. The double meaning of ‘woolly’ 
encapsulates the core of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology: the adjective can 
refer simultaneously to vagueness and the tactile property of the wool, suggesting 
what Merleau-Ponty labels in his last work, the chiasmic intertwining of the visible 
and the tactile. 
It is crucial to clarify at this point that by ‘mystery’ and ‘indistinctness’, 
Bowen does not mean complete abstraction or retreat into fleeting immateriality. 
On the contrary, she emphasises the significance of the body as a living, 
vulnerable, three-dimensional entity that cannot be ‘pressed flat without losing 
                                                        
69  See Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962. The original French reads ‘phénomène du <bougè>’. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. Phénoménologie de la Perception. Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1945, p. 62.  ‘Bougè’ 
is the past participle of the verb ‘bouger’, meaning ‘to move’. Though the original French does not 
explicitly refer to photography, Colin Smith’s translation, ‘“blurred” photographic effect’, might 
suggest that an image usually becomes blurred if the camera is not stable at the moment of 




form’ (HP 119). As Karen concludes: ‘What Mrs Michaelis said about Max and 
his reasons for wanting to marry Naomi would be, no doubt, true – if you pressed 
him flat like a flower in a book. But he had a thickness you had to recognize […]’ 
(119). In this context, the verb ‘press’ expresses violence and desires for 
possessiveness even at the cost of intrusion into the other’s body. Through 
Karen’s criticism of her mother’s reading methods, Bowen exposes the dangers 
of restricting people within the fixed boundaries of a realist portrait.  
 Karen’s musings about the nature of character pose an important 
question: how can we preserve the ‘thickness’ of humans without completely 
refraining from touch? Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy provides a possible answer. 
In Phenomenology of Perception, he describes sensation as a non-cognitive act, 
which does not concern the part of my being ‘for which I am responsible and upon 
which I decide – but rather another self that has already sided with the world […]. 
Between my sensation and myself, there is always the thickness of an originary 
acquisition that prevents my experience from being clear for itself’ (224, emphasis 
in original). According to Merleau-Ponty, our perception of the world, including 
other human beings, cannot be reduced to a detached visual act, a rational 
possession of the object of our sensation. Our experience of others is never a flat 
and unambiguously clear phenomenon but one enveloped in thickness, which 
instead of separating us from the other, represents the medium in which our 
encounter can unfold and materialise. The term ‘thickness’ acquires a greater 
significance in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, such as The Visible and the Invisible, 
where it is associated with the flesh of the world. The flesh, neither matter nor 
idea but an ‘element of Being’, represents the ‘tissue’ between seer and world, 
which ‘sustains and nourishes’ their relationship (VI 132–133). It is the body’s 
thickness and its organic embeddedness in the flesh that allows us to connect to 
the sensible, made up of things that are ‘not flat […] but beings in depth, 
inaccessible to a subject that would survey them from above, open to him alone 
that […] would coexist with them in the same world’ (VI 136). This kind of 
coexistence is precisely what Mrs Michaelis’s approach to Max lacks. In her 
attempt to ‘press him flat’, she fails to care for his ‘thickness’ and ‘depth’, and 
instead she detachedly surveys him ‘from above’. The gesture of pressing flat 
becomes heavily invested with violence, an act that, in its possessive attempts, 
closes off the hollow between self and other, that sympathetic in-between space 
where moments of togetherness can unfold. 
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 Mrs Michaelis’s reading method remains phenomenologically problematic 
because it reduces the ‘possibility’ and ‘latency’ inherent in the thick, three-
dimensional body (VI 132–133). Her technique resembles what Merleau-Ponty 
calls the assembling of ‘leaves or layers’, which means ‘to flatten and to 
juxtapose, under the reflective gaze, what coexists in the living and upright body’ 
(VI 138). However, as Karen remarks, compiling different layers does not lead to 
the better comprehension of Max’s persona, whose matrimonial wish cannot be 
put down to a clearly defined, unquestionable reason. Through the description of 
Mrs Michaelis’s approach, based on hyper-visibility and cognitive possession, 
Bowen dismisses the ‘well-lit’ ‘camera-portraits’ of the Edwardians. Her criticism 
resembles Woolf’s earlier rejection of Edwardian techniques in Jacob’s Room 
and her non-fiction written in the late 1920s. Both writers rebuff Edwardian 
portraying techniques because these try to make the reader believe that human 
character is a ‘pressed flower’, falling out of the book directly into the reader’s 
lap. By presenting humans as flat and reducible to ‘well-lit’ characteristics, the 
Edwardians fail in what Woolf called in ‘Character in Fiction’ the ‘business of 
intimacy’ (48).70 
However, it is important to stress that neither Woolf nor Bowen meant that 
fictional characters should be described as floating mirages constantly slipping 
through their creator’s, or indeed the reader’s fingers. In ‘Mr Bennett and Mrs 
Brown’ Woolf highlighted the importance, but at the same time the difficulty of 
creating a ‘solid, living, flesh-and-blood Mrs Brown […] from the gleams and 
flashes of [the] flying spirit’ (Essays 3: 388). In this, Woolf and her younger fellow 
writer Bowen saw the greatest challenge and one the most fulfilling rewards of 
modernist fiction. It is probably not a mere coincidence either that Woolf opted for 
a tactile metaphor when defining the new ‘business’ of the modernist novelist: the 
‘catching’ of Mrs Brown. In this context, the act of catching is free from 
associations of violent grasping and rapacious possessiveness, and it rather 
                                                        
70 Woolf wrote in ‘Character in Fiction’: ‘The writer must get into touch with his reader by putting 
before him something which he recognises, which therefore stimulates his imagination, and 
makes him willing to co-operate in the far more difficult business of intimacy. And it is of the 
highest importance that this common meeting-place should be reached easily, almost 
instinctively, in the dark, with one’s eyes shut.’ (Essays 3: 48) According to Woolf, the encounter 
between author, reader and character represents an instinctual and sensuous experience, 
achieved through a kind of bodily closeness ‘in the dark’. Shutting one’s eyes, nevertheless, does 
not mean the total absence of visibility. Instead, it suggests an embodied immersion into the flesh 
of the world, which leads to an alternative sight: a form of vision that does not scrutinise from 
above but being already braided into the thickness of the sensible, ‘coexists’ with the latter in 
intimate proximity. 
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evokes an image of delicate handling. At the same time, the verb ‘catch’ carries 
connotations of fleetingness and quickness, indicating a form of touch the aim of 
which is not a tight and coercive hold but rather a light stroke, attentive to the 
other’s boundaries. Character chasing for Woolf and Bowen is not fuelled by a 
wish for subordination but expresses a desire of laying hands on the other with 
gentleness, openness and curiosity, while simultaneously accepting the 
inevitable possibility of hurting and becoming injured in the process: ‘Dismally he 
[the writer] must admit bruises received in the pursuit’ (Essays 3: 388). In her 
attempt to gently ‘catch’ her characters, the writer herself becomes woundable 
as a result of her openness to her own fictional creatures. In other words, the 
relationship between author and character is based on mutual vulnerability and 
reciprocity: the writer envisages the characters but the latter also affect their 
creator, and indeed the reader. In order to fully participate in the ‘business of 
intimacy’, both writer and reader have to learn the art of tender touch, at once 
firm and light, perseverant and releasing, torn between an irreconcilable desire 
of holding on to and the painful realisation of its impossibility. 
 
‘Characters must materialize’: the preconditions of sympathetic character-
making 
 
In her essays on creative writing, published predominantly in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, Bowen often reflects on the possibilities of an embodied 
rather than purely intellectual approach to fictional characters. In a 1946 essay 
entitled ‘Notes on Writing a Novel’, she writes: ‘Characters must materialize – i.e., 
must have a palpable physical reality. They must be not only see-able […]; they 
must be to be felt [sic]. Power to give physical reality is probably a matter of the 
extent of the novelist’s physical sensibility, or susceptibility’ (Lee, The Mulberry 
Tree 38, emphasis in original). She employs the same phrase, ‘physical reality’, 
in a 1949 letter addressed to a young fellow writer, Enid Williams, to whom Bowen 
offers professional advice: ‘I think your writing still too disembodied. One feels 
the poetic significance of persons and objects you write about, but not nearly 
enough their physical reality’ (Hepburn, The Weight of a World 4). Bowen 
emphasises that, in order to create valid and memorable characters, the writer 
must open to the sensible, the world made of tangible-visible flesh, experienced 
through a ‘physical sensibility’ irreducible to intellectual skills.  
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Bowen sees in the novelist’s relationship with her characters the perfect 
illustration of sympathetic principles. In ‘A Novelist and His Characters’ (1969), 
she elaborates on the origin of fictional characters, which are neither simply 
‘made’ nor ‘found’, but ‘called into being’ out of an ‘azure transparency’, a ‘mist’ 
of forgotten experiences, dreams and imagination ‘like a ship coming forward out 
of a fog at sea’ (Hepburn, Listening In 183). Bowen’s description of the meeting 
place between writer and character as an ‘azure transparency’ and misty horizon 
anticipates one of her later reflections on the nature of character- making, which 
she explicitly links to the war:    
 
I once said, in writing about the novel, that at the outset of the story, my 
characters were rather like persons seated opposite to me in a railway 
carriage. […] And I envisaged such a carriage or compartment as it used 
to be, during after-dark travel in the war, when the whole thing was 
darkened down to a single small blue lamp up in the ceiling. So that when 
one first entered the carriage and sat down, one saw only opposite one 
four or five veiled forms, without features, without characteristics. And only 
as these people moved or expressed themselves, and partly as one’s eyes 
naturally became accustomed to the half dark, did the features and the 
personality that goes with the features begin to emerge. (‘The Technique 
of the Novel’, The Weight of a World 17)71 
 
The novelist’s quest for her characters becomes, for Bowen, a sensuous, 
corporeal experience that presupposes the writer’s interweaving with the 
Merleau-Pontian sensible, which accommodates the half-visible silhouettes of the 
characters. Echoing Woolf’s ‘Character in Fiction’, Bowen emphasises the 
limitations of clear sight in interpersonal relationships, which are rooted in a kind 
of misty semi-darkness. The pale blue lamplight allows the observer to trace the 
dim outlines of his/her fellow travellers, which become gradually more familiar not 
due to a sudden intellectual illumination but through the subject’s ability to fold 
deeper and deeper into the fabric of the visible, until his/her look ‘envelops, 
palpates, espouses the visible things’ (Merleau-Ponty, VI 133). In other words, 
the seer is not a detached spectator scrutinising the visible from an external 
                                                        
71 ‘The Technique of the Novel’ is a speech Bowen delivered at Harvard University in 1953 
(Hepburn, The Weight of a World 394). 
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perspective but his/her tactile-visible gesture is possible due to his/her immersion 
in the flesh (s)he perceives. Dimness does not create a distance between self 
and other, but on the contrary, it envelops them in the flesh that, due to its 
thickness, can never become completely transparent. As ‘The Technique of the 
Novel’ shows, the war shapes what it means to affectively approach the other: 
both real-life people and fictional characters. Many modernists advocated a form 
of sympathy that was not rooted in clarity – often associated with violent 
ownership and military logic – but became articulated in semi-obscurity, which 
allowed for the exploration of the other’s blurred contours through the caressing 
palpitations of the eye. Bowen sets against a hyper-visible and rational mode of 
enquiry a sensuous, embodied intimacy, which allows a better insight into the 
mysteries of other minds.  
Indeed, Bowen distances herself from a purely rational attitude towards 
characters. She rejects the possibility of ‘inventing’ characters because this 
suggests an intellectual endeavour that does not account for the ‘thickness’ of 
humans. The result of trying to ‘invent’ a human being, Bowen argues, would be 
‘[a] clockwork figure, mechanized, empty of breath’, a description that recalls Mrs 
Michaelis’s gesture of pressing Max flat (‘A Novelist and His Characters’ 182). As 
such, fictional creatures are not born out of ‘the hardest thinking’ but of the ‘desire 
of the author that [they] should exist’ (183). Instead of the cerebral and goal-
oriented word ‘invent’, Bowen suggests using the verb ‘perceive’ to describe the 
process of bringing characters into the world:  
 
The character begins to come into existence at the moment it is first 
perceived by the author. As he contemplates it, it grows, it intensifies. 
Physically, it materialises. Both in its inner being and in outward form it 
takes on for him an urgent, pressing reality. A reality which […] he will 
convey to, make felt by, others: his readers. (183, emphasis in original) 
 
Perception, in this case, is coterminous with the novelist’s ‘open susceptibility’, 
another phrase Bowen used earlier to describe the precondition of sympathetic 
character-making. In ‘The Roving Eye’ (1952), she depicts the task of character 
creation as a ‘state of open susceptibility’, ‘involuntary’ and ‘unconscious’, in 
which the writer does not deliberately look for subjects but lets them ‘find’ her 
(The Mulberry Tree 63–64). Characters thus come into existence at the 
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crossroads of internal and external, active creation and passive waiting, 
imagination and reality. The writer’s contemplative gaze is not (only) the 
manifestation of hard intellectual labour but is imbued with a sense of sensuous 
longing. Bowen’s sea-metaphor indicates a liminal space, an invisible bridge 
between internal subjectivity and external reality, conscious creation and 
sensuous contemplation, where fictional characters are not mechanically 
assembled from an authoritative, vertical perspective but met and greeted by the 
author. Bowen’s sea imagery is further elucidated by Merleau-Ponty’s definition 
of togetherness as ‘an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand’ (VI 
130). The image of the sea and the shore illustrates the principle of sympathy at 
the centre of this thesis: though water and land are two different elements, their 
union resembles the tactile-visible proximity between self and other. In the 
indefinable, misty hollow between shore and sea characters are born and acquire 
‘physical reality’, which, for Bowen, represents the common ground where author, 
character and reader can form a community, based on togetherness and mutual 
influence. 
 Bowen’s use of the terms ‘perception’ and ‘open susceptibility’ can be 
better understood by reading it alongside Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the 
‘phenomenal field’. In Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty critiques the 
way empiricism and intellectualism define human perception. While empiricists 
hold the view that an object is perceived as the sum of its physical properties, 
intellectualists claim that the visual field is actually constructed by our cognitive 
abilities. Merleau-Ponty rejects both approaches because they fail to account for 
the role of the living body in perception. Empiricists transform the body into a 
lifeless mechanism, a mere object among other objects; intellectualists, on the 
other hand, disregard our corporeal existence, substituting it for abstract mental 
skills. In contrast, phenomenological sensing, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the 
‘living communication with the world that makes it present to us as the familiar 
place of our life. The perceived object and the perceiving subject owe their 
thickness to sensing.’ (PP 53) Things become phenomenologically meaningful 
for us because they form part of our phenomenal field. The concept of 
‘phenomenal field’ designates neither a strictly ‘inner world’ nor ‘mental fact’, nor 
an external, objective realm but rather describes our bodily entrenchment in the 
fabric of the world (PP 57). Since we are embodied subjects in the first place, the 
only way we can engage with the sensible is through our corporeality. As 
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Merleau-Ponty and Bowen suggest, we can establish a genuine sympathetic 
connection with the visible only if we renounce our attempts at ‘survey[ing] [it] 
from above’ and clutching it violently with our intellectual skills. Instead, our 
coexistence with the sensible unfolds through a bodily-affective relationship, 
which takes place in an environment in which self and other are enmeshed.  
 In her essays, Bowen often gives voice to her suspicion of a merely 
intellectual relationship between novelist and characters, and instead explores 
the affective-bodily bond between them. In ‘Notes on Writing a Novel’, she 
describes character-making as an act of falling in love. A good novel, according 
to her, should contain:  
 
at least one magnetic character. At least one character capable of keying 
the reader up, as though he (the reader) were in the presence of someone 
he is in love with. […] The character must do to the reader what he has 
done to the novelist – magnetize towards himself perceptions, sense-
impressions, desires. (39, emphasis in original) 
 
In an eponymous essay on one of her favourite writers, Jane Austen, Bowen calls 
Mr Darcy, the protagonist of Pride and Prejudice (1813), a ‘magnetic’ character 
because he has not been ‘“created” in the limited brainbound sense so much as 
observed fleetingly out of the corner of an eye, recollected uncertainly, 
speculated upon’ (People, Places, Things 212). The limitations of sight come 
again into focus, this time unequivocally linked with rationality. According to 
Bowen, characters able to awaken readers’ sympathy are those created in an 
instinctive and speculative way, left open to further sensuous exploration and not 
arbitrarily framed like an Edwardian portrait.72 As such, Bowen’s insistence on 
the novelist’s ‘open susceptibility’ is in stark contrast with the seemingly 
omniscient and undoubtedly patronising mode of character reading exemplified 
by Mrs Michaelis in The House in Paris. If the novelist’s relationship with her 
characters is grounded in a rationally unexplainable, intuitive form of attraction, 
the very same driving force determines readers’ feelings for characters. What 
                                                        
72 Bowen’s ideas about sympathetic character-making are close to what literary critic John Bayley 
called the author’s love for his/her characters: ‘What I understand by an author’s love for his 
characters is a delight in their independent existence as other people, an attitude towards them 
which is analogous to our feelings towards those we love in life; and an intense interest in their 
personalities combined with a sort of detached solicitude, a respect for their freedom’ (7–8). John 
Bayley. The Characters of Love: A Study in the Literature of Personality. Constable, 1960. 
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makes the reader feel ‘keyed up’ in the presence of Bowen’s characters is her 
complex portrayal of the delicacies of bodily interaction, what Emmeline, the 
protagonist of To the North, calls ‘that other means of communication’, which 
transcends the limits of rationality, and exposes the malleability of the human 
flesh (TTN 69). 
Furthermore, Bowen does not simply reject but finds the novelist’s 
possessive attitude towards her characters ‘distasteful’ (‘A Novelist and His 
Characters’ 184). Instead of a hierarchical approach in which characters are 
subjected to their creator’s will, Bowen proposes a more sympathetic attitude 
towards fictional beings, describing them as ‘stormy inhabitants’ of the writer’s 
‘being’ and not her possessions (184). Bowen’s metaphor comprises the 
seemingly oxymoronic nature of author–character rapport: while characters are 
dwellers of the novelist’s ‘being’, they are not unequivocally subordinated to their 
creator’s will. On the contrary, their ‘stormy’ independence can be a source of 
great anguish and restlessness for the author. However, what prevents fictional 
creatures from ‘running riot’ is the fact that their existence is limited within the 
boundaries of the plot, which Bowen defines as ‘the author’s intention’ (184). The 
word ‘intention’ is significant because it suggests a rational mental act, thus 
drawing attention to the complex nature of literary creation. While Bowen depicts 
the first step of the creative process as a sensuous and unconscious encounter, 
she also admits that writing fiction requires a great deal of intellectual skills: after 
the meeting with her characters has taken place, the novelist analyses her 
creations, ‘evaluates them’, ‘explores them to find out how they would react to 
this, that or the other circumstance’ (184).  
However, although cerebral analysis is an inherent part of novel writing, it 
also represents a phase fraught with the potential of violent encroachment, as 
the novelist subordinates characters ‘to an inhuman pressure – keeping them at 
the alert, and extracting the utmost from them, forcing them along’ (184). When 
the writer’s ‘open susceptibility’ gives place to the ‘inhuman pressure’ of the 
intellect, the line between gentle holding and violent grasping becomes fragile, 
imbued with the dangers of ‘inventing’ mechanical and ‘flat’ figures, a creative 
method from which Bowen firmly dissociates herself.73 Yet while The House in 
                                                        
73 Bowen might be implicitly alluding to E. M. Forster’s differentiation between ‘flat’ and ‘round’ 
characters in Aspects of the Novel (1927). Forster defines ‘flat’ or ‘two-dimensional’ characters 
as ‘constructed round a single idea or quality’ (75). An example of a ‘flat’ character would be Mrs 
Micawber in Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield (1850) (Forster 75). ‘Round’ characters, on the 
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Paris and her essays suggest her rejection of hyper-visibility as a method of 
intellectual grasping of the other, in some of her novels written in the interwar and 
post-Second-World-War period, she also draws attention to the dangers of 
complete transparency in self-other ties. If the hyper-visible mode risks reducing 
the subject to a flat being, the mere sum of its ‘deadeningly clear’ physical 
qualities, transparency threatens to annihilate the body altogether, transforming 
it into an invisible and intangible ghost that hovers uncannily over interpersonal 
relationships.   
 
‘Her face appeared transparent’: To the North and the perils of invisibility  
 
Bowen’s preoccupation with the problem of invisibility and its consequences in 
human relationships becomes strongly articulated in To the North. The novel is 
set in interwar London, where the young Emmeline Summers leaves with her 
sister-in-law, Cecilia, following the untimely death of Henry, Cecilia’s husband 
and Emmeline’s brother. Emmeline epitomises the modern woman: she manages 
a travel agency, which she also co-owns, drives a car, and undertakes business 
trips to foreign countries. Based on this description, the reader might expect to 
encounter a strong-willed and determined woman; however, this is rarely the 
case. Through her portrayal of Emmeline, Bowen shows the perils of the 
complete dissolution of the subject’s material borders, which can lead to cruelty 
in interpersonal connections. Though it is beyond the scopes of this chapter to 
engage with Bowen’s feminist ideas in detail, it is important to briefly touch upon 
the ways in which reading Bowen in parallel with Merleau-Ponty might challenge 
existing feminist interpretations of To the North, bringing into view an alternative, 
more sympathetic version of male-female interaction.  
 Emmeline’s life changes dramatically when she encounters Mark 
Linkwater, a young lawyer, with whom she falls in love. As their clandestine 
relationship gradually unfolds, they meet regularly in Markie’s flat and 
                                                        
other hand, due to their ability to change and act in unexpected ways in various situations, can 
never be summed up in a sentence, and as such they can awaken in the reader deeper feelings 
than ‘humour and appropriateness’ (81). Forster argues that Jane Austen’s characters, such as 
Lady Bertram in Mansfield Park (1814), can be viewed as examples of ‘round’ characters (81–2). 
See E. M. Forster. Aspects of the Novel. 1927. Penguin, 1962. Though Forster’s classification is 
simplistic in many ways, his definition of ‘flat’ characters resembles Bowen’s in the sense that 
both writers associated flatness with immobility and fixity. As such, ‘flat’ characters, by being 
restricted within a predetermined frame, not only lose their own freedom but also curtail the 
reader’s interpretative possibilities.   
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occasionally in public spaces. From the beginning, Markie’s intentions are 
dubious, often imbued with desires for domination. Indeed, several commentators 
on To the North, mostly from a feminist point of view, have remarked upon the 
unlikable nature of Markie, who seduces and ruthlessly abandons Emmeline, 
then suddenly reappears in her life expressing his wish to continue their casual 
love affair without committing himself. Ellmann has called Markie ‘satanic’, 
someone who, together with Bowen’s other caddish male characters, such as 
Eddie in The Death of the Heart (1938), represents the ‘killer of the heart’ 
(‘Elizabeth Bowen: The Missing Corner’ 77). As Ellmann has proposed, the 
lovers’ relationship in To the North is heavily invested with gender stereotypes.  
 Phyllis Lassner writes that the reader is ‘given no reason to sympathise 
with Markie’, adding that ‘[i]n the light of his characterisation, even empathy is 
dissuaded’ (62). Furthermore, Geneviève Brassard suggests that despite 
Bowen’s rejection of feminism in her essays, she makes ‘narrative interventions 
that look and sound feminist’ (286). Brassard alludes to Bowen’s dismissal of 
Woolf’s version of feminism formulated in the latter’s non-fictional writings. For 
Bowen, Woolf’s feminist manifestoes represent her least successful writings: 
‘What must inevitably be called Virginia Woolf’s feminism appears most strongly 
in her doctrinal, non-fiction books; most notably in A Room of One’s Own and 
Three Guineas – it was a bleak quality, an aggressive streak, which can but 
irritate […]’ (‘The Achievement of Virginia Woolf’, CI 81). Despite Bowen’s open 
rejection of Woolf’s feminism, Brassard argues that Bowen’s portrayal of 
‘complex women […], her unfailing eye for and ear for male weakness, and her 
clinical analysis of women’s motivations and actions’ actually question her 
critique of feminism (286). Similarly to previous commentators, Brassard locates 
Bowen’s feminism in her emphasis on ‘male weakness’, epitomised by Markie, 
whose ‘opportunistic sexual morality “mark[s]” him […] as a typical male of the 
period who worships female purity but still wants women to be sexually available 
for his needs’ (290). Indeed, Markie’s wish to possess Emmeline is partly rooted 
in his selfishness and male pride, but by dismissing his attitude as merely 
misogynistic, we would miss out on the complexity and ambiguity of male touch 
in To the North. Bowen might have been a feminist but her version of feminism 
was definitely far from antagonistic gender models. Instead, she was interested 
in a form of feminist approach that refused to view female-male relationships in 
strictly hierarchical terms, and embraced the vulnerability of human flesh as a 
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basic precondition of intimate coexistence. Bowen’s fiction written in the 1930s 
delineates an alternative feminist sensibility, based on the mutual corporeal 
fragility of seer and seen, rather than the female body’s exploitation by men. In 
several of her interwar novels, men and women are equally portrayed as both the 
victims and agents of violent incorporation, a phenomenon she rejects in favour 
of an interpersonal intimacy founded on affective attention and care for the 
fragility of human flesh.  
To the North captures the complexity of Bowen’s feminist ideas, which 
transcend classical accounts of gender binaries. While I do not wish to downplay 
Markie’s exploitative behaviour towards Emmeline, it is important to recognise 
that his emotions cannot be reduced to mere carnal desires imbued with male 
superiority. After all, he rarely enjoys his lover’s docility; on the contrary, he finds 
her acquiescence viscerally frightening. Bowen’s unpublished correspondence 
also warns against simplistic readings of Markie’s persona. In a letter dated 10 
September 1932, Alfred E. Coppard, Bowen’s fellow writer and friend, 
commented on To the North: ‘It seems a pity that Markie had to share 
[Emmeline’s] death, altho [sic] her own tragic end began to menace me long 
before the end. It loomed as inevitable somehow, altho [sic] I could not believe it 
would be suicide. […] Markie is amazingly well drawn, a disagreeable & yet 
blameless figure.’ (HRC, Elizabeth Bowen Collection, Box 10, Folder 6) 
Coppard’s letter summarises succinctly the difficulty of pinning down Markie, who 
is at once a ‘disagreeable & yet blameless figure’. Bowen shares Coppard’s 
opinion in her reply on 15 October 1932: ‘I agree: it was tough on Markie, having 
to come in on that death’ (HRC, A. E. Coppard Collection, Box 25, Folder 7). 
Markie might not be entirely ‘blameless’, and he is surely not agreeable, but as 
Bowen and Coppard acknowledge, his character cannot be easily categorised.  
Undoubtedly, Markie’s caddishness represents a central concern of the 
novel, corroborated in several scenes. His possessive attitude is expressed both 
verbally and in coercive tactile gestures. During one of Emmeline’s visits to his 
flat, Markie – resenting the fact that his lover refuses to understand the ‘moral’ of 
his story about the detrimental effects of female employment – firmly presses 
‘one hand on the back of her neck to make her sit quiet. For she was inclined to 
get up and stroll round the room, as elusive in mind as in person.’ (TTN 176) This 
passage elucidates the ambiguous nature of touch in To the North. While 
Markie’s grip on Emmeline’s neck is heavily invested with violence, his gesture is 
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also rooted in his necessity for a bodily sense of security, which the volatile 
Emmeline cannot offer him. Indeed, throughout their tumultuous affair, Markie 
constantly feels threatened by Emmeline’s physical elusiveness.  
 Markie’s dreads become strongly articulated in Paris, where he 
accompanies his lover on a business trip. While waiting in the hotel hall for 
Emmeline, who has returned to her room to fetch a fresh pair of gloves, Markie 
muses poignantly on the possibility of her definitive disappearance: 
 
She might have melted in some corridor of their hotel, her bodily vanishing 
would […] hardly have been incredible; for he had been oppressed since 
last night by sensations of having been overshot, of having, in some final 
soaring flight of her exaltation, been outdistanced: as though a bird whose 
heart one moment one could feel beating has escaped from the hands. 
(140) 
 
Markie’s desire to hold Emmeline still between his hands is delicately poised 
between tenderness, an image of care and love, and a sense of oppressiveness. 
The heart imagery subtly illustrates Markie’s ambivalent feelings, at the same 
time suggesting the dangers of Emmeline’s corporeal absence, which hovers 
hauntingly over their relationship, at times hindering the establishment of intimate 
contact. When Emmeline suddenly returns to her room, leaving the puzzled 
Markie behind, the narrative likens her to Eurydice, the Greek nymph who 
dissolves among the shadows of the Underworld when her husband fails to 
respect his promise of not looking back at her during their journey out from the 
Underworld (144).74 In a somewhat similar fashion, Emmeline, who often seems 
to inhabit both the real, physical environment and a sort of ghostly, 
transcendental realm, repeatedly slips through the fingers of Markie, who tries to 
retain her in the present moment.  
Though Markie’s attitude towards Emmeline cannot be either denied or 
absolved, it is important to acknowledge that his often seemingly possessive 
touch is imbued with a sensation of utter despair caused by his inability to hold 
(on to) the woman without feeling constantly threatened by her dissolution. As 
                                                        
74 Bowen’s use of the Eurydice-myth is similar to Woolf’s implicit reference to Ovid’s story in 
Jacob’s Room. In both novels, the characters’ inability to hold on to the beloved person results in 
the latter’s physical dissolution, and ultimately death. In Woolf’s novel Jacob dies on the 
battlefield, while in To the North, Emmeline loses her life in a car accident.  
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such, the novel outlines a model of touch rooted in both female and male 
vulnerabilities, complicating existing feminist readings focusing exclusively on 
women’s subordination, and instead working towards a more collaborative or 
dialogical feminism. The relationship between Emmeline and Markie reveals the 
lovers’ mutual fragility, caused partly by their inability to preserve their own bodily 
contours, while simultaneously reaching out to the other.  
 To the North thus repeatedly reminds us of the inherent perils of 
characters’ failure of self-materialisation. Too much transparency and volatility 
threaten to annihilate the subject and inhibit interpersonal contact, as Emmeline’s 
portrayal suggests. From the beginning of the novel, Emmeline is described as 
having a ‘transparent skin’, which is a recurrent motif in the book, and becomes 
emblematic of the fundamental difference between her and Markie’s 
interpretation of love (42). During their flight to Paris, Markie contemplates 
Emmeline’s translucency: ‘Close in the strong light and distant in roaring silence 
her face appeared transparent; watching the thoughts come up like shadows 
behind it he thought of the Scottish queen’s ill-fated delicate throat, down which, 
says a chronicler, red wine was seen to run as she drank.’ (135) ‘Strong light’ and 
translucency do not contribute towards a clearer understanding of Emmeline’s 
being, on the contrary, her thoughts remain ‘shadows’ for Markie, while the 
parallel between her and the ‘ill-fated’ Scottish queen foreshadows the novel’s 
tragic end. Emmeline’s transparency is harmful because it is associated with 
extensive openness and subordination, which represent a serious threat to her 
corporeal integrity. In her interaction with Markie, her bodily reality often 
evaporates, leaving no space for the unfurling of intimacy. While Emmeline’s 
translucency frequently serves the purpose of arousing Markie’s carnal desire, at 
times imbued with gentleness and care, volatility proves to be inadequate for 
creating lasting bonds. Instead of providing a better insight into the other’s being, 
limpidity dissolves the materiality of the viewed subject, rendering it untouchable. 
Hence, while both invisibility and hyper-visibility (as discussed in relation to The 
House in Paris) act as blocking forces in interpersonal relationships, To the North 
seems to favour a state of semi-transparency.  
Emmeline’s semi-transparency coincides with the solidification of her 
corporeal outlines and the affirmation of her autonomy. When, during a quarrel, 
Markie, ‘tightening his grip on her elbows’, accuses her of not thinking and failing 
to have ‘common sense’, she reacts with unexpected firmness:  
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[S]top, Markie, you’re hurting me rather […] A shadow of more than 
incomprehension, of distaste, even of boredom crossed Emmeline’s face 
which, always transparent to feeling, now seemed, pale and clear in the 
lamplight, more than half transparent materially. She said: ‘You are like an 
insurance company,’ and did not explain why. (181–182) 
 
Emmeline’s ‘always transparent’ face acquires a new quality, at once ‘pale’ and 
‘clear’, opaque and limpid, volatile and solid. Her complexion becomes ‘more than 
half transparent materially’, suggesting that while she continues to reveal her 
innermost being to her lover, she also starts to show resistance by hardening her 
bodily contours. Resistance, in this context, does not necessarily mean hostility 
but rather the precondition of self-preservation, and by extension, of intimate 
touch. By conserving her own borders, Emmeline momentarily withstands her 
lover’s verbal and physical intrusion, and asserts her own agency.  
 Moments of self-materialisation, however, prove to be fragile and 
transitory. As the love affair inevitably approaches its end, Emmeline becomes 
increasingly alienated from her body. After a sudden breakup with Markie, she 
ceases to exist as a living body in the Merleau-Pontian sense. She loses 
connection not only with her lover but also with her immediate surroundings. She 
walks the once familiar London streets like a ghost haunted by ‘the whirr’ of her 
unanswered calls to Markie (TTN 223). Her body starts to slowly disintegrate 
metaphorically: the typist in the travel agency observes how Emmeline ‘look[s] all 
to bits’ (222), while the narrator comments on Emmeline’s crumbling sense of 
self: ‘Walking the streets blindly she did not know that she thought, till a knuckle 
grazed on the wall, a shout as she stepped off into the traffic recalled her from 
depths whose darkness she had not measured’ (223). She becomes unable to 
identify experiences and sense perceptions as belonging to her: ‘The bleeding 
knuckle, the angry face of a man shouting down from a lorry were like bright light 
flashed in her eyes […]’ (223). Emmeline feels her own body parts as separate 
entities, objects detached from herself: it is not her knuckles that get hurt but a 
and later the knuckle, whose bleeding she views with unconscious and distant 
disinterestedness. Emmeline’s blind movements differ strikingly from the 
Egyptians’ sensuous ‘fumbling’ in the dark, celebrated by Lawrence in Women in 
Love. While, according to Lawrence, the Egyptians experienced their ‘existence 
 143 
surging in the darkness of the world’, Emmeline loses not only sight of but also 
touch with her environment (Lawrence, ‘Art and Morality’ 165). She ceases to be 
a perceiving subject, who, intertwined with the flesh of the world, ‘feels that [s]he 
is the sensible itself coming to itself and that in return the sensible is in [her] eyes 
as it were [her] double or an extension of [her] own flesh’ (VI 114). The ‘sensible’ 
can be no longer located in the eyes of the woman, who ‘walk[s] the streets 
blindly’ and fails to attach meaning to the ‘bright light flashed in her eyes’. The 
world no longer represents the extension of her flesh but transforms into a chaotic 
whirl, in which her own corporeality comes under an increasing threat of 
annihilation.  
 Emmeline’s disembodied state culminates in the last chapter of the novel, 
when her inability to return to her own body results in her and Markie’s tragic 
death. Literal death, nevertheless, is preceded by the gradual disintegration of 
the feeling body, which transforms into insentient automaton. The final scene of 
To the North illuminates Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of empirical sciences that 
reduce the sensing body to a mere mechanism, devoid of affectivity and 
movement. As he puts it in Phenomenology of Perception: in empiricist accounts, 
the ‘living body […] ceased to be my body, that is, the visible expression of a 
concrete Ego, in order to become one object among all others’ (56). Prior to literal 
death, Emmeline’s body first becomes a lifeless object in a mechanical 
environment in which she loses her capacity to establish a phenomenological 
relationship with the world. Near the end of the novel, Cecilia, without consulting 
with Emmeline, invites Markie for dinner in the St John’s Wood home of the 
sisters-in-law. Emmeline, who has not been in touch with Markie for weeks, 
objects to the invitation but finally decides to attend the dinner. After the dinner 
Emmeline offers to drive Markie to the station from where he can take a train to 
Baldock. However, instead of going to King’s Cross, Emmeline heads directly to 
the north.  
During their journey, Markie’s desires rekindle and he tries to win her back 
by persuading her to accompany him to his flat. But Emmeline, as Markie soon 
realises, has already ceased to be a living body. The narrative subtly suggests 
the metamorphosis of woman into machine: her fingers are hard and cold and 
her agency lost, as her limbs become the mechanical prolongations of the car. 
Her frozen hands form an uncanny union with the steering wheel, and her silver 
slippers cause the speedometer to creep up without any human will involved 
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(236). She loses sense of her own faculties and Markie’s presence beside her: 
‘She was lost to her own identity, a confining husk’ (242). Her impenetrable husk 
prevents her from connecting to the living world as her sense perceptions 
gradually shut down: her skin is unable to register touch, and her pupils, which 
earlier could at least detect some flashes of light, are now only filled with ‘night’ 
(240). Emmeline’s insentient body becomes one with the accelerating machine 
which she can no longer control, causing the imminent accident in which the 
lovers lose their lives. 
 The couple’s last drive transforms into a kind of reversed Orpheus-myth. 
While in the original Greek story Orpheus leads his wife, Eurydice, out from the 
Underworld towards the land of the living, in Bowen’s novel Emmeline and Markie 
travel in the opposite direction. In contrast with the Parisian hotel scene, in which 
Markie dreadfully realises Emmeline’s ability to metamorphose into a ghostlike 
Eurydice, the final episode reveals a different facet of the Eurydician existence. 
During the lovers’ last ride Emmeline is not so much portrayed as a transparent 
and fleeting entity but more as a hard and opaque object, a prolongation of the 
machine that contains her. She loses not only her self-transparency (which as I 
have shown, functions as a precondition of interpersonal proximity), but also the 
softness of her flesh, an attribute that would permit the yielding of her body to her 
surroundings. As her body temperature starts to drop under the ‘chilly fingers’ of 
‘the North’, her limbs simultaneously tighten until they become completely 
impenetrable by Markie’s pleading caress (236). When Markie understands that 
the woman sitting beside him is nothing more than an empty ‘husk’, enveloped in 
the coldness of the night and closed in her rigidity, he renounces trying to bring 
her back to the realm of the living. Instead, he succumbs to Emmeline’s half-
conscious guidance that leads them steadily towards death. The final scene of 
the novel thus illuminates the core of Bowen’s idea about corporeal intimacy 
which happens between feeling, semi-transparent and firmly soft bodies that 
caress the other with their eyes and, in turn, let themselves be stroked by the 
other’s palpitating gaze.    
 At the same time, the end of To the North intimates a theme that will 
acquire a crucial importance in Bowen’s later wartime fiction: the dangers of 
dissolving in obscurity. As already anticipated by her blind walking after her 
breakup with Markie, in the last chapter Emmeline is literally engulfed and 
annihilated by the dark and cold night. As such, To the North flags up the perils 
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of a complete absence of sight, which can lead to violence and ultimately death. 
Instead, the novel suggests that the presence of a certain kind of luminosity is 
important not only for retaining one’s bodily integrity but also for understanding 
other minds. The state of soft luminosity, which implies both a form of misty light 
and the tactile nature of the visible, becomes emphatic in The House in Paris too, 
especially in Mrs Michaelis’s changing attitude towards character reading.  
While at the beginning Mrs Michaelis has no doubt about her ability to 
interpret human personality accurately, later events make her reconsider her 
previous stance. When Karen returns from an illicit date with Max, she finds the 
seemingly illegible traces of her mother’s message on the telephone pad. Though 
the first page has been torn off, Karen manages to reconstruct the semi-invisible 
writing by following the form of the letters engraved on the paper: ‘The blank pad 
was scored with curves where writing had dug through; the sheets were thin, her 
mother’s pencil emphatic. Karen stared at it; then, bringing the pad nearer to light, 
she took the pencil and traced her mother’s dinted writing.’ (171) The original 
message, written with clear black ink, would have violently confronted Karen with 
her lie of having spent the weekend with a friend, while she actually met Max in 
Hythe. Mrs Michaelis chooses not to directly accuse her daughter of having lied, 
but instead, the mother destroys the message, probably being unaware of the 
barely visible traces left by her pen on the second page of the pad.  
Karen’s lie shocks Mrs Michaelis on a double level: first, it makes her 
acknowledge the fact that she does not know her own daughter well enough, but 
at the same time she also understands the fallibility of her earlier definition of 
character as an entity reducible to clearly legible physical traits. This realisation 
impedes Mrs Michaelis in directly unveiling Karen’s secret by leaving out the 
original message with its unambiguous black letters on the white paper. Instead, 
the mother unconsciously opts for a more sympathetic mode of communication: 
the second page represents the semi-soft surface that accommodates in its flesh 
the dents drawn by the nib, at once preserving and blurring the shape of the 
letters, the reading of which requires Karen’s joint effort of sight (‘bringing the pad 
nearer to light’) and touch (‘she took the pencil and traced […] [the] writing’). Mrs 
Michaelis’s writing with semi-transparent ink can be read as a special form of 
écriture féminine. As Marian Eide suggests in regard to James Joyce’s fiction 
(read through the lens of Hélène Cixous’s feminist criticism):  
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Writing with blue or black ink that contrasts starkly with the white page, the 
writer emphasizes the distinction between the imposition of inscription and 
the blank, existent page. Writing with milk employs nuanced alterations, 
shadings of difference that at the same time emphasize connection and 
similarity by virtue of the comparable colors of ink and page. (22) 
 
Writing with milk, a fluid associated with the female body, represents a more 
sympathetic means of communication than the traditional blue or black ink 
because the former exists in a harmonious relationship with the page: while the 
milk is a different substance, its white colour allows for its seamless union with 
the paper. Yet in contrast with Cixous’s emphasis on the fluidity of milk, Bowen 
highlights the rough quality of letters that are almost engraved onto the page. 
Karen is able to decipher her mother’s message only when she follows the letters 
with a pencil that becomes the extension of her finger. Looking from a distance 
is not enough for understanding Mrs Michaelis’s lines: Karen has to literally touch 
the shapes her mother’s hand has left on the paper. Nevertheless, the writing 
does not completely transform into a Braille-language either, as the message’s 
readability remains dependent on the presence of light (Karen takes the pad 
under the lamp). 
 Bowen’s distrust of blue or black ink acquires special importance in her 
interwar novels, and can be linked to her association of traditional black ink with 
violence and military logic. Though To the North does not explicitly address the 
topic of the First World War, the reader can find at least one implicit reference in 
the novel, which draws attention to the need for a different, more sympathetic 
means of communication than the ‘dark’ language of the war. In the second half 
of the novel, the narrator remarks: ‘Across the mind’s surface – on which a world’s 
apprehension, strain at home and in Europe, were gravely written – the sense of 
a spoilt summer, so much prettiness wasted, darkly spread like spilt ink’ (175). 
After the dehumanising consequences of the war, which remain ‘gravely written’ 
on the minds of people, language itself becomes ‘strained’, reminiscent of a 
painful bruise that spreads ‘like spilt ink’. Jessica Gildersleeve interprets the 
‘strain’ of the ‘world’s apprehension’ as an allusion to the possibility of another 
war, and she views Emmeline’s volatility as ‘symptomatic of the aftermath of war’: 
Bowen’s protagonist ‘represents the wounding, or the woundedness, of her 
generation’ (16). Indeed, the narrative draws attention to Emmeline’s status as 
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the representative of a generation painfully scarred by the war when describing 
her as the ‘step-child of her uneasy century’ (TTN 61). To the North shows how 
the emphatic pen of the war has brutally left its marks in the fragile human flesh 
until the ‘spilt ink’ has completely covered and dissolved the sensing body.  
If we accept Gildersleeve’s explanation that Emmeline’s vagueness can 
be partly put down to the destructive effects of the war, the motif of transparency 
becomes imbued with a deeper sense. The spreading ink devours the surface of 
the human body, annihilating it to the extent of invisibility. Even though To the 
North contains only a few references to the war, the novel’s preoccupation with 
the fragility of interpersonal intimacy and the threats of transparent existence can 
be, at least partly, traced back to the dominating atmosphere of the interwar 
years, a period caught between the mourning of the past and the anxious 
anticipation of an unknown future. This future, which became present reality with 
the outbreak of the Second World War, made Bowen think further about invisibility 
and affective belonging in her short stories and The Heat of the Day, texts written 
during the years of the Blitz. 
 
The ‘cracked’ reflector: love and intimacy in wartime 
 
During the Second World War, Bowen had the opportunity to gain first-hand 
knowledge of the ways in which darkness can erase individual shapes. As an Air 
Raid Protection warden, she spent many nights walking and observing the 
deserted streets of London. Lara Feigel describes in detail the cityscape Bowen 
witnessed during her solitary walks: ‘The buses and cars in the street were almost 
invisible except for a tiny point of light at each side. Lenses on traffic lights were 
permanently covered by a black metal plate pierced by a single cross. Passing 
human figures had been reduced to shadows.’ (18) After the blackout, London 
becomes a haunted city, devoid of any trace of life, and importantly, of materiality: 
vehicles are ‘almost invisible’, the traffic lights show no colours, and humans 
transform into fleeting shadows, reminiscent of ghosts rather than flesh-and-
blood subjects. This dreary landscape is at times illuminated by the moonlight, 
which instead of gently enveloping things, and redrawing their erased silhouettes, 
brutally exposes them to the searching gaze of potential German bombers. The 
pale beam of Lawrence’s acetylene lamp in the Etruscan caves, and ‘the softer 
light of spring mixed with moonlight gliding gently’ in Woolf’s To the Lighthouse 
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(145), transform into blinding brightness in some of Bowen’s war stories, in which 
luminosity becomes associated with the violent gaze of the war.75  
 Bowen’s 1944 short story, ‘Mysterious Kôr’, opens with the uncanny 
description of London in the moonlight: ‘Full moonlight drenched the city and 
searched it; there was not a niche left to stand in. The effect was remorseless: 
London looked like the moon’s capital – shallow, cratered, extinct. […] The futility 
of the black-out became laughable […]’ (728). Yet the possibility of bombing is 
not the greatest peril Londoners face: ‘The Germans no longer came by full moon. 
Something more immaterial seemed to threaten, and to be keeping people at 
home’ (728). The danger appears as a magnified force due to its immaterial 
nature: people are exposed to unknown threats without being able to identify their 
origin. Nothing seems to escape the cruel gaze of the moon that leaves not a 
single niche in which humans could sympathetically reach out to the other. Even 
people who share the same space, show a complete indifference to each other 
as they melt in the night: ‘The wardens turned their faces, mauve in the moonlight, 
towards the Frenchmen with no expression at all. […] [A] trickle of people […] 
disappeared quickly, in an abashed way, or as though dissolved in the street by 
some white acid […]’ (729). The moonlight literally erases humans’ outlines, 
brutally corroding their existence like ‘white acid’.76 In the absence of a niche, all 
that is left behind is a union not of feeling bodies but of abstract shadows: ‘blotted 
into one shadow’, Arthur (a soldier on leave) and his lover Pepita ‘proceeded 
towards the park’ (729). Having no place of their own where to spend the night 
together, the couple finds a faint solace in the abstract union of their 
‘synchronized’ shadows (729). Though there are no signs of a concrete air raid, 
the description of the moon’s searching and corroding gaze carries echoes of 
militarism, thinning the borders between combatant and civilian experience. 
                                                        
75 While in Woolf’s high modernist novels it was still possible to view the searching gaze of the 
airplane as a form of sympathetic seeing, for Bowen such an explanation becomes untenable. 
Paul Saint-Amour, for example, has suggested that by appropriating the aeroplane’s perspective, 
the narrator of Mrs Dalloway creates a moment of sympathy in which people and non-human 
entities become intricately intertwined: ‘Affiliated with the airplane’s mobility and capacity for 
penetrating overview’, the narrator ‘is capable of tracing the filaments of feeling, information and 
fellow-suffering across the metropolis to connect Clarissa with Septimus’ (116). Paul Saint-
Amour. Tense Future: Modernism, Total War, Encyclopedic Form. Oxford University Press, 2015. 
76 The motif of the acid appears in Bowen’s other wartime stories too. In ‘The Demon Lover’ 
(1941), Mrs Drover fails to recall her past lover’s face: ‘She remembered – but with one white 
burning blank as where acid has dropped on a photograph: under no conditions could she 
remember his face’ (The Collected Stories 665, emphasis in original). 
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London, the ‘shallow’ and ‘extinct’ ‘capital’ of the moon, acquires an uncanny 
similarity to the battlefields.  
The war’s ability to transform people into ghostly shadows haunted 
Bowen’s war writings, among them her major novel, The Heat of the Day, in which 
corporeal transparency becomes associated with lack of individuality and 
undignified death.77 In the autumn of 1940, the streets of London became the 
nameless graveyards of many people whose identities could no longer be 
determined and whose passing away was only marked by their absence ‘from 
the routine which had been life’ (92): 
 
[N]ot knowing who the dead were you could not know which might be the 
staircase somebody for the first time was not mounting this morning, or at 
which street corner the newsvendor missed a face, or which trains and 
buses in the homegoing rush were this evening lighter by at least one 
passenger. 
These unknown dead reproached those left living not by their own death, 
which might any night be shared, but by their unknownness, which could 
not be mended now. Who had the right to mourn them, not having cared 
that they had lived? So among the crowds still eating, drinking, working, 
travelling, halting, there began to be an instinctive movement to break 
down indifference while there was still time. The wall between the living 
and the living became less solid as the wall between the living and the 
dead thinned. In that September transparency people became 
transparent, only to be located by the just darker flicker of their hearts. (HD 
92) 
 
Translucency becomes synonymous with anonymity, unlocatedness and the 
corrosion of facial imprints that ensure the individual value of human subjects. 
The real horror of the war, according to Bowen, does not consist only in the vast 
numbers of dead people, but in their ‘unknowness’ and unnoticed absence, their 
complete dissolution, which transforms even the mourning process into a futile if 
not impossible endeavour. This innermost dread of material disintegration haunts 
the protagonist of the novel, Stella Rodney.  
                                                        
77 Hereafter HD. 
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Stella, a woman in her early forties, lives in London during the Blitz, where 
she divides her time between work and meetings with her lover, Robert Kelway. 
Stella’s love for Robert is put to test when a mysterious man called Harrison 
informs her that Robert is a Nazi spy. Following the announcement, he suggests 
she leave Robert and take up Harrison himself as lover. After hearing the alleged 
news, Stella’s life is torn between her tormenting doubts about Robert’s identity 
and her worries for her son, Roderick, a soldier enlisted in the British Army. When 
she expects her son’s visit, Stella contemplates the fragility of the human self. 
Every time she ‘confront[s] the soldier in battle-dress’, she is overwhelmed by ‘the 
fear that the Army was out to obliterate Roderick. In the course of a process, a 
being processed, she could do nothing to stop, her son might possibly disappear. 
[…] She dreaded dissolution inside his life, dissolution never to be repaired’ (49). 
The vocabulary Bowen employs to render Stella’s motherly fears echoes the 
general anguish and tense atmosphere during the Blitz. What connects dead 
civilians and soldiers is the constant threat of becoming invisible and bodiless 
creatures, without any recognisable, and importantly, memorable features. As 
Neil Corcoran succinctly puts it, The Heat of the Day is concerned with the ways 
in which ‘identities in peril’ can be preserved amidst the obliterating forces of the 
war (170).  
Several commentators of The Heat of the Day have written on humans’ 
fleetingness and the fragility of interpersonal relationships. Bennett and Royle 
have introduced the concept of ‘sheer kink’ to indicate the dissolving materiality 
of the narrative texture, which becomes an ephemeral space where ‘narratives 
and narratees’ never ‘coincide with themselves’, and in which identity is veiled in 
vagueness (88). Vike Plock, in her close reading of the role of the necktie in The 
Heat of the Day, suggests that in wartime London, where ‘human associations 
form rapidly and intimacy becomes discountable, all sorts of ties […] might easily 
become oppressive or burdensome and finally will have “to go”’ (156). 
Undoubtedly, The Heat of the Day destabilises subjectivity and loosens 
interpersonal bonds in various ways. However, drawing attention to the 
precariousness of relationships does not necessarily imply the complete 
disappearance of affective ties. Painfully aware of the frailty of human flesh, 
Bowen’s wartime novel also highlights the possibilities of intercorporeal intimacy, 
a form of affective communi(cati)on that takes place between vulnerable bodies, 
subjected to destructive forces, yet able to create brief moments of proximity. As 
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Bowen writes in ‘The Poetic Element of Fiction’, an essay published in 1950 (a 
retrospective reflection on the literature produced during the war years):  
 
We cannot really accept, even in our most introverted individualism, the 
idea of a one-man world, of the solitary consciousness reflecting 
everything else. And that really, the fact that it concerns itself with two 
people, with three, with an unnumbered cast of persons, placed in a 
pattern relating to one another and acting upon one another, does 
constitute the hold and the future promise of the story […]. (Listening In 
160) 
 
In a review of Desmond Hawkins’s Lighter than Day (1940), Bowen uses a similar 
vocabulary when describing the prerequisites of a good novel, which has ‘to 
respect the human pattern, a pattern largely made of attachments’ (The Weight 
of a World 103). Ultimately, human bonds represent the foundation of a fictional 
story, the ‘pattern’ that holds the elements of the narrative together. Attachments 
between humans, and between people and the larger world acquire in The Heat 
of the Day a material, physical reality, which in its ephemerality is still capable, 
even if only temporarily, of holding bodies together.78  
 Affective bonds, Bowen’s wartime fiction suggests, can be forged between 
flesh-and-blood bodies that care for the other’s individual features. In her 
postscript to her collection of short stories, The Demon Lover & Other Stories 
(1945), Bowen writes how during the war, ‘individual destiny became an 
obsession in every heart. You cannot depersonalize persons. Every writer during 
this time was aware of the personal cry of the individual’ (The Mulberry Tree 97). 
Paying attention to individual traits, however, is not coterminous with obtaining 
unambiguous, clear knowledge about the other. Similarly to her novels written in 
the 1930s, in The Heat of the Day Bowen stresses the importance of feeling for 
the blurred features and distortions of the body, which create a semi-transparent 
                                                        
78 This particular aspect of Bowen’s fiction was noticed and commented on by several of her fellow 
writers. In a letter dated 24 February 1949, Elizabeth Taylor expressed her fascination with The 
Heat of the Day because its characters ‘are all real and physically real. When they lift a hand, or 
laugh, it is a real thing that is done. No thin bits, nothing dull.’ (105, emphasis in original) Quoted 
in N. H. Reeve, editor. Elizabeth Taylor: A Centenary Celebration. Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2012. Taylor’s remark represents the most valuable praise Bowen could have possibly 




veil around the subject, who at once yields to the stroking eyes of the viewer but 
at the same time retains his/her own corporeal outlines and resists intellectual 
appropriation. The need for indistinctness in interpersonal contact, to allude to 
my earlier reading of The House in Paris, remains a central concern in Bowen’s 
post-Second-World-War novel, which at the same time draws attention to the 
inherent dangers of excessive obscurity. In other words, The Heat of the Day 
shows how blurriness can simultaneously represent a threat to human 
relationships and be conducive to intimacy.  
 Recalling her first encounter with Robert, Stella remarks: ‘At the first 
glance they saw in each other’s faces a flash of promise, a background of 
mystery’ (95). The pair’s first meeting, ‘in a bar or club’, is enveloped in the roaring 
sounds and trembling lights of the war sweeping through the streets of London 
(95). Military conflict often erodes individual features and challenges sympathetic 
communication but as The Heat of the Day suggests, the war can also endow 
human relationships with a sense of uncertainty necessary for the unfolding of 
intimacy. Stella and Robert abandon themselves to the first signs of attraction 
while around them ‘[t]he barrage banged, coughed, retched; in here the lights in 
the mirror rocked. […] With the shock of detonation, still to be heard […]; bottles 
danced on glass; a distortion ran through the view’ (96). Their love is born in a 
hazy environment, among fragile objects and equally vulnerable human beings, 
where their view of each other is constantly distorted by the wobbling light. The 
depiction of the war-shaken milieu resembles Bowen’s later comment in which 
she likened The Heat of the Day to ‘the convulsive shaking of a kaleidoscope, a 
kaleidoscope also of which the inside reflector was cracked’ (qtd. in Ellmann, The 
Shadow 146). The lovers find an inexplicable excitement in the semi-luminous, 
rocking space in which their attempts at speech are cut short by the ‘drumming’ 
noise of the falling bombs (96). Yet the ‘convulsive shaking’ and broken light also 
anticipate the precariousness of the protagonists’ bond, which, by the end of the 
novel, fails to remain intact in the face of violent external forces and personal 
treacheries. The mysterious half-light in the bar, embraced by both Stella and 
Robert, remains an organic part of the lovers’ relationship. At a later moment, 
Stella ponders Robert’s face, a surface on which pallor and shadow intricately 
intertwine to create an unfamiliarly familiar effect:  
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The effect of his being in uniform was that the claylike khaki threw his 
features into transparent relief […]. The most curious of the qualities he 
should have, candescence, was at the moment less from his eyes being 
turned away – their flame-thin blueness was missing. The prolonging of 
the refusal to look at her became more of an avowal than any look; the 
fact, for him, of there being nothing more to be said set his mouth in a 
stone line which itself spoke. (98) 
 
Stella’s musings comprise an interesting amalgamation of the visual and the 
tactile. She names as Robert’s most salient characteristic the ‘candescence’ of 
his face, yet she is unable to identify the exact source of this luminosity. While 
earlier she believed that candescence originates from his flaming blue eyes, 
Robert’s averted eyes in the restaurant undermine her presupposition.  
The above-quoted passage also corroborates Stella’s former thoughts on 
how uniforms make individual facial features invisible, yet the phrase ‘transparent 
relief’, due to its oxymoronic nature, complicates this idea. If a relief is 
transparent, it is visually non-perceptible. But if we interpret sight in the Merleau-
Pontian sense, as an act involving tactile properties, we might gain a better insight 
into Stella’s feelings. Robert’s face, resembling a relief, cannot indeed be seen, 
in the conventional sense of the word, but its outlines yield to the eye’s caressing 
palpitations. In a similar vein, his mouth, a fixed and mute ‘stone line’, appears 
for Stella as a moving and speaking entity, because she perceives it 
phenomenologically, and not merely through detached vision. This embodied 
perception, involving the interplay of senses, allows Stella to experience an 
intimate proximity with Robert, a feeling that originates less from epistemological 
certainty than from a kind of emotional, even sensual attention to the delicate 
details of the other’s corporeal existence: those tiny changes in colour, light and 
shape that, by poising between finalised knowledge and endlessly unknown, 
inhibit the violent appropriation of the perceived. As Stella concludes: ‘To miss 
from his eyes, mouth, forehead the knowable unguarded play of his nature was 
for her, for the first time, to be made feel its force. In the unfamiliar the familiar 
persisted like a ghost […]’ (98). Stella finds delight in the unfamiliar mystery of 
Robert’s face, in which she can still spot some ghostly signs of familiarity.  
At the same time, the narrative warns against an overvaluation of blurred 
vision and the unknown aspects of human personality. Robert’s eyes (looking 
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away and devoid of their usual blue light), his silent mouth (closed in an 
impenetrable ‘stone line’), and the unstable, ‘ghostly’ nature of what Stella has 
previously thought of as one of his familiar features, can be read as implicit 
allusions to his secret identity as a spy, a mystery that will haunt and ultimately 
end the lovers’ liaison. A complete absence of clear sight, The Heat of the Day 
suggests, might easily become a threatening force that imperils, rather than 
nourishes, human relationships. A lack of knowledge about others transforms 
people into spies of the private mind, who try to desperately intrude into the 
hidden recesses of each other’s existence in a novel in which, as Corcoran 
argues, the border between spies and non-spies becomes immensely fragile 
(179–183). Engaging in acts of voyeurism, nevertheless, does not result in more 
accurate knowledge or closer intimacy but rather leads to lonely distress, as in 
the case of Stella, who is unable to directly confront Robert after learning about 
his secret identity; or in the case of Robert, who does not dare to tell her the facts, 
or indeed to admit to himself that she does not know the truth as he sometimes 
believes she does: ‘I [Robert] thought, yes, silence is better: why risk some silly 
unmeaning battle between two consciences? […] There were other times when I 
was less certain you knew. But I did not know you did not know till you asked me.’ 
(271, emphasis in original) The repetition of the negative forms of ‘know’ 
emphasises the detrimental effects of the lovers’ failure to engage in open 
dialogue, and to dissipate the obscurity surrounding their individual lives, a 
darkness that will haunt, and eventually end their relationship.   
The ambiguity and complexity of clear vision acquires special significance 
towards the end of the novel, this time, during the last encounter between Stella 
and Robert. Surrounded by the darkness of the night in Stella’s flat, Robert finally 
admits that he has worked for the Germans. The only source of ‘infernal’ red light 
comes from the electric fire which Robert turns off, as though he is only able to 
communicate with Stella in complete obscurity, in an ‘unseeable’ room that ‘might 
now have been any room of any size’ (267). He eliminates any visible traces of 
familiarity, of their past intimacy in his attempt to explain his reasons for having 
lied. While at the beginning of their affair, Robert’s semi-obscure face aroused a 
feeling of tenderness and love in Stella, after his avowal, she becomes 
disorientated in the oppressive darkness, which ‘blot[s] out’ both speaker and 
listener, rendering the forging of emotional bonds impossible (269). Stella 
suddenly experiences a moment of amnesia as she finds herself unable to recall 
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those unfamiliarly familiar signs of Robert’s face, with which she fell in love years 
before: ‘there occurred in the listener one of those arrestations of memory which 
made it impossible to conceive not only what the look on the face might now be 
but what the face had been, as a face, ever’ (269, emphasis in original). The 
absence of light affects not only Stella’s momentary sense perceptions but 
somehow penetrates the past to erase the memory of that shadowy face on which 
her caressing eyes used to dwell lovingly.  
Stella temporarily experiences the disintegration of the world around her: 
the once familiar shapes and sights seem to lose their physical reality. Robert 
transforms into a disembodied entity whose presence becomes almost non-
existent, until he starts to move across the room, making Stella remember that 
he actually possesses corporeal substantiality: ‘the sounds of physical movement 
came as a shock, reminding her that he after all was a presence here in the room 
– feet, their naked soles […] could be heard walking with a hallucinated precision 
towards the window’ (269). But even after being made aware of Robert’s bodily 
presence, Stella continues to experience her lover as a hallucination. She tries to 
reduce her unease by asking him to come nearer her so that she can gain tactile 
certainty about his bodily contours by letting him take her ‘tensile fingers’ in his 
cold hands (272). Stella never understands rationally, or indeed accepts Robert’s 
explanations, and she even begins to doubt, or at least reappraise, the role of 
mystery in sympathetic communication. In the suffocating darkness of her flat, 
she comprehends with hindsight the necessity for a sort of clarity, a partial 
transparency, in interpersonal relationships.  
Yet, though Robert’s lie leaves lasting scars in the vulnerable flesh of the 
lovers, the novel also suggests that there are ways in which their wounded bodies 
can still engage in brief moments of tactile intimacy: ‘They were in each other’s 
arms. If there were any step in the street of sleeping houses, it was impossible it 
should now be heard by the two blotted out.’ (277–278) Their love is on the verge 
of being ‘blotted out’ by the ‘step in the street’, belonging probably to Harrison, 
waiting in ambush to catch Robert. But at the same time, the state of being 
‘blotted out’ – resonating with the phrase ‘black(ed) out’ – permits Stella and 
Robert to temporarily forget about the threats of the external world and gain 
solace in each other’s bodily reality, before Robert’s sudden death destroys the 
last, fragile remnants of their love story.  
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In the blotted-out, blacked-out minutes preceding Robert’s death, the 
lovers’ bodies intertwine in a gesture of tenderness that transcends any rational 
understanding, a space-time where accusations and unanswered questions lose 
their significance. Both are aware of being the victims as well as the perpetrators 
of historical and personal distortions, which cannot be cleared or mended 
anymore. As Robert concludes: ‘We should have to understand each other all 
over again, and it’s too late now’ (267). Since no time has been left for rational 
comprehension, the couple instinctively engages in a sensuous-tactile intimacy, 
a form of proximity devoid of words and thoughts, which confer a new meaning 
to the distortions of the past.  
The novel’s ability to embrace contortions, even if often hesitatingly, 
represents a quality that many of Bowen’s contemporary readers appreciated. In 
a letter addressed to Bowen, the crime writer Agatha Christie writes: 
 
Like “Death of the Heart” [sic] and “The House in Paris”, it [probably The 
Heat of the Day] made a wonderful impact on one – I shall be able to read 
it many times and enjoy it each time – it gives me a feeling like swimming 
in deep sea, very calm, if I look down I see things below water – tips of 
rocks, seaweed, fish – all transformed into something else – and yet, 
perhaps, more them selves [sic] because distorted into a different 
dimension – which perhaps is truer reality – […]. (HRC, Elizabeth Bowen 
Collection, Box 10, Folder 6)79 
 
Christie likens the reading of Bowen’s works to a peaceful swimming experience 
in a calm sea, which allows the gaze to investigate and delight in the seabed 
without achieving an absolutely clear and unambiguous view. Looking down onto 
the sea bottom, the exploring swimmer does not see clear-cut and solid outlines 
but the underwater flora and fauna transform ‘into something else’ under his/her 
inquisitive look. Bowen’s narrative achievement in The Heat of the Day lies, 
according to Christie, in the former’s ability to reveal the irregularities of the 
visible, which simultaneously modify reality and create a different, ‘truer reality’. 
The swimmer’s gaze does not take possession of the visible but envelops it in a 
kind of semi-transparency that allows for the unfolding of a sympathetic 
                                                        
79 The letter was written on 2nd March, the year being unspecified. 
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interaction between seer and seen. The form of sympathy at the heart of 
Christie’s commentary is attentive to the irregularities of the visible, which – by 
representing an alternative version of reality – are capable of becoming ‘more 
them selves’.    
 Reading Christie’s letter in parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s essays on arts 
throws further light on Bowen’s ideas about semi-transparency. In ‘Eye and Mind’ 
Merleau-Ponty elaborates on the visual-tactile qualities of water, which permit the 
unfolding of sympathetic sight:  
 
When through the water’s thickness I see the tiled bottom of the pool, I do 
not see it despite the water and the reflections; I see it through them and 
because of them. If there were no distortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it 
were without that flesh that I saw the geometry of the tiles; then I would 
cease to see it as it is and where it is – which is to say, beyond any 
identical, specific place. (142, emphasis in original) 
 
The water does not represent a separating layer between seer and seen but its 
semi-transparent thickness creates the conditions necessary for 
phenomenological perception. The waving motion of the water and the ripples of 
light permit the perceiver’s corporeal immersion into the flesh of the visible, which 
allows for the complex sensuous experience of a ‘truer reality’. The half-
transparent and semi-soft qualities of the element yield to the observer’s tactile 
gaze to reveal an unfamiliarly familiar world, made of the same flesh yet resisting 
total unity and appropriation. The importance of seeing through and with the 
object of vision, rather than seeing it, is also stressed in another passage of 
Merleau-Ponty’s essay, in which he contemplates, through the example of the 
Lascaux cave paintings, the viewer’s relationship to the art object: 
 
Things have an internal equivalent in me; they arouse in me a carnal 
formula of their presence. […] The animals painted on the walls of Lascaux 
are not there in the same way as are the fissures and limestone 
formations. Nor are they elsewhere. Pushed forward here, held back there, 
supported by the wall’s mass they use so adroitly, they radiate about the 
wall without ever breaking their elusive moorings. […] For I do not look at 
it [painting] as one looks at a thing, fixing it in its place. My gaze wanders 
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within it as in the halos of Being. Rather than seeing it, I see according to, 
or with it. (‘EM’ 126, emphasis in original) 
 
Since we are made of the same flesh as the world, the sensible is not something 
outside of us but part of the same system and thus an integral particle of our 
being, reminding us, in turn, that we constitute an organic extension of the same 
prehistoric body. The animals painted on the wall of the cave do not dissolve into 
the primal canvas of nature, but in their very difference, form a soft-hued 
prolongation of the rock. They at once belong to the stone and resist melting into 
it. This indeterminacy of the artwork, of being simultaneously ‘there’ and eluding 
precise location, establishes the conditions of phenomenological (binocular) 
vision: the viewer becomes unable to ‘fix’ the object ‘in its place’ (as Mrs Michaelis 
does with Max in The House in Paris), and instead lets his/her gaze interlace with 
the flesh of which both seer and seen form an organic part, thus adjusting his/her 
perspective so as to see with the sensible rather than look at it from above. For 
Merleau-Ponty and Bowen, this kind of vision represents the basis of sympathetic 
coexistence, in which the subject does not close off a part of the world by 
‘appropriat[ing] what he sees [but] he merely approaches it by looking, [and] he 
opens onto the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, ‘EM’ 124). 
 Through her persistent focus on the simultaneous necessity for and 
danger of pinning down bodily matter, Bowen often creates a viscerally unsettling 
atmosphere in her fiction written in the 1930s and 1940s. Her literary methods 
challenge us as readers to reappraise our own concepts of corporeality, and our 
understanding of what it means to affectively perceive other bodies. Tactile-visual 
encounters between humans reveal the complex, problematic nature of intimacy, 
which often refuses any critical attempt to confine it within predetermined frames. 
Affective proximity, as Bowen and Merleau-Ponty suggest, unfold in hollows, 
those half-luminous, semi-soft spaces in which borders are not hermetically 
sealed but infinitely open, allowing the subject to touch/see and be touched/seen, 
while at the same time protecting his/her corporeal autonomy. At the same time, 
in her wartime writings, Bowen shows the difficulties of feeling for barely visible, 
blurred shadows, which in their resistance to clear light, risk being divested of 
their fleshy nature. Lawrence’s cosmic darkness and Woolf’s ‘gently gliding’ 
moonlight start to wear thin in Bowen’s 1940s fiction, which reveals the 










Ian McEwan: the anxious modernist 
 
 
Empathy, as discussed in the introduction of this thesis, represents an important 
term in McEwan’s vocabulary, mainly because he associates it with human(e) 
values. Fellow feeling, according to McEwan, is a function located in the brain, 
which helps humans to project themselves, through imagination, in the minds of 
other people. In a Guardian article published shortly after the 9/11 terror attacks 
in the United States, McEwan attributed the hijackers’ actions to their inability to 
enter their victims’ minds: 
 
Imagining what it is like to be someone other than yourself is at the core 
of our humanity. It is the essence of compassion, and it is the beginning of 
morality. The hijackers used fanatical certainty, misplaced religious faith, 
and dehumanising hatred to purge themselves of the human instinct for 
empathy. Among their crimes was a failure of imagination. (‘Only Love and 
Oblivion’, 15 September 2001) 
 
Temporarily inhabiting the other’s mind, McEwan deems, allows one to 
experience the other person’s inner world, which, in turn leads to the empathetic 
person’s inability to commit violence. In other words, our ability to imaginatively 
access other minds makes us compassionate humans and caring citizens. If 
reading fiction can indeed hone our empathetic skills, as McEwan suggests, then 
literature has real-life benefits and values that have been seriously 
underestimated.80 
 McEwan’s efforts to prove the value of literature can be placed in a wider 
cultural context. Among several other thinkers, such as sociobiologist E. O. 
Wilson, scientist Richard Dawkins, and cognitive psychologist and linguist Steven 
Pinker, McEwan considers himself a representative of the so-called ‘third culture’ 
(Salisbury, ‘Narration and neurology’ 893–896). David Amigoni notes that ‘third 
culture’ is a term used by the publisher and writer John Brockman, who borrowed 
                                                        
80 For a detailed discussion of the problematic nature of such claims see Salisbury’s ‘Narration 
and neurology’.  
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it from C. P. Snow’s lecture ‘The Two Cultures: A Second Look’ (1963) (157). The 
title of Snow’s lecture refers to a debate that took place between himself and 
literary critic F. R. Leavis. In 1959 Snow, a British scientist and novelist, claimed 
that ‘literary intellectuals’ should no longer occupy a privileged place in culture, 
but this role should rather be taken over by scientists who are capable of 
describing reality in a way that literary critics are not. As Stefan Collini puts it in 
his introduction to The Two Cultures, Snow rejected ‘a set of largely backward-
looking or pessimistic attitudes associated with Modernist literature’ in favour of 
‘more optimistic and “modernising” commitments associated with natural science’ 
(xliii). In 1962, Leavis responded vehemently to Snow’s lecture, rejecting the 
former’s claims with hostility, and claiming that only literature can provide 
adequate answers to the question ‘What do […] men live by?’ (56) Recently, the 
Snow–Leavis debate has been resurrected in an attempt to reassert the value of 
disciplines falling under the umbrella term ‘humanities’. Collini writes in What are 
Universities For?: ‘In contemporary public discussion of universities, it invariably 
proves more difficult to characterize the nature of teaching and research in the 
humanities, and thus to explain their value, than it does to give such an account 
of the scientific, medical, and technological disciplines’ (61). As sciences have 
started to gain more privilege, many academics working in the humanities have 
felt the need to make a case for the (public) value of their subjects.81  
In ‘The Two Cultures: A Second Look’ Snow argued that there is a space 
between science and humanities, where representatives of both parties can have 
a fruitful and intellectually stimulating dialogue. However, as Amigoni observes, 
Brockman uses the phrase in a somewhat different sense: his aim is not to fill in 
the gap between science and humanities but to build a bridge between scientists 
and the wider public (156). The aim of third-culture scientists and ‘empirical 
thinkers’, Brockman highlights on his website Edge, is to replace the ‘traditional 
intellectual’ and make ‘visible the deeper meaning of our lives’ (n.p.). Brockman 
enumerates among the traditional, or what he elsewhere calls the ‘literary’ 
intellectuals, thinkers such as ‘Freud, Marx and modernis[ts]’, claiming that ‘a 
1950s education in the above-mentioned authors’ works ‘is not a sufficient 
qualification for a thinking person in the 1990s’ (n.p.). As Salisbury observes, it 
                                                        
81 Other prominent examples of academic books “defending” the humanities, include: The Public 
Value of the Humanities, edited by Jonathan Bate, Bloomsbury Academic, 2011; Helen Small. 
The Value of the Humanities. Oxford University Press, 2013.  
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becomes evident that Brockman dismisses ‘what might broadly be determined as 
the antihumanism of various “social constructivist” accounts of knowledge’ 
(‘Narration and neurology’ 894). ‘Freud, Marx and modernis[ts]’ fail to address 
the problems and questions that a twenty-first-century intellectual public faces, 
because their outdated pursuits remain ‘the marginal disputes of a quarrelsome 
mandarin class’, looking down on the masses from an ivory tower (n.p.). This 
‘mandarin class’ is characterised by the excessive use of a ‘swelling spiral of 
commentary’ in which ‘the real world gets lost’ (n.p.). There is no space here to 
discuss the problematic and flawed nature of Brockman’s statements. A few 
questions that arise in the mind of a critic trained in ‘Freud, Marx and modernism’ 
might be: Who counts as an ‘intellectual’? If third-culture thinkers are ‘tolerant’ 
and open-minded, why do they discard any subject or critical framework that fall 
outside of empirical modes of enquiry (n.p.)? The aim of this chapter is not to 
answer these questions, but they are important to help us better understand 
McEwan’s position in third-culture debates. 
 McEwan, who appears on Brockman’s list of third-culture thinkers, shares, 
to an extent, the latter’s rejection of ‘Freud, Marx and modernism’. More precisely, 
he agrees with Brockman’s emphasis on the significance of the ‘real world’, a 
view that McEwan also attributes to the protagonist of Saturday (2005), the 
neurosurgeon Henry Perowne.82 McEwan’s obsession with the ‘real world’ might 
explain his interest in neuroscience, or at least with neuroscientific theories that 
locate (inter)subjectivity in brain matter. In ‘Literature, Science, and Human 
Nature’ (quoted in the introduction of this thesis), he identifies the value of art and 
literature in their ability to reveal ‘our common nature’ despite our wide-ranging 
differences: ‘It would not be possible to read and enjoy literature from a time 
remote from our own, unless we shared some common emotional ground, some 
deep reservoir of assumptions, with the writer’ (11). The existence of a ‘deep 
reservoir of assumptions’ is the consequence of our shared genetic inheritance, 
which allows us to connect to the distant and different other. However, as 
Salisbury suggests, what differentiates McEwan from third-culture scientists is 
                                                        
82 At some point in Saturday, Henry recalls one of his quarrels with his daughter Daisy, when 
influenced by her poststructuralist education at Oxford, she tried to convince her father that 
madness ‘was a social construct’, an attempt of the wealthy to suppress the poor. Henry 
dismisses definitively Daisy’s stance, based on Foucault’s works: their argument ‘ended with 
Henry, in a rhetorical coup, offering her a tour of a psychiatric wing. Resolutely, she accepted, 
and then the matter was forgotten’ (92). Salisbury also mentions this scene in ‘Narration and 
Neurology’ p. 891.  
 163 
that despite rejecting poststructuralism, he does not promote a purely scientific 
mode of reading; rather he ‘suggests a very broadly scientifically subtended, 
explicitly humanist, account of an evolved species commonality’ that represents 
the basis of literature’s ability to create bridges between people (‘Narration and 
neurology’ 896).  
McEwan’s real contribution to the debate on the value of humanities, this 
chapter suggests, lies not in his journalistic claims but in his fiction, which often 
transcends, or even contradicts his authorial statements.83 Just as in Lawrence’s 
case, my aim is not to resolve these contradictions but to show how fellow feeling 
works inside the fictional realm of the novels. Even if we accept that fellow feeling 
is evolutionarily coded in the brain, as McEwan believes, what the modernist texts 
analysed so far, as well as McEwan’s own novels show, is that a purely biological 
explanation remains insufficient for revealing how two flesh-and-blood humans 
relate to each other in a particular historical, cultural, and emotional context.  
The body, as understood throughout this thesis, means a sensing, 
breathing and moving entity, which exists in close interaction with the social and 
cultural environment it inhabits. Phenomenology offers an alternative 
interpretation of fellow feeling, one that intersects on several levels with ideas of 
sympathy in the fiction of my chosen modernist writers. Merleau-Ponty rejected 
the hypothesis that empathy occurs in an isolated and abstract mind, and 
proposed in Phenomenology of Perception that intersubjectivity takes place 
between interacting bodies embedded in a socio-cultural environment. Shaun 
Gallagher succinctly summarises the essence of phenomenology: ‘[I]t seems 
wrong to claim that the mental life of others is essentially inaccessible, just as it 
seems wrong to claim that everything is open to view’ (187). In other words, the 
possibilities of feeling for and with others lie in a zone of semi-transparency, to 
borrow Woolf’s often-used phrase, where gaining clear knowledge about the 
other remains an unachievable endeavour but this does not imply the 
impossibility of forging emotional bonds.  
 Viewing fellow feeling as a half-visible realm is productive because it 
allows for the physical-tangible presence of the object of empathy while at the 
same time retaining some aspects of its abstraction, which resist unambiguous 
interpretation. This is the way many modernist authors, such as Lawrence, Woolf 
                                                        
83 David James has also noticed this contradiction (Modernist Futures 137).  
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and Bowen understood the hazy nature of fellow feeling, and this is also close to 
McEwan’s ideas of intersubjectivity in Saturday. In what follows, I will switch to 
the term ‘sympathy’ precisely because I want to suggest that McEwan – though 
he does not use the word ‘sympathy’, or when he does, he usually employs it in 
the sense of pity or compassion – has been significantly influenced by modernist 
ideas of sympathy. Furthermore, using the word ‘sympathy’ also allows the 
reader to differentiate between McEwan’s representation of fellow feeling in his 
fictional works and his journalistic assertions about empathy. The affinities 
between McEwan’s and modernists’ ideas about sympathy is not always the 
result of the former’s conscious borrowing from his predecessors’ works, but 
rather the texts, especially Atonement (2001), seem to be working beyond their 
author. In doing so, McEwan’s novels provide an understanding of corporeality 
that intersects with phenomenological thinking, and compels us to reconsider 
what it means to exist not only in but also with the world.  
Indeed, as Patricia Waugh remarks, though McEwan is often ‘accused of 
science envy, the emphasis in [his] fiction is also phenomenological’ (‘The 
Naturalistic Turn’ 25). McEwan’s implicit phenomenology can be grasped in his 
engagement with literary modernism: in that chiasmic space where the 
contemporary novel meets its modernist predecessor. Through this cross-period 
meeting, the contemporary novel learns to reappraise not only the modernist 
corpus but also the concept of embodied sympathy and its implications in the 
twenty-first century. In entering into dialogue with modernist aesthetics, 
McEwan’s novels transcend scientific explanations of fellow feeling, and present 
a complex view of the body, as something delicately poised between biological 




Atonement and the tracing of modernist tesserae 
 
In The Anxiety of Influence (1973), literary critic Harold Bloom quotes a passage 
from the American poet, Wallace Stevens’s letter to Richard Eberhart: 
 
I sympathize with your denial of any influence on my part. This sort of thing 
always jars me because, in my own ease, I am not conscious of having 
been influenced by anyone and have purposely held off from reading 
highly mannered people like Eliot and Pound so that I should not absorb 
anything, even unconsciously. But there is a kind of critic who spends his 
time dissecting for echoes, imitations, influences, as if no one was ever 
simply himself but is always compounded of a lot of other people. (qtd. in 
Bloom 7) 
 
Even though the writer wants to consciously distance himself from the past, as in 
Stevens’s case, or admits having relied on tradition though in a somewhat 
corrective manner, as McEwan emphasises in his interviews, the literary past is 
never entirely dismissible, but remains a haunting presence in the texture of the 
new work. My intention is not to become the type of critic discarded by Stevens: 
one that ‘spends [her] time [arbitrarily] dissecting for echoes, imitations, 
influences’. Instead, I want to show how ‘echoes’ are not merely scholars’ 
obsessions but lively presences in the fabric of the new text, which can help 
readers to reappraise not only the literary past but also its sympathetic, though at 
times reluctant host, the contemporary novel. In other words, I will not ‘dissect’ 
but rather assemble or more precisely reassemble the pieces of modernism in 
the structure of the contemporary novel, to show how the investigation of these 
modernist fragments can help us reconsider what it means to feel sympathy in 
the literature of the twenty-first century. 
 Why is Stevens so anxious about being caught out by critics? Why does 
he dread using, ‘even unconsciously’ any allusions to the works of other poets? 
A possible answer might be found in his fear of being considered a faux, an artist 
lacking original insights, who must fall back on his literary ancestors to find 
inspiration. Stevens is anxious about losing his identity, that part of his existence 
that makes him unique and distinguishable from others, and which, in turn, 
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constitutes his individual artistic value, an idea that echoes Romantic views of 
selfhood and art. He interprets originality, at least in the above-mentioned letter, 
as the ‘denial of any influence’, conscious or unconscious. In other words, 
appropriating another poet’s words, images and style unconsciously is not an 
excuse for Stevens. Artistic appropriation, however, is perhaps a more complex 
problem, which I do not intend to theoretically redefine in this chapter, but on 
which I want to throw fresh light by examining the ways in which Atonement 
engages with modernist legacies.  
 The differentiation between conscious and unconscious appropriation is 
not an easy task in McEwan’s case. He admits his debt to modernism but at the 
same time he tends to view this literary period as somewhat obsolete, mannered 
and self-centred.84 In the second part of Atonement, by introducing the figures of 
literary critic Cyril Connolly, and Elizabeth Bowen, McEwan critiques high 
modernism for its excessive use of stylistic devices, such as the interplay of ‘light 
and shade’ (313), and modernist writers’ failure to create a plot, which Connolly 
calls the ‘backbone’ of the story (320).85 McEwan’s novel thus could be read as 
an example of what Bloom calls the clinamen. In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom 
distinguishes between six phases or ‘ratios’ of engaging with literary tradition: 
clinamen (or ‘poetic misreading’), tessera, kenosis, daemonization, askesis, and 
apophrades (14). In McEwan’s case the first two phases seem the most relevant. 
Bloom defines the clinamen as a conscious misreading of ‘the precursor poem’, 
which implies that the latter ‘went accurately up to a certain point, but then should 
have swerved, precisely in the direction that the new poem moves’ (14). 
McEwan’s journalistic assertions about modernism and his appropriation of 
Connolly’s and Bowen’s voice in the second part of Atonement (to which I will 
shortly turn) seem to underline the interpretation of the novel as a clinamen, which 
intends to offer a corrective to modernism’s putative shortcomings. However, the 
first section of Atonement questions such a straightforward interpretation, rather 
allowing for the reading of the novel as a tessera. Bloom defines the tessera as 
 
                                                        
84 In an interview he claims that he relied on the works of Virginia Woolf, Elizabeth Bowen and 
Rosamond Lehmann when writing the first part of Atonement, but immediately afterwards he 
describes the aforementioned writers’ fiction as ‘slightly mannered’, ‘a little formal’, and ‘a tiny bit 
archaic’ (Bookworm n.p.). 
85  Connolly thinks that Briony’s novella relies too heavily on high modernist aesthetics, 
characterised by ‘random impressions’ and a ‘static quality’ (313), which fail to provide a sense 
of ‘development’ (312) that, according to Connolly, a reader in the 1940s would expect.  
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completion and antithesis; I take the word not from mosaic-making, where 
it is still used, but from the ancient mystery cults, where it meant a token 
of a recognition, a fragment of a small pot which with the other fragments 
would re-constitute the vessel. A poet antithetically “completes” his 
precursor, by so reading the parent-poem as to retain its terms but to mean 
them in another sense, as though the precursor had failed to go far 
enough. (14) 
 
He takes the concept from Jacques Lacan’s Discours de Rome (1953), in which 
the latter writes that ‘the Word, even when almost completely worn out, retains 
its value as a tessera’ (Bloom 67). Lacan’s translator, Anthony Wilden remarks 
that this ‘allusion is to the function of the tessera as a token of recognition, or 
“password”. The tessera was employed in the early mystery religions where fitting 
together again the two halves of a broken piece of pottery was used as a means 
of recognition by the initiates’ (Bloom 67). The tessera, a piece of pottery, usually 
of the shape of a triangle or other geometrical form acts as a token that confers 
a new meaning to the work of art it originally belonged to.86 In Bloom’s analysis 
of poetic influence, the term tessera refers to the new work, whose aim is to 
‘complete’ its ‘precursor’, thus also revealing the latter’s imperfections. Although 
I borrow Bloom’s concept in my further analysis of Atonement, I use it in a slightly 
different sense. In my reading of McEwan’s novel, the ‘precursor[s]’, in this case 
the modernist – primarily Woolf’s – works, represent the tesserae, which placed 
in the texture of the contemporary novel, act as tokens that cast fresh light on 
both old and new artwork, without necessarily establishing a hierarchical order 
between the two. As such, the first section of Atonement works beyond its author, 
unwinding the subtleties and complexities of the contemporary novel’s 
sympathetic yet fragile coexistence with its modernist predecessor. In other 
words, the first part of Atonement illustrates how feelings of sympathy – as we 
have seen in Lawrence, Woolf and Bowen – often operate beyond the realm of 
rational control, and are driven by a form of unconscious, sensuous longing for 
the other: living entities and art alike. 
Several critics have commented on McEwan’s engagement with the 
modernist tradition. Laura Marcus argues that McEwan’s later novels, such as 
                                                        
86 Online Oxford English Dictionary. www.oed.com. Accessed 4 December 2018. 
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Atonement and Saturday, establish a ‘dialogue with the structures of modernist 
fiction’ (85). For Marcus dialogue means the simultaneous acknowledgment of a 
‘debt’ and ‘the necessary and inevitable distance’ between the contemporary 
novelist and his modernist predecessors (85). David James uses the same term 
when describing the twenty-first-century novel’s complicated relationship to 
modernist fiction, suggesting that transitions between literary periods should be 
‘understood as dialogues with, rather than departures’ from the past (The 
Legacies of Modernism 6, emphasis in original). As both Marcus and James 
highlight, contemporary novelists do not aim at eradicating modernist legacies 
but as James puts it elsewhere, they redefine the modernist novel ‘as a medium 
for connecting interiority and accountability, braiding the description of 
characters’ innermost reflections into the fabric of worldly situations’ (Modernist 
Futures 9). McEwan himself corroborates the interpretation of Atonement as a 
dialogical exchange with the past, claiming in an interview that his aim was to 
‘enter into conversation with modernism’ (Bookworm n.p., my emphasis). He 
envisages this ‘conversation’ as a discussion with the past, embedded in an 
‘emotional situation’, by which he means the love story between Robbie and 
Cecilia, and Briony’s attempts at atonement (Bookworm n.p.). But the dialogue 
Atonement establishes with modernism already represents an emotional gesture, 
an act of sympathetic reaching out to the past.  
McEwan’s ‘working definition of the modernist novel’, to appropriate 
James’s words, can be grasped in the first section of Atonement, in the scene 
redrafted from Two Figures by the Fountain (Modernist Futures 9). In the 
mentioned episode, Cecilia carries a precious Meissen vase with wild flowers to 
the garden fountain, where following an unfortunate incident, the vase is broken. 
Briony’s decision to write about this particular scene in her later novella bears 
great importance because it throws fresh light on her, and by extension 
McEwan’s, attitude towards modernist poetics.87  
                                                        
87 Peter Boxall comments on the importance of the vase, albeit from a different perspective. He 
argues that Briony’s decision to replace the original Ming vase – following Connolly’s suggestion 
– with a Meissen one that belonged to Uncle Clem, proves that Briony, the novelist, actually 
invented the fountain scene (as well as the rest of the novel) not before but after receiving 
Connolly’s letter (70). Brian Finney also highlights the wider implications of the vase’s breakage, 
but he does not link them to the role that modernist poetics play in McEwan’s novel: ‘[T]he 
fracturing and eventual destruction [of the vase] imagistically anticipate those of the family and 
pre-War society to which both the vase and family belong’ (77). Brian Finney. ‘Briony’s Stand 
Against Oblivion: The Making of Fiction in Ian McEwan’s Atonement.’ Journal of Modern 
Literature, vol. 27, no. 3, 2004, pp. 68–82. 
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Several critics have read the first section of Atonement as a pastiche. 
Alistair Cormack proposes that upon their return to the fountain scene, readers 
realise the pastiche-like quality of the text: ‘what we read in good faith in the first 
section as a Woolf-like modernism […] we must now regard as an imitation by an 
absent author-demiurge (McEwan) of one character’s own modernist 
reconstruction of the event […]’ (75). In contrast with Cormack, what I suggest, 
through the analysis of the vase, is a reading of the scene as a palimpsest rather 
than pastiche, an idea implicitly corroborated by McEwan himself. When asked 
about the genesis of Atonement, McEwan identified the ‘germ’ of the novel in the 
first paragraph he had written ‘about a girl with some wild flowers in her hand, 
coming into a rather elegant room, aware of a young man gardening outside’ 
(Bookworm n.p.). This scene, which later became the second chapter of Part 
One, represents the foundation of the novel, whose fictional author, Briony, is – 
according to McEwan – an amalgamation of Elizabeth Bowen, Virginia Woolf, 
and Rosamond Lehmann (Bookworm n.p.). 
Richard Robinson notices that Atonement can be interpreted as a 
‘modernist palimpsest that has undergone continual erasure’, until, after several 
drafts, it hardly resembles its original sources (475). The problem with this 
reading is that it pays too much attention to the new writing, which deletes or at 
least muddles the old script to such an extent that the latter becomes 
unrecognisable. As Robinson concludes his analysis of modernist influences in 
Atonement: ‘[w]e can remodel our sense of Atonement democratically containing 
competing poetics and underline that modernism is subordinated (rather than 
dominant) in the text’ (491). Robinson’s statement presupposes the existence of 
an irreconcilable contradiction, which is somewhat problematic because it 
suggests that self and other, or contemporary and modernist writing, cannot 
engage in a simultaneous coexistence but one must necessarily appropriate the 
other. My interpretation of palimpsest, relying on the Oxford English Dictionary 
entry, differs from Robinson’s in that it focuses on the interaction between “old” 
and “new”, rather than advocating one over the other. While the primary meaning 
of palimpsest is a parchment on which the older text has been erased and 
overwritten by a new one, the dictionary offers a further explanation: ‘In extended 
use: a thing likened to such a writing surface, esp. in having been reused or 
 170 
altered while still retaining traces of its earlier form; a multilayered record’.88 As 
Sophie Ratcliffe argues in her analysis of Shakespearean allusions in the works 
of Robert Browning, W. H. Auden, and Samuel Beckett, ‘[a]cts of allusion alert us 
to the way in which one may move towards a new world, while still feeling for the 
past’ (3). Before turning to a detailed analysis of Atonement’s sympathetic 
reaching back to modernism, however, it is important to examine McEwan’s 
critique of high modernism’s shortcomings, as put forward in Connolly’s letter to 





‘Fussy and oppressive’: modernism’s imperfections 
 
In the first section of the novel, while taking the vase to the fountain, Cecilia 
recalls that the object belonged to Uncle Clem, her father’s brother, an officer 
who received it as a present for having saved a small town, next to Verdun, in the 
First World War. The porcelain arrived to the Tallis family a few weeks after Uncle 
Clem’s re-burial and despite being the most precious object in the household, it 
was continuously in use, as Cecilia’s father refused to ‘imprison it behind a glass 
case’ (22, 24). The vessel represents a perfect example of chinoiserie, the 
imitation of Chinese and other oriental artistic traditions in Europe, which began 
in the seventeenth century and went through a revival in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 89  Cecilia notes how her mother, Emily, dislikes the vase 
because ‘[i]ts little painted Chinese figures [which] gathered formally in a garden 
around the table, with ornate plants and implausible birds, seemed fussy and 
oppressive’ (24). The vessel’s description is reminiscent of modernist, in 
particular Woolf’s fiction on a double level: first, the scene on the porcelain can 
be read as a very faint echo of To the Lighthouse and The Waves (in both novels 
characters gather rather formally around a dinner table, and both are peppered 
with oriental flowers, and birds),90 while at the same time the Chinese decoration 
                                                        
88 Online Oxford English Dictionary. www.oed.com. Accessed 4 December 2018. 
89 For a detailed study of Chinese influence on literary modernism see British Modernism and 
Chinoiserie, edited by Anne Witchard, Edinburgh University Press, 2015. 
90 In To the Lighthouse the Ramsay family and their guests, while in The Waves the six friends 
gather together for dinner. Birds and flowers play important roles in both novels: in To the 
Lighthouse Jasper’s favourite activity is shooting birds, and Mrs Ramsay and Cam are often 
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reminds us of the first section of Briony’s/McEwan’s novel: Cecilia fusses over 
the aesthetic arrangement of some wild flowers picked for a family dinner while 
she observes the courting ritual of two swallows over the fountain. What is more, 
Emily’s critique of the vase acquires further meanings if read in parallel with 
Connolly’s and Bowen’s ideas about high modernism, two literary figures of 
central importance in McEwan’s novel.  
After several months of having sent her novella, Two Figures By a 
Fountain, to the literary magazine Horizon, the eighteen-year-old Briony receives 
a response from Connolly, the magazine’s editor, in which he explains his 
reasons for being unable to publish her story. Based on his own judgment as well 
as on Bowen’s comments, which are ‘mulched into’ (314) his letter, Connolly 
captures the main problem with Briony’s prose in its tendency to imitate high 
modernist literary techniques, especially those of ‘Mrs Woolf’ (312). Emily’s 
dislike for the ‘fussy and oppressive’ Chinese figures on the porcelain can be 
linked to Connolly’s criticism of high modernist aesthetics. In his 1938 work, 
Enemies of Promise, a hybrid of literary criticism and autobiography, the real 
Connolly distinguishes between two literary styles dominant in the 1920s and 
1930s: the Mandarin and the vernacular. He enumerates among the 
characteristics of the Mandarin style/‘dialect’ the use of long and syntactically 
convoluted sentences, allusions, and metaphors (31), adding to this list the 
egocentrism of Mandarin writers, who ‘were all inmates of the Ivory Tower’, and 
favoured ‘extreme individualism’ (42). Connolly singles out Woolf as the writer 
who had ‘the worst defect of the Mandarin style, the ability to spin cocoons of 
language out of nothing’ (60). All these accusations are levelled against the 
solipsism endorsed by high modernists, who, according to Connolly, use 
language in a self-indulgent way, to examine the workings of the private mind, 
even at the risk of shutting out other minds. Emily’s dismissal of the Chinese 
décor might be read as a subtle allusion to McEwan’s rejection of Woolf, the most 
prominent Mandarin writer in Connolly’s account. At the same time, Connolly’s 
use of the term ‘Mandarin’ resonates with Brockman’s dismissal of the 
‘quarrelsome mandarin class’ associated with ‘Freud, Marx, and modernists’. 
                                                        
compared to birds: ‘[Cam] was off like a bird, bullet, or arrow, impelled by what desire, shot by 
whom, at what directed, who could say?’ (60–61). Oriental flowers in To the Lighthouse include 
the jacmanna (Lily contemplates their bright violet colour – 23), while in The Waves Rhoda’s 
activity of rocking petals in a basin becomes a recurrent motif. Bernard imagines a visit at his 
future wife’s house, where ‘[t]he pattern on the plates is of Oriental long-tailed birds’ (59).  
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According to The Merriam-Webster Dictionary the word ‘mandarin’ meant a public 
official of a high rank in the Chinese Empire, but the term was also used to denote 
an influential person in literary circles, especially an older and traditionalist 
member.91 Connolly’s and Brockman’s employment of the concept suggests a 
view of modernism as self-centred and isolated, entangled in aesthetic and 
intellectual questions that have no connection to, or indeed no effect on the ‘real’ 
world.  
McEwan, nevertheless, fails to attend to the complexity of the real 
Connolly’s and Bowen’s attitude towards high modernism. Connolly’s dismissal 
of the Mandarin style and his preference for vernacular literary works – 
characterised by the use of colloquial/journalistic language and interest in social 
matters – is far from being straightforward. Connolly actually sees the future of 
literature in the successful interweaving of the Mandarin and vernacular ‘dialects’, 
and importantly, he finds certain aspects of the Mandarin style praiseworthy. For 
instance, he appreciates Woolf’s The Waves because instead of focusing on a 
single character’s inner world, the novel fuses the consciousness of the six 
protagonists and thus ‘comes nearest to stating the mystery of life’ (Connolly 61). 
In a similar vein, the real Bowen – herself a regular contributor to Horizon and 
friend of Connolly – had a more complex opinion about high modernism than 
McEwan attributes to her in Atonement. After the publication of The Heat of the 
Day, her famous Second World War novel, Bowen claimed in an interview that 
turning to ‘exterior rather than interior crisis’ is a form of reassurance for the post-
war novelist, as ‘[t]hese days one feels rather a revulsion against psychological 
intricacies for their own sakes’ (Hepburn, Weight of a World 12). Though this 
comment marks her departure from high modernist aesthetics, Bowen preserved 
a special fondness for Woolf’s fiction, which continued after the latter’s death. In 
the same year that The Heat of the Day was published in Britain, Bowen wrote a 
review of Bernard Blackstone’s book entitled Virginia Woolf (1949). Bowen 
summarised the main merits of Blackstone’s monograph: ‘He disposes of the 
charge that Virginia Woolf’s art was the product of an aerial remoteness from the 
human norm; […] and he places her, essentially, a creature of her environment 
and her time’ (‘The Achievement of Virginia Woolf’, CI 78). Bowen considers this 
                                                        
91 Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, Merriam-Webster. 
www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/filibuster. Accessed 20 December 2018. 
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last characteristic Woolf’s principal achievement, which also demonstrates that, 
as Blackstone remarked, Woolf was not ‘purely aesthetic’ but preoccupied with 
the historical realities of her time (CI 79). Nevertheless, what made Woolf (at least 
her fiction written in the 1920s) different from many late modernists, including 
Bowen, was the former’s tendency to ‘purify’ the moment by filtering it through 
the sieve of time:  
 
From the past her art could retrieve the moment, make it again the present, 
but a present to be lived without any pain. Her novels […] are full of 
moments which exactly this process has purified, crystallized, placed in 
time’s light but completely outside time. (Bowen, ‘Virginia Woolf’, CI 76) 
 
Bowen’s comment about Woolf’s ‘crystallizing’ method is echoed in Connolly’s 
letter to Briony: ‘The crystalline present moment [explicitly associated with ‘Mrs 
Woolf’] is of course a worthy subject in itself, especially for poetry; it allows a 
writer to show his gifts, delve into mysteries of perception, […] permit the vagaries 
and unpredictability of the private self to be explored […]’ (Atonement 312). 
Nonetheless, McEwan’s Connolly continues, this kind of writing can easily 
become artificial ‘when there is no sense of forward movement’ (312). McEwan 
thus partly relies on the real-life Connolly’s and Bowen’s statements about high 
modernist poetics when composing Connolly’s rejection letter but at the same 
time the fictional editor of Horizon, and by extension McEwan himself, fail to 
capture the complexity of late modernism’s relationship with the literary 
productions of the 1920s.92 In a similar vein, McEwan’s own authorial comments 
about high modernism, at least partially, lose their validity in the textual realm of 
Atonement. As mentioned before, in his interviews he distances himself from his 
modernist predecessors, such as Woolf, Bowen and Rosamond Lehmann, 
whose prose he generally describes as mannered and highly aestheticised 
(Bookworm n.p.). Yet, despite McEwan’s own slightly condescending claims, the 
first part of the novel, more precisely Uncle Clem’s broken vase, can be read as 
a sympathetic though fragile memorial to modernist fiction. 
  
                                                        
92 By late modernism I mean the literature written roughly in the 1930s, as suggested by Tyrus 
Miller in Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts between the World Wars (1999).   
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Modernism’s broken fragments and the possibilities of mending 
 
In the first part of Atonement, Cecilia’s gesture of mending the broken vase by 
gluing the triangular-shaped shards can be read as a ‘means of recognition’ for 
the modernist novel. The fountain scene occupies a special role in the novel, 
among other reasons, because it represents the only episode in which the main 
artist figure is not Briony, the writer, but Cecilia, the “designer”. For Cecilia, the 
arrangement of flowers in the vase represents an existential question, which 
causes her great turmoil, and which ultimately contributes to her seemingly 
stubborn decision to get hold of the porcelain when Robbie offers to fill it with 
water: ‘She had no time, and certainly no inclination, to explain that plunging vase 
and flowers into the water would help with the natural look she wanted in the 
arrangement’ (29). Cecilia’s experience echoes Lily’s torments in the first section 
of To the Lighthouse, when the latter tries to explain to Mr Bankes her artistic 
choice of painting Mrs Ramsay as a purple triangle. McEwan’s and Woolf’s 
heroine share many characteristics. Both are haunted by an uncanny inner voice 
reinforcing that ‘[w]omen can’t paint, women can’t write’ (TTL 54), and both try to 
solidify their identity as artists/intellectuals in a historical and cultural context 
dominated by men.  
Though she misunderstands Robbie’s gestures, Cecilia feels mocked by 
the man, among other reasons, for her having received a poor degree at 
Cambridge, ‘not that they actually awarded degrees to women anyway’ (27). 
Cecilia’s degree, or the lack of it, echoes Woolf’s indignation about gender 
inequality discussed in A Room of One’s Own (1929) and her essays, written in 
the same period when the first part of Atonement takes place. The figure of the 
marginalised female artist creates a subtle link between McEwan’s and Woolf’s 
works, at the same time casting fresh light on their ideas of sympathetic 
memorialising. For Cecilia, just as for Lily Briscoe, aesthetic questions interlace 
with attempts at preserving the memory of the dead. In the final part of To the 
Lighthouse, Lily understands that paying tribute to a dead beloved can take many 
shapes, such as a purple shadow walking across a lily/hyacinth field. Though 
Cecilia did not actually know her dead uncle, she reaches a similar conclusion 
when contemplating how a non-conventional arrangement of the rose-bay willow-
herbs and irises (both having a purplish colour, just as the lilies/hyacinths in To 
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the Lighthouse) can honour Uncle Clem’s memory.93 Cecilia’s gesture betrays a 
preference for abstract beauty: ‘It made no sense, she knew, arranging flowers 
before the water was in – but there it was; she couldn’t resist moving them 
around, and not everything people did could be in a correct, logical order […]’ 
(23). This thought could equally be formulated by Lily, who considers moving the 
tree in her painting to obtain a better geometric symmetry, a harmony of forms 
and colours that transcends a realistic, ‘logical order’, associated with male 
dominance. 
At the same time, Cecilia’s memorialising act recalls female characters in 
Jacob’s Room, whose creative efforts remain largely unrecognised by the 
patriarchal society. Jacob’s Room, as discussed in my Woolf chapter, advocates 
a form of remembering that is attentive to the fragilities and imperfections of the 
flesh, a term used in the Merleau-Pontian sense to incorporate both living and 
non-living entities (in this case the art object). Woolf’s ‘battered’ statues in Jacob’s 
Room find an echo in the broken vase in Atonement. After rescuing the triangular 
porcelain pieces from the bottom of the fountain, Cecilia tries to conceal the 
damage by gluing the vessel. The result of her mending efforts becomes 
Atonement’s own ‘battered’ monument to modernist fiction: ‘[The vase] had 
baked all afternoon on a table by the south-facing window in the library, and now 
three fine meandering lines in the glaze, converging like rivers in an atlas, were 
all that showed. No one would ever know.’ (43) The river-like cracks in the vase 
– recalling Uncle Clem’s heroic crossing of a flume with the vessel in his hands, 
and anticipating Briony’s later definition of modern consciousness ‘as a river 
through time’ (281) (echoing William James’s concept of ‘stream of 
consciousness’, later introduced in literary studies by May Sinclair)94– act as 
mementos of the First World War, as well as of the literary tradition heavily 
influenced by the war. McEwan’s novel’s dialogical exchange with modernism 
can be delicately captured in the image of the repaired Meissen vase: after the 
mending act, the porcelain becomes a whole artistic composition, yet the 
meandering lines fail to completely merge into the glaze, thus reminding of the 
half-visible presence of the past. The repaired vase acquires new artistic meaning 
                                                        
93 At the same time, the novel as a whole, especially the first section, represents Briony’s own 
memorial to Cecilia and Robbie. As Briony admits in the epilogue, by reuniting her sister and 
Robbie, she wanted not only to atone for her crime, but also to preserve the lovers in the fictional 
realm of her novel. 
94 May Sinclair used the term ‘stream-of-consciousness’ to describe Dorothy Richardson’s 1915 
novel, Pilgrimage. May Sinclair. ‘The Novels of Dorothy Richardson.’ Egoist, 5, 1918, pp. 57–59. 
 176 
through the re-embedding of the modernist tesserae, which act as tokens or 
‘passwords’ that help us reappraise both past and present. 
 The lines, however, do not represent total ruptures with modernist 
aesthetics. Dominic Head warns us against an interpretation of literary history as 
something focusing exclusively on change and difference: ‘The perennial 
problem with literary history is that it emphasises change, drawing chronological 
lines in the sand that may be preliminary signposts, merely, requiring 
complication and enrichment […]’ (41).95 The cracks in the porcelain suggest 
Atonement’s refusal to present literary history as linear succession: as Cecilia 
remarks, ‘not everything people did could be in a correct, logical order’ (23). In 
her book on sympathetic reading, Ratcliffe also notes how the act of 
‘remembering’ the literary past resembles the difficulty of feeling for others: 
‘[w]hile the echoes of Shakespeare [in the works of Browning, Auden, and 
Beckett] are similar, they are never quite the same and, in this way, allusions 
allow us to see the ideals and the fractured actualities of feeling and 
understanding’ (3). ‘The fractured actualities’ of fellow feeling acquire importance 
not only on aesthetic level but also in characters’ relationship with each other. 
Indeed, in Atonement feeling sympathy for the literary past becomes analogous 
to how one might feel for other human beings. The broken and partially repaired 
vase seems to anticipate Briony’s realisation as a nurse caring for injured 
soldiers: ‘From this new and intimate perspective, she learned a simple, obvious 
thing she had always known, and everyone knew: that a person is, among all 
else, a material thing, easily torn, not easily mended’ (304). Unlike the vase, 
however, which – at least at this point of the narrative – seems to be partially 
mendable, many soldiers Briony meets during her time in the hospital turn out to 
be beyond recovery. And yet, although the torn flesh of the soldiers is doomed to 
decay, through Briony’s encounter with Luc Cornet the novel opens up a brief 
moment of sympathetic coexistence that makes the young nurse realise the 
fallibility of her previous conceptions of sympathy on multiple levels: as writer, 
nurse and human being.  
  
                                                        
95 The same quotation is used in James’s introduction to The Legacies of Modernism, p. 3.   
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Flexible ‘[back]bones’: sympathy and the broken body 
 
During her training as a nurse in the 1940s London, Briony’s ideas of sympathy 
undergo a radical change. Her description of the hospital regime becomes an 
uncanny echo of ideas of militarism critiqued in the works of Lawrence, Woolf, 
and Bowen. Briony learns that in the hospital individual identity has no value: 
nurses are strictly forbidden to use their first names, and their uniforms as well 
as their monotonous daily routine under Sister Drummond’s supervision, ‘erode 
identity’, emptying the personal contents of the mind: ‘There could be no 
resistance as [the ward sister] filled their vacated minds [with her authoritative 
commands]’ (276). Briony’s realisation is analogous to what Adam Piette calls 
the ‘hollow[ing] out’ of the mind in wartime fiction. In his close reading of a 
passage from Bowen’s The Heat of the Day, Piette argues: ‘Uncertain of itself, 
emptied and hollowed out by the relentless privations and daily tasks of the war, 
[…] the mind at war became an empty theatre […]’ (4). Briony submits herself to 
the military regime, partly as a form of atonement for her past crime, and studies 
the nursing handbook with diligence before bedtime, to make sure that she does 
not miss any ‘points of etiquette’ (272). However, as her encounter with a dying 
French soldier demonstrates, following a predetermined ethical code might not 
always be enough for, or at times can even hinder, the forging of sympathetic 
bonds.  
When Briony is sent to keep company to Luc, a seriously injured French 
soldier, she interprets the command as a punishment for her showing signs of 
tiredness. She tries to protest that her French is not good enough but then 
reluctantly succumbs. Her first contact with Luc is tactile: as she holds his hands 
she feels their coldness and greasiness. When the soldier asks for her name, she 
answers dutifully: ‘Tallis’ (306). In a state of delirium, Luc begins to talk about his 
life in France as though Briony were part of it: he believes that she is his fiancé 
and asks her whether she liked the croissants made in his father’s bakery. At the 
beginning Briony is adamant that ‘it wasn’t right to lead him on’ and refuses to 
participate in his fictional narrative (307). However, when Luc asks her to loosen 
his head bandage, she finally understands the seriousness of his injury: ‘The side 
of Luc’s head was missing. […] Below the jagged line of bone was a spongy 
crimson mess of brain, several inches across […]’ (308). Brutally confronted with 
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the fragility of human flesh, Briony decides to abandon the moral codes to which 
she has previously submitted herself. She does this on a double level. First, she 
renounces her new literary credo of remaining faithful to reality, which she views 
as a form of respect for the alterity of other minds – a stance she adopts after 
realising the serious consequences of her past inability to distinguish between 
reality and imagination. As she gently holds Luc’s hand, she agrees to become 
at once the co-author, character and reader of his delirious story, almost helping 
him to move the imaginary pen that his weakening fingers can hardly hold. Luc’s 
narrative is a mere ‘unintelligible scrap’ (309) without any symmetric design and 
order, qualities of great importance to Briony, yet this broken and incoherent 
language represents a space where the conventions of storytelling can be 
momentarily suspended to give way to a form of sympathy based on a careful 
attention to the vulnerabilities of individual bodies.  
Salisbury notices that Briony’s exposure to the ‘illegitimate openings into 
the flesh’ in the hospital, immediately followed by her receiving of Connolly’s letter 
– in which he advises her to build a ‘backbone’ of the story – results in her 
rejection of modernism’s subjectivity and makes her turn to the material aspects 
of human character as well as storytelling (‘Narration and neurology’ 888). What 
Briony understands, after her interaction with Luc, and Connolly’s response, is 
that not only her narrative but also she as a human being needs a ‘backbone’. 
She starts to view her attraction to what the fictional Connolly and McEwan 
consider modernist hallmarks of interiority, as a lack of courage, an attempt at 
‘drown[ing] her guilt in a stream – three streams! – of consciousness. The 
evasions of her little novel were exactly those of her life’ (320). Briony’s 
conclusion chimes with McEwan’s, who claimed that through Atonement he 
wished to reveal modernism’s ‘dereliction of duty in relation to what I later have 
Cyril Connolly call the backbone of the plot’ (Bookworm n.p.; also qtd. in Salisbury 
‘Narration and neurology’ 885). As Connolly puts it in the novel, modernist literary 
techniques, such as stream of consciousness, ‘permit the vagaries and 
unpredictability of the private self to be explored’, which represents ‘a worthy 
subject’ but without a ‘forward movement’, ‘an underlying pull of simple narrative’, 
it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to hold ‘the reader’s attention’ (312). 
 Briony’s encounter with Luc, nevertheless, has further implications than 
her realisation of the necessity for a ‘backbone’. The novel suggests that having 
a ‘backbone’ is not synonymous with rigidity, or does not imply the necessity to 
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submit to unchangeable moral codes.96  As soon as Briony understands the 
seriousness of Luc’s injury, she discards her preconceptions about writing and 
nursing alike. Any line of demarcation between truth and lie becomes 
meaningless in the face of death. As a final act of sympathy, Briony decides to 
abandon any rules, and she not only attends to the dying soldier’s fragile body, 
but her own body becomes soft and malleable in the attempt of offering 
consolation and easing his agony. When in his delirious dreams he asks her 
whether she loves him, Briony does not hesitate for long: ‘”Yes.” No other reply 
was possible. Besides, for that moment, she did.’ (309) After committing her 
childhood crime of falsely accusing Cecilia’s lover, Robbie, of having raped the 
sisters’ cousin, Briony becomes obsessed with telling, or more precisely writing 
the truth. Yet when she meets Luc, she comprehends that being a writer, or 
indeed a nurse with a ‘backbone’ is not synonymous with rigidly holding on to 
reality or the nursing handbook. Instead, the novel suggests, possessing a 
‘backbone’ means to preserve a sense of flexibility that allows one to open 
towards the other, and pay attention to the vulnerability of other bodies in the 
present moment and under the given circumstances, which might go beyond any 
pre-established codes, professional or otherwise. By sympathetically reaching 
out to the dying man, Briony not only succeeds in offering Luc solace and a brief 
moment of peace before death, but she also regains her own sense of identity, 
erased in the hospital regime: ‘”It’s Briony,” she said, so only he would hear. […] 
“It’s not Tallis. You should call me Briony […]”.’ (310) In the moment preceding 
Luc’s death, she whispers in his ears her first name, a forbidden act according to 
the nursing etiquette.  
 The questions Atonement poses about interpersonal and inter-textual 
sympathy are intricately intertwined with the ways in which modernist authors 
viewed and wrote about fellow feeling. Yet an analysis of the survival of modernist 
                                                        
96 The idea of the flexible backbone might be linked to T. S. Eliot’s definition of tradition in his 
well-known essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1919): ‘[Tradition] involves, in the first 
place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue 
to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a perception, not only 
of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not 
merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of 
Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous 
existence and composes a simultaneous order.’ Eliot’s interpretation of literary influence seems 
to contradict Wallace Stevens’s, as explained in his letter to Eberhart. Eliot thinks that in order to 
make good poetry, the poet must write with past generations ‘in his bones’; in other words, he 
must be malleable and flexible enough to accommodate the past while simultaneously 
transcending it and creating something new. See T. S. Eliot. The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry 
and Criticism. 1920. Methuen & Co., 1929, p. 49. 
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ideas about sympathy in Atonement would remain incomplete without mentioning 
at least one important way in which McEwan’s representation of fellow feeling 
diverges from the modernists’, especially Woolf’s fiction. After all, as Marcus 
argues, a dialogical relationship with the past implies not only common grounds 
but also a ‘necessary and inevitable distance’ (85). This divergence can be best 
grasped in Briony’s realisation about the immense fragility of human flesh: ‘that a 
person is, among all else, a material thing, easily torn, not easily mended’ (304). 
In Atonement the corporeal vulnerability of human subjects is often presented as 
a definitive and irreversible state, which culminates in the impossibility of being 
mended. While Woolf’s To the Lighthouse ends with Lily’s artistic (re)creation of 
Mrs Ramsay, an attempt which, as I have argued in my Woolf chapter, is at least 
partially successful in transforming Mrs Ramsay’s memory in a palpable and 
visible presence, Atonement refuses to offer a similar consolation. Luc’s broken 
body, just as Robbie’s and Cecilia’s flesh torn by the brutal forces of the war (as 
we learn from the epilogue) are beyond any hope of cure. What is more, as we 
find out from Briony’s discussion with her sister in Part Three, Cecilia’s efforts of 
mending Uncle Clem’s vase turn out to be futile: during the Second World War, 
Betty, the Tallis’ servant drops the porcelain, which is shattered to smithereens. 
When Cecilia learns about the fate of the vase, the first question she asks her 
sister is whether their parents have kept any pieces (333). We never actually find 
out the answer to Cecilia’s question, as Briony herself does not know it. The novel 
nevertheless might offer an affirmative response. Luc, Cecilia and Robbie cannot 
be brought back to life (at least if we accept the validity of Briony’s authorial claims 
in the epilogue), the vase is broken beyond repair, and the old Briony, suffering 
from dementia, is on the verge of oblivion. Yet even if we never find out with 
certainty whether the Tallis family kept any fragments of the vase, the novel as a 
whole becomes a preserver of splinters. These pieces of modernist tesserae, 
delicately embedded in the fabric of Atonement, do not represent unambiguous 
‘passwords’ or keys in the sense of offering any clear-cut solutions to the 
decoding of the narrative. Instead, the triangular-shaped shards of modernism 
act as tiny tokens of sympathy which guide the reader, without falsely promising 
that (s)he will never get lost in the dense and convoluted texture of the novel.  
 McEwan’s next novel, Saturday, takes the idea of the sympathetically 
malleable body to a further level by revealing the inadequacies of the objective 
medical gaze that tries to reduce the human subject to a biological computer. 
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Henry Perowne, the neurosurgeon protagonist of the novel, is convinced that the 
key to understanding personality lies in brain matter. However, the novel’s 
portrayal of Henry’s complex and often problematic relationship with his fellow 
beings interrogates the protagonist’s views, and softens, even if only partially, the 
firmness of his preconceptions about sympathetic coexistence. 
 
Cognitive and embodied theories of fellow feeling 
 
Saturday corroborates but also complicates McEwan’s obsession with the ‘real 
world’ and his insistence on literature’s ability to create shared affective 
experiences. Before turning to an analysis of the novel, nevertheless, it is 
important to offer a brief overview of some cognitive models of fellow feeling, a 
theory that has significantly influenced McEwan’s views. Though McEwan does 
not deny the existence of ‘our exotic differences’, his insistence on our common 
traits suggests that differences are important only insofar they are superseded by 
empathetic identification (‘Literature, Science, and Human Nature’ 19). 
Nevertheless, as Dutch psychologist Douwe Draaisma suggests in his response 
to McEwan’s 2002 Van der Leeuw Lecture (an earlier version of ‘Literature, 
Science, and Human Nature’), our ability to understand and enjoy literature does 
not necessarily originate from our identification with characters possessing the 
same emotions as we. On the contrary, as Draaisma puts it, if we presume that 
emotions are not universal, the “role” we attribute to literature might undergo 
some change: ‘[The novelist] would report on a world that we do not know at first 
hand, but that we do want to get acquainted with. Through him we would get to 
know diversity, change, variation, with feelings and thoughts and motives we do 
not know ourselves and yet turn out to exist.’ (Draaisma, ‘The annoying 
resistance of facts’, Van der Leeuw Lecture, 2002, HRC, Ian McEwan Archive, 
Box 28, Folder 3, p. 11) Therefore, McEwan’s insistence on ‘our common nature’ 
poses some problems because it presupposes that identification is a necessary 
precondition of fellow feeling, a view that dates back to at least Adam Smith’s 
moral philosophy but has been recently embraced by cognitive science, in two 
interrelated areas: simulation theory and theory-theory. 97  Simulation theory 
                                                        
97 Sophie Ratcliffe suggests that the liberal humanist approach of Nussbaum and Booth is partly 
rooted in Adam Smith’s interpretation of sympathy as an imaginary transposition into the other’s 
mind (13). Ratcliffe refers to Smith’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740). She later argues 
 182 
suggests that we understand others as a result of ‘put[ting] ourselves in their 
shoes’ (Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art 344–345). On the other hand, 
advocates of theory-theory claim that we comprehend others’ inner states due to 
our general knowledge about the operation of the mind, which we apply to other 
(human) minds (Carroll 342–344). McEwan, at least in his non-fictional writings, 
seems to be influenced by both approaches.  
 Imagination represents a basic prerequisite of ‘putting ourselves in the 
other’s shoes’. Indeed, McEwan places a heavy weight on the word ‘imagination’ 
which he equates with (what he calls) empathy. In an unpublished talk given at 
the Wellcome Trust in 2008, McEwan offers a simplistic definition of empathy as 
‘[t]hat act of imagination, […] central to the novel, [which] is the commonplace of 
our everyday, […] the essence of human nature’ (‘Talk on Consciousness’, 2 
October 2008, HRC, Ian McEwan Archive, Box 28, Folder 4, p. 4). He then adds 
that when empathy is hindered, as in cases of neurological disease or brain 
damage, the ‘consequences are tragic’ (‘Talk on Consciousness’ 4). He 
corroborates this statement in a public lecture given in Cambridge in 2011:  
 
Unless we are hampered by Aspergers [sic] or other mental conditions, we 
carry through these readings [of other minds] with automatic ease – which 
is not to say we are always correct in our conclusions. Awareness of the 
mind of others may well be at the root of our moral codes; a failure in that 
awareness may even lie at the root of what we call evil. (‘Graham Storey 
Lecture’, 7 March 2011, HRC, Ian McEwan Archive, Box 28, Folder 1, p. 
18) 
 
This is not only a narrow but also an ethically problematic definition of 
mindreading. Do people, who fail mindreading tests due to a neurological 
condition, lack morality? And if they are unable to live by ‘moral codes’, which as 
McEwan suggests are founded on awareness of other minds, should they be 
considered ‘evil’ or even hazardous? Some of McEwan’s novels, such as 
Enduring Love (1997) and Saturday, seem to offer a partially affirmative answer. 
In both novels, the characters suffering from neurological diseases and 
psychiatric conditions – De Clérambault’s syndrome and Huntington’s disease – 
                                                        
that Smith’s model as well as liberal humanist theories of literature can be further illuminated by 
simulation and theory-theory (44).  
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are portrayed as dangerous individuals, who threaten the wellbeing of their 
fellow-citizens.  
McEwan’s definition of empathy as ‘an act of imagination’ is problematic 
for other reasons too. Imagination is usually considered a cognitive faculty: ‘the 
power or capacity to form internal images or ideas of objects and situations not 
actually present to the senses’.98 As the dictionary entry suggests, imagination is 
an abstract mental capacity that substitutes for bodily sense perceptions. Thus, 
paradoxically, putting oneself in the other’s shoes implies that empathy happens 
between two Cartesian minds; in other words, the shoes – and one might find an 
uncanny echo of Jacob’s Room here – remain empty of a tangible body. As such, 
considering imagination as the precondition of empathy implies the priority of a 
cognitive act, which triggers feelings and leads to adequate (pro-social) 
behaviour. Indeed, Suzanne Keen remarks how theories of empathy tend to 
unwittingly emphasise either the cognitive or emotional aspect of fellow feeling 
(27). Such interpretations do not only risk separating the realms of cognition and 
emotion, which as some neuroscientists have recently argued represents a 
flawed view, but they are also problematic in terms of respecting the other’s 
difference.99 Approaches such as simulation and theory-theory suggest that we 
no longer visualise the other’s inner experience as belonging to an entity separate 
from us but we attempt to take possession of his/her thoughts and feelings and 
fit them into our own pre-conceived mental paradigms. In other words, we are 
involved more in a process of (slightly coercive) identification than differentiation. 
Both simulation and theory-theory represent forms of incorporation, but they 
operate in opposite directions: in the former case we penetrate the other and put 
ourselves in his/her shoes, while the latter scenario implies that we take the 
other’s cognitive database and run it through our own mental computer. As Shaun 
Gallagher and Dan Zahavi suggest: ‘If I project the results of my own simulation 
on to the other, I understand only myself in that other situation, but I don’t 
necessarily understand the other’ (177). Consequently, both theories imply that 
                                                        
98 Online Oxford English Dictionary. www.oed.com. Accessed 10 December 2018. 
99 In Descartes’ Error Antonio Damasio argues that ‘feeling [is] an integral component of the 
machinery of reason’. Antonio Damasio. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human 
Brain. Picador, 1994, p. xii. Joseph LeDoux also suggests that the realms of emotion and 
cognition interact in complex ways, emotions often being able to squeeze out ‘nonemotional 
events’ (like thoughts) from out consciousness. Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain. Phoenix, 
1998, p. 19. 
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we cease to regard the other as other and in fact try to understand our own 
hypothetical behaviour in his/her situation.  
Advocates of theory-theory, such as Daniel C. Dennett – a cognitive 
scientist often cited by McEwan – claim that we are able to understand other 
humans because our mind is an optimally working computer, which:  
 
treat[s] the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; 
then [it] figure[s] out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place 
in the world and its purpose. Then [it] figure[s] out what desires it ought to 
have, on the same considerations, and finally [it] predict[s] that this rational 
agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. (The Intentional 
Stance 17) 
 
Dennett’s hypothesis-making computer model raises several unsettling 
questions. Are mental phenomena purely rational? What determines the beliefs 
and desires humans ‘ought to have’? Is human behaviour always driven by a 
well-defined ‘purpose’? Do ‘rational agents’ act only to ‘further [their] goals’? 
There is something worrying in this view of empathy, which transforms humans 
into machines running ‘multiple drafts’ and selecting the optimal version that 
better fits the universal template. In other words, human subjectivity becomes an 
abstraction, a pile of data processed by a computer (Consciousness Explained 
101–138). One of the main problems with this interpretation is that it unwittingly 
falls back on Cartesian dualism, a theory it sought to challenge in the first place. 
Describing the self as a computer program carries the danger of ignoring the 
importance of the body in the constitution of subjectivity, and by extension in the 
forging of empathy. As Evan Thompson argues, ‘[o]ne’s consciousness of oneself 
as a bodily subject presupposes a certain empathetic understanding of self and 
other’ (382–383). Put another way, the mind is not an isolated machine making 
predictions about other (independently existing) minds, but is born out of its 
(bodily) interaction with other entities. This is a lesson that Henry Perowne, the 
protagonist of Saturday, will learn (though never fully embrace) through his 
phenomenological interactions with his fellow beings, especially his children, 




‘[You] can only guess’: Saturday and the limitations of the medical gaze 
 
Saturday opens with the figure of Perowne standing at the bedroom window of 
his Fitzrovia house. Perowne, who describes himself as a ‘coarse, unredeemable 
materialist’ (134), watches, with the ‘remote possessiveness of a god’ (13) and 
the insensitivity of a ‘marble statue’ (5), two figures crossing the square:  
 
In the lifeless cold, they pass through the night, hot little biological engines 
with bipedal skills suited to any terrain, endowed with innumerable 
branching neural networks sunk deep in a knob of bone casing, buried 
fibres, warm filaments with their invisible glow of consciousness […]. (13)  
 
Henry’s biological ‘summary’ of the people in the street and his belief that the 
mind cannot be separated from the biological matter of the body, but ‘the mind is 
what the brain, mere matter, performs’, suggest an omniscient and authoritative 
perspective (67). This is further corroborated by his confidence in his own vision, 
which – ‘always good – seems to have sharpened’ (4). The reader’s first 
impression of Perowne is not necessarily a pleasant one: he seems an unlikable, 
narrow-minded and arrogant character. Thomas Jones goes as far as to call the 
protagonist of Saturday a monomaniac, ‘who can’t look at a fish without thinking 
about its nervous system’ (19). However, while at times augmenting Henry’s 
negative traits, the narrative simultaneously resists easy categorisations. The first 
pages of the novel already suggest the fallibility of clear sight and interrogate the 
presentation of the human body as mere solid matter. Henry is not like the 
insensitive statue of a distant god but a human being made of soft flesh, 
vulnerable to even such minor external factors as coldness. Henry’s fragility, at 
the same time, does not manifest only on a tactile (shivering) but also on a visual 
level. While at the beginning he has no doubts about the sharpness of his gaze, 
his omniscience turns out to be an illusion, scattered in the moment when he 
starts to speculate about the burning plane streaking across the sky. He 
fabricates various scenarios regarding the cause of the fire but in the end, all his 
hypotheses prove to be erroneous, as he later finds out from the twenty-four-hour 
news. The clarity and reliability of his perspective is questioned by the 
appearance of the plane, which, as Peter Boxall argues, ‘breaks the spell of 
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sharpened vision, leaving Perowne feeling disorientated and unsure what he is 
looking at’ (155). 
 Perowne might feel uncertain about the real nature of the scene he is 
looking at, but he does not seem to have many doubts about what constitutes the 
essence of human character. He firmly believes that the core of personality is 
determined by ‘which sperm finds which egg’ (25). When he visits his mother 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, he involuntarily starts to analyse the chemical 
processes in her brain (162), and he puts down his daughter Daisy’s sensitivity 
to her pregnancy (218). Yet the novel is far from endorsing Perowne’s god-like 
perspective. Instead, the omniscient and objective medical gaze and touch are 
continuously interrogated and replaced by, or at least complemented with a 
different mode of interpersonal communication, rooted in affective physical 
intimacy between vulnerable bodies. While Perowne tries to literally or 
metaphorically penetrate the skull of his mother, daughter, and Baxter in order to 
better understand them, he will have to realise that the brain, ‘the one kilogram 
or so of cells’ does not, after all, represent a straightforward window onto human 
subjectivity (254). Through his interaction with his family, Henry partially 
reappraises his former understanding of intimacy, and starts to doubt his 
omnipotent medical skills. 
 When Daisy arrives home after a six-month absence, Henry finds it difficult 
to conceal his turbulent emotions. While embracing her, he sees her as a little 
girl: he feels ‘the child’s body […] as he almost lifts her clear off the floor, the 
smoothness of muscle under the clothes, the springiness he can feel in her joints, 
the sexless kisses’ (182). At the same time, the father knows that the frail body 
he holds is not that of a child in need of protection, but his daughter has become 
‘an independent young woman’ whose ‘life is a mystery to him now’ (182–183). 
He starts to look for biological signs, such as the surface of her nails, which would 
provide clues about her hidden inner world. Despite his repeated efforts, Henry 
remains unsuccessful in finding out Daisy’s thoughts and feelings. His medical 
scrutiny proves to be equally useless as his attempts at verbal communication, 
which end in their quarrel about the Iraq war.  
Henry’s torments caused by his failure to find out his daughter’s state of 
mind culminate in the scene when Daisy suddenly starts to cry. He first registers 
Daisy’s sobs in his own body, which comes as a shock precisely because it does 
not give him enough time for medical assumption-making: ‘Only then is he aware, 
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from tremors in her form huddled up against his own and a flush of body warmth, 
that she’s crying. She pushes her face into his upper arm.’ (203–204) Daisy’s 
schooling ‘in the accurate description of feelings’ proves to be insufficient, and 
when linguistic possibilities wear out, intimacy is established through tactile 
corporeal gestures: the daughter’s tremors transform into ‘pins and needles 
moving along [the father’s] upper arm’ (204). This colloquial phrase, translated 
into medical language, means that Henry’s upper arm gets numbed as a result of 
external pressure. Interestingly though, the narrative, otherwise peppered with 
medical jargon, in this case reverts to everyday language. Similarly to the nursing 
etiquette in Atonement, which failed to provide advice on how to reach out 
sympathetically to a dying soldier, Perowne’s medical knowledge seems 
insufficient in offering consolation. The sensation Henry feels in his body cannot 
be simply explained in medical terms, and for the first time he himself does not 
try to find biological answers. His numbness is poised between tangible bodily 
matter and abstract emotion, the wish to gain an insight into the other’s mind and 
the poignant realisation of its impossibility: ‘You stare at a head, a lushness of 
hair, and can only guess’ (205). The novel thus turns the over-medicalised 
mentality and language against the protagonist, reinforcing the fallibility of his 
detached perspective and returning sympathy to its place of origin: the 
vulnerable, soft flesh, irreducible to bio-chemical formulae.   
Henry’s acknowledgement of the limitations of sight in providing accurate 
knowledge becomes evident as he contemplates his daughter’s half-concealed 
face: ‘He looks down at her fondly, at what little he can see of her face. Not even 
the first traces of ageing or experience around the corner of her visible eye, only 
clean taut skin, faintly purple, like the peripheries of a bruise.’ (204) From his 
vantage point, Henry can only glimpse a small portion of Daisy’s face, and while 
the purple shadows under her eyes fail to add anything to his understanding of 
the situation, they nevertheless create a moment of tenderness between father 
and daughter. At the same time, the purple lines are reminiscent of the bruise on 
Henry’s chest, the painful result of his earlier confrontation with Baxter. The 
bruise-motif, at once physical injury and metaphor, produces a tension between 
literal and figurative meaning, physical and psychological realm. Daisy’s skin is 
not violet due to an external blow, yet the simile anticipates her later physical 
exposure to Baxter’s violence. In turn, Henry’s chest is literally bruised but the 
narrative unsettles a simplistic reading of his injury and instead balances on the 
 188 
borderline between bodily and emotional dimensions. The double nature of the 
bruise becomes evident in an earlier scene, when after their futile row about the 
Iraq war, Henry ‘feels a tightness above his heart. Or is it the bruise on his 
sternum?’ (188). There is a significant linguistic play at stake here: the narrative 
mocks the sentimental connotations of the word ‘heart,’ as the primary locus of 
feelings (especially taken into account that these are the thoughts of a brain 
surgeon), but at the same time reinforces the non-rational aspect of emotions, by 
associating them with the heart rather than the brain. Perowne himself seems to 
become aware of this duality as he immediately corrects his first statement by 
looking for a biological explanation (‘[o]r is it the bruise on his sternum?’).  
 Henry’s thoughts, triggered by his failure to understand Daisy, remind the 
reader of Lily Briscoe’s musings in Woolf’s To the Lighthouse. In a crucial scene 
of the novel, Lily gets close to despair when she realises that her perceptions of 
Mrs Ramsay will always remain in a ‘half-way’ state to truth (TTL 57). As Lily sits 
on the floor, ‘with her arms round Mrs Ramsay’s knees, close as she could get’, 
literally pressing her body against the adored woman’s legs, she imagines  
 
how in the chambers of the mind and heart […] were stood, like the 
treasures in the tombs of kings, tablets bearing sacred inscriptions, which 
if one could spell them out would teach one everything, but they would 
never be offered openly, never made public. What art was there, known to 
love or cunning, by which one pressed through into those secret 
chambers? […] Could the body achieve it, or the mind, subtly mingling in 
the intricate passages of the brain? or the heart? […] for it was not 
knowledge but unity that she desired, not inscriptions on tablets, nothing 
that could be written in any language known to men, but intimacy itself, 
which is knowledge […]. (57) 
 
Lily is torn apart between heart and brain, unable to place intimacy within either. 
She tries to achieve ‘unity’ through tactile proximity but the harder she presses 
her hands to Mrs Ramsay’s knees, the more she realises the impossibility of her 
endeavour. The body turns out to be insufficient, but so is the mind, which Lily, 
at least in this passage, equates with the brain. The groping hands cannot reach 
the tablets and the mind fails to decipher the ‘sacred inscriptions’. Lily’s agony 
erupts in a painful mute cry: ‘Nothing happened. Nothing! Nothing! as she leant 
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her head against Mrs Ramsay’s knees’ (57). However, the scene does not end 
on a note of utter hopelessness: ‘And yet, she knew knowledge and wisdom were 
stored in Mrs Ramsay’s heart’ (57). Though the inscriptions remain illegible and 
rationally incomprehensible, the novel suggests that there are possibilities of 
forging affective ties. As discussed in my chapter on Woolf, Lily achieves the most 
complex knowledge of Mrs Ramsay in the last section of the novel, when, while 
completing her unfinished painting, she understands that a more gentle hold 
might bring the beloved person closer. When she ceases to tightly grip Mrs 
Ramsay’s body, Lily finally manages to read the enigmatic language on the 
tablets. To her great surprise, nevertheless, the secret does not reveal itself as a 
coherent narrative but rather as a purple shadow retaining Mrs Ramsay’s 
corporeal borders while simultaneously merging into the violet folds of the 
hyacinth/lily field.  
 Returning to Lily’s musing on the impenetrability of the heart’s and mind’s 
‘secret chambers’, it is important to look at characters’ body postures: Lily sits on 
the floor at Mrs Ramsay’s feet, embracing and pressing her head to the latter’s 
knees. As a consequence, Lily’s view of Mrs Ramsay is extremely restricted, and 
certainly, Lily’s vantage point does not allow her to see Mrs Ramsay’s face. In 
Saturday, the corporeal architecture differs slightly: Henry and Daisy are sitting 
next to each other, with Daisy’s freshly published poetry book open on Henry’s 
lap. As Daisy starts to cry, she buries her face in her father’s upper arm, which 
registers the rhythmic tremors of her body. These details might seem 
superfluous, but taken into account the novel’s constant preoccupation with how 
bodies connect to each other, spatial clues merit further scrutiny. The way Daisy 
pushes her head into Henry’s arm, restricts his visual field to a small portion of 
her face: the ‘faintly purple’ skin under one of her eyes. This dim violet shadow 
comes to represent a stronger bond than any language, scientific or otherwise, 
could possibly create, causing Henry’s bruise to literally throb. Clear sight 
remains unachievable for both Lily Briscoe and Henry, yet this does not act as an 
impediment in the forging of emotional ties. Indeed, Woolf’s painter and 
McEwan’s doctor arrive at a similar conclusion: an abstract violet shape might, in 
some cases, prove to be a more solid emotional connector than – to remain 
faithful to Lily’s and Henry’s archeological metaphor – (brain) digging.100   
                                                        
100 While walking towards the hospital to operate on Baxter, Perowne recalls a neurosurgery 
symposium he attended in Rome, where, the delegates were offered a private tour in the Domus 
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The inseparable nature of the physical-biological and emotional 
vulnerability of the body acquires further significance in another scene of the 
novel, when Henry attends his son Theo’s private concert, dedicated specifically 
to his father. As Henry enters the dark hall, his eyes can only discern some vague 
outlines moving on the stage, and the light projecting ‘an elongated purple disc 
across the floor’, complemented by ‘an orange exit sign’ (169). He literally gropes 
his way across the hall when the first sounds of Theo’s guitar break the silence. 
The father suddenly realises that his son and his musician friends have been 
aware of his presence long before he could identify their vague silhouettes on the 
stage.  
The narrative describes Perowne’s vision as distorted and partial. Similarly 
to his interaction with Daisy, when he feels a pain in his chest, Theo’s music 
intensifies his physical ache, as ‘the bassline thump[s] into his sternum and [he] 
puts his hand to the sore spot’ (170). Medical language filters in the thoughts of 
Perowne, who uses the biological expression ‘sternum’ to pin down the exact 
locus of his pain. At the same time, while he tries to restrict his sensations within 
a well-defined anatomical frame, the narrative simultaneously deconstructs 
material borders, as, for a brief moment, Henry breaks free of his self-imposed 
biological ties: ‘Something is swelling, or lightening in him as Theo’s notes rise, 
and on the second turnaround lift into a higher register and begin to soar’ (170). 
The music softens rigid corporeal borders, allowing the body to acquire different 
shapes. Henry feels ‘touched’, and as in many previous examples, the border 
between emotional and bodily realms becomes blurred (170). As Boxall puts it, 
Theo’s music provides Henry the possibility to step out of the constraints of his 
pragmatic ‘bound’ being, and experience a complex sense of freedom, ‘when 
boundaries between himself and others, between himself and his son, himself 
and his mother, fade away, freeing him from his own mind, his own brain’ (160). 
As such, Perowne is far from being an insensitive ‘marble statue’, as he refers to 
himself in the opening scene of the novel; rather he is malleable flesh, equally 
shaped by art and human beings. 
                                                        
Aurea. The mayor of Rome – to please his guests – compared the underground palace to a skull 
of brick that hides ‘the mind of ancient Rome’ (243). Thinking back to the mayor’s remark, Henry 
questions whether penetrating the skull reveals the mind, and not simply the brain. According to 
Laura Salisbury, McEwan’s use of archeological metaphors can be read as an allusion to Freud’s 
definition of the mind as consisting of different layers that resemble topographical strata. As such, 
McEwan’s reference to the Domus Aurea might suggest that ‘getting into the mind […] requires a 
different, perhaps a more linguistic kind of digging than a craniotomy can offer’ (‘Translating 
Neuroscience’ 94).  
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 Indeed, the boundaries between biological matter and abstract emotion 
are not fixed but retain a malleable nature, allowing for the opening of what 
Salisbury calls those ‘in-between spaces and times’ where brain matter becomes 
meaningful as long as it functions inside a phenomenal body capable of reaching 
out to the world: ‘Despite the thread of biological reductionism […] through its 
phenomenological attention to mind’s complexity and drift, Saturday remains 
interested in a self that transcends the neurological by showing how brains, as 
they emerge into subjective selves, are enmeshed in history, in society, in culture’ 
(‘Translating Neuroscience’ 104). Reading McEwan’s fiction in parallel with a 
modernist understanding of fellow feeling shows how attachments are forged 
between body-subjects that exist and interact in a specific historical, social and 
cultural moment, often burdened with vulnerability, loss, and a deep sense of 
despair caused by our inability to see what lies behind a ‘lushness of hair’. As 
Atonement and Saturday suggest, feeling for the other – a human being or literary 
tradition – is never devoid of complications, unanswered questions and at times 
even hostility (as McEwan’s anti-modernist claims show), but this is a journey one 
must be willing to take in order to become part of a fragmented and blurred, yet 




















A ‘[lack] of conclusion’: sympathetic criticism? 
 
 
Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct, she thought, walking 
on. If you put her in a room with some one, up went her back like a cat’s; 
or she purred. […] [O]n the ebb and flow of things, here, there, she 
survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part of people she 
had never met; being laid out like a mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, 
herself. (Woolf, Mrs Dalloway 9–10) 
 
During her walk in London, Clarissa Dalloway contemplates the nature of 
knowing other people. She believes in the existence of a bodily-instinctual form 
of sympathy, which allows for the creation of interpersonal bonds that transcend 
the limits of cognitive knowledge. At the same time, feeling for others is not an 
automatic reflex triggered by an impulse, but an ‘almost’ instinctual corporeal 
response to the world, in which the perceiver is already rooted. Woolf suggests 
that one needs to possess a kind of cat-knowledge, a sixth sense, consisting of 
and simultaneously going beyond the mere sum of the other five senses. This 
type of sympathy does not lead to clear understanding; on the contrary, it thickens 
the ‘mist’ between people. The spreading mistiness, does not impede 
interpersonal proximity but rather facilitates it by enveloping Clarissa, Peter and 
the ‘people she had never met’ in a semi-luminous halo.  
 I started this thesis with another quotation by Woolf, in which Rhoda, 
similarly to Clarissa, muses on the importance of vagueness in sympathetic 
encounters. Rhoda contemplates how ‘this mystery’ that surrounds people 
creates the possibility of fellow feeling by transforming not only the object of 
sympathy but also the sympathiser herself into semi-transparent and softly 
yielding flesh. Indeed, as this study argued, haziness and mystery are essential 
qualities of intimacy. The works of Lawrence, Woolf, Bowen, and McEwan show 
that feeling for and with others is not always coterminous with acquiring complete, 
rational knowledge about their minds. On the contrary, giving space to gaps, 
ambiguities and vagaries can at times allow for a more complex understanding 
of our fellow beings. 
 As discussed in Chapter One, D. H. Lawrence was deeply sceptical of, at 
times even hostile to rationality and unambiguous knowledge. In his novels 
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written during the First World War, and his later essays and studies he advocated 
a form of intimacy rooted in what he called ‘blood-consciousness’, the sensuous 
and sensual nature of the body. Lawrence viewed cognition and sight (the latter 
being linked to rationality and mechanical existence) as forces corrupting the 
feeling body that represents the basis of humans’ interaction with the world. He 
celebrated the primordial darkness associated with certain ancient civilisations, 
such as the Etruscans and Egyptians, as the most authentic way of relating to 
others, in contrast with the illuminated and ocularcentric style of the Greeks and 
Romans. However, while Lawrence accused the Greeks and Romans of 
committing violence by elevating (clear) sight above other sense perceptions, his 
own works are also imbued with traces of aggression, not only on a thematic but 
also on a formal level, evident in his biased and fragmentary presentation of 
Cézanne’s and the Etruscan cave painters’ artistic merits.  
 As I argued in Chapter Two, Woolf shared Lawrence’s distrust of clear 
vision but at the same time she complicated his ideas, especially his lionisation 
of primordial darkness and his rejection of shadows as mere mental abstractions. 
In her fiction and essays written in the 1920s Woolf suggested that sympathy is 
based on the interaction of semi-transparent and firmly soft bodies that yield to 
each other without losing their individual boundaries. Woolf imbued shadows (as 
seen in To the Lighthouse) with a sense of sensuousness and lyricism, conferring 
them at once a physical-embodied presence and an abstract fluidity. By reading 
Woolf’s works in parallel with different art forms, from ancient Greek statuary to 
Victorian photography and Post-Impressionist aesthetics, I suggested that 
intimacy is rooted in a form of hazy vision and gentle touch which do not aim at 
possessing the object of perception but rather approach the other with gentleness 
and curiosity, leaving space for hollows and uncertainties.    
 As proposed in Chapter Three, Elizabeth Bowen was preoccupied with 
similar ideas as Woolf. Bowen’s fiction written in the interwar period, such as To 
the North and The House in Paris, shows her interest in a kind of sympathy rooted 
in haziness. In The House in Paris she rejected modes of characterisation based 
on hyper-visibility, which she associated with violence and desire for 
subordination. She preferred half-visibility as the zone of sympathetic encounters, 
not only between characters themselves but also between the author and her 
fictional creatures. As Bowen suggested in her essays, a writer does not create 
her characters ‘in the limited brainbound sense’ of the word but she rather 
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‘observ[es] [them] fleetingly out of the corner of an eye’. Nevertheless, in her 
wartime fiction Bowen seemed to distance herself from Woolf. In The Heat of the 
Day Bowen became suspicious of vagueness that is associated with treachery 
and the questioning of trust, leading ultimately to the dissolution of interpersonal 
ties.  
 Chapter Four was mainly interested in the legacies of modernist sympathy 
in the contemporary novel, with special focus on Ian McEwan’s novels: 
Atonement, and to a lesser extent Saturday. This chapter proposed that 
McEwan’s engagement with modernist legacies is at times problematic, or at 
least not devoid of contradictions. Nevertheless, despite his slightly derogatory 
journalistic assertions about high modernism, McEwan’s novels establish a 
sympathetic relationship with modernism, especially Woolf’s works. As such, 
Woolf’s To the Lighthouse can be read, following Harold Bloom’s terminology, as 
a tessera sympathetically embedded in but not indistinguishably melted into the 
texture of Atonement. Similarly to the broken and mended Meissen vase, the 
signs of rupture with the past remain faintly visible in the matter of the 
contemporary novel. By questioning the omniscient objective gaze and often 
preferring half-visibility to unambiguous clarity, Saturday also shares some of my 
modernist authors’ views on fellow feeling, which becomes evident in the 
portrayal of interpersonal relationships in the novel.  
 Read through the lens of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, the works 
examined in this thesis show that intimacy occurs between feeling, vulnerable, 
and importantly, imperfect bodies that are unable to gain a clear view of other 
bodies and minds. Yet rational understanding might not represent the only way 
of getting to know people. As Woolf suggests, there might be other routes to 
fellow feeling. Indeed, Woolf showed a keen interest in the existence of ‘some 
secret sense’ across her career. Near the end of To the Lighthouse Lily Briscoe 
muses on the (im)possibility of getting complete access to Mrs Ramsay’s mind: 
 
One wanted fifty pairs of eyes to see with, she reflected. Fifty pairs of eyes 
were not enough to get round that one woman with, she thought. Among 
them, must be one that was stone blind to her beauty. One wanted most 
some secret sense, fine as air, with which to steal through keyholes and 
surround her where she sat knitting, talking […]; which took to itself and 
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treasured up like the air which held the smoke of the steamer, her 
thoughts, her imaginations, her desires. (214) 
 
Even ‘fifty pairs of eyes’ turn out to be insufficient to ‘get round’ Mrs Ramsay. 
Clear sight, which tries to fix and cognitively possess its object, is unable to 
provide an adequate base for fellow feeling. Instead, what one needs, is a kind 
of delicate sense, ‘fine as air’, which gently surrounds the other’s ‘treasured up’ 
thoughts and feelings. This ‘secret sense’, Woolf suggests, allows for the 
unfurling of a form of intimacy grounded in the sensuous and sensual interaction 
of bodies, or as she puts it in ‘How Should One Read a Book’ (1925): ‘an 
understanding with the senses, not with the intellect, in a state of intoxication’ 
(Essays 4: 396). In this essay, as the title indicates, Woolf reflects on the ways in 
which one can become a sympathetic reader and critic. Though she does not 
deny the importance of criticising, she believes that these intellectual skills should 
be activated only after a first, sensuous-affective reading has taken place. What 
is more, for Woolf, the line between reading and writing becomes thin: ‘To read a 
book well, one should read it as if one were writing it. Begin not by sitting on the 
bench among the judges but by standing in the dock with the criminal. Be his 
fellow worker, become his accomplice’ (390). Woolf does not propose that 
readers should suspend their ‘judging’ attitude but she advocates an alternative 
kind of criticism, characterised by proximity rather than ironical distance, and 
careful attention rather than quarrelling spirit or a desire to dismantle a literary 
work by merely exposing its hidden meanings.  
 Woolf’s call for sympathetic reading has been recently embraced by many 
literary critics. In The Limits of Critique (2015), Rita Felski proposes a reading 
method that differs from critique, or at least a version of it, defined as ‘includ[ing] 
[…] a spirit of sceptical questioning or outright condemnation, […] the claim to be 
engaged in some kind of radical intellectual and/or political work, and the 
assumption that whatever is not critical must therefore be uncritical’ (2, emphasis 
in original). In her earlier study, Uses of Literature (2008), Felski sets out to offer 
a ‘neo-phenomenological’ reading of literature, which ‘blends phenomenological 
and historical perspectives’ (18). As Felski acknowledges, her terminology has 
been influenced by Steven Connor’s concept of ‘cultural phenomenology’. 
Connor offers the following definition of ‘cultural phenomenology’:  
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Cultural phenomenology would aim to enlarge, diversify and particularise 
the study of culture. Instead of readings of abstract structures, functions 
and dynamics, it would be interested in substances, habits, organs, rituals, 
obsessions, pathologies, processes and patterns of feelings. Such 
interests would be at once philosophical and poetic, explanatory and 
exploratory, analytic and evocative. Above all, whatever interpreting and 
explication cultural phenomenology managed to pull off would be achieved 
by the manner in which it got amid a given subject or problem, not by 
degree to which it got on top of it. (18) 
 
Felski and Connor suggest that a phenomenological reading of literature can lead 
to a different form of literary criticism, interested in the wide-ranging processes of 
embodied experience: substances, habits, rituals, and importantly ‘patterns of 
feelings’, without ignoring the historical context in which literary works are 
inherently embedded. A phenomenological framework allows for a sympathetic 
perspective the aim of which is not to possess or ‘g[e]t on top of’ the object of 
investigation from a detached viewpoint but to explore it from bodily proximity, 
‘amid a given subject or problem’. In other words, phenomenological literary 
criticism does not set out to unmask or demystify literary works. The role of the 
critic, as Woolf suggests, is not to condemn the text, by revealing its suspicious 
intentions, but rather to ‘stand’ with it ‘in the dock’. If we learn to become the 
writer’s ‘fellow worker’ rather than judge, we might gain a new intimate experience 
of reading. As Derek Attridge argues in his analysis of Samuel Beckett’s The 
Unnamable (1953), this kind of reading is grounded in ‘the reader’s painful, 
pleasurable experience’ rather than in purely ‘mental exercise’ (21).  
 Emotional proximity therefore is a necessary precondition of 
phenomenological literary criticism. As critics, we do not only trace logical links 
and lacunae in texts but we also explore ‘patterns of feelings’, in which we are 
inextricably caught up. Perhaps if we were able to establish a more bodily 
relationship with the objects of our critical work, we would be in a better position 
to address what Sophie Ratcliffe calls ‘the trouble with feeling now’, which she 
identifies in our lack of bodily-affective contact with art objects. Ratcliffe argues 
that a historical methodology might not always be enough for our understanding 
of art. Though she does deny the importance of historicism, and indeed uses it 
extensively in her article, Ratcliffe offers an alternative way of attending to art 
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works (in this case a Victorian statue and its poetic representation): a method 
based on a sensuous encounter with art, taking place in the present moment of 
feeling rather than a distant historical past (‘The Trouble with Feeling Now’ 24). 
What unites Felski’s, Connor’s, Ratcliffe’s, and Woolf’s argument is their 
emphasis on emotional bodily proximity imbued with historical perspective. The 
combination of these methodologies results in a phenomenological investigation 
that grounds reading in intimate closeness rather than ironic distance, softness 
rather than hardness, and haziness rather than all-illuminating clarity.  
 As suggested in my close reading of Woolf’s ‘Street Haunting’ in the 
introduction, the texts examined in this thesis are imbued with a perhaps-quality, 
a sense of vagueness that lies at the heart of sympathetic feeling and reading in 
modernism, and to an extent in contemporary fiction. In The World of Perception 
Merleau-Ponty characterises ‘modern thought’ as ‘unfinished and ambiguous’ 
(106). According to the philosopher, modern artists ‘seek to add to the enigmas 
which already surround them’ rather than wanting to decode the secrets (107). 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates his argument through the example of Proust’s In Search 
of Lost Time (1908), in which, as the phenomenologist proposes, the reader can 
never be sure whether the narrator ‘really loves Albertine’ (107). Proust’s 
ambiguous way of presenting love suggests, for Merleau-Ponty, that ‘the modern 
heart is intermittent and does not even succeed in knowing itself’ (108). The 
modern work of art, as well as the world in which the former is embedded, are 
‘unfinished’ and ‘[lack] a conclusion’ (108). Consequently, ‘human existence can 
never abstract from itself in order to gain access to the naked truth’ (108). Well 
before the publication of Merleau-Ponty’s work, Woolf had already drawn 
attention to humans’ inability to possess ‘the naked truth’: when coming to terms 
with the futility of her attempt to get full access to Mrs Ramsay’s mind, Lily 
contemplates how ‘one’s perceptions’ are destined to remain ‘half-way to truth’ 
(TTL 57). But as Merleau-Ponty and the authors at the centre of this thesis 
suggest, this half-truth, the mist ‘laid out’ between people, and the inability of 
reaching unambiguous clarity represent the essential ingredients of sympathetic 
coexistence. By accepting our limitations in knowing others, human beings and 
works of art, we might become more open-minded and caring sympathisers, and 
perhaps literary critics. But in order for this to happen, we have to return to the 
feeling and vulnerable body, at once delicately intertwined in and ruthlessly 
exposed to the forces of a world beyond our control. 
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 What we need is, to borrow Woolf’s words, is a kind of cat-understanding, 
a sensuous-sensual approach to the object of perception. This form of knowledge 
will never lead to unambiguous rational comprehension but might allow for the 
unfurling of bodily intimacy. As Woolf puts it in Jacob’s Room: ‘It is no use trying 
to sum people up. One must follow hints, not exactly what is said, nor yet entirely 
what is done. […] Kind old ladies assure us that cats are often the best judges of 
character. A cat will always go to a good man, […] but Mrs Whitehorn, Jacob’s 
landlady, loathed cats.’ (135) Woolf intimates the impossibility of pinning down 
Jacob’s character, of telling whether he is a ‘good man’. Yet even in the absence 
of a cat (Mrs Whitehorn ‘loathed cats’), the reader is left to ‘follow hints,’ those 
subtle bodily gestures which, suspended between speech and action, make 
possible the forging of sympathetic ties. Instead of a concluding statement, the 
phenomenological intertwining of Lawrence’s, Woolf’s, Bowen’s and McEwan’s 
works suggest how a hazier ‘manner of our seeing’ can facilitate an ‘other means 
of communication’ that creates a ‘widening circle’ of sympathy, impossible to seal 
off definitively. After all, as long as the world lacks a conclusion, the most one 
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